

MODERN TURKEY

MODERN TURKEY

By
JOHN PARKER, M.P.
AND
CHARLES SMITH

LONDON
GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS, LTD.
BROADWAY HOUSE : 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.

First published 1940

PREFACE

WE hope that this book will contribute to the greater understanding of Turkey and its problems by the English-speaking public.

It is based on a study of all the available material and on first-hand impressions gained on an extensive tour of Turkey immediately before the outbreak of the present European War. Every effort has been made to bring the information up to date.

Our thanks are due to the many Turks both in official and unofficial positions who so patiently answered our innumerable questions. We much appreciated their frankness and objectivity. In particular we express our gratitude to the members of the staffs of the various Ministries and to certain members of the Assembly, to the Director General of the Press Department of the Ministry of the Interior and his colleagues, especially Burhan Belge and Hikmet Emil, to Nusret Koymen, Satvet L. Tozan and Ekrem Auni, to the municipalities of Istanbul, Adana, Kayseri and Konya, to many managers and staffs of factories and to officials of the People's Party and of the People's Houses.

Finally the authors would like to express their regret that mobilisation on the outbreak of war made it impossible for Christopher Mayhew, their travelling companion, to participate in the writing of the book.

JOHN PARKER
CHARLES SMITH

June 1, 1940.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	v
NOTE—EXCHANGE RATE OF TURKISH POUND	x
CHAP. I ANATOLIAN LAND AND PEOPLE	1
II THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE	17
III KEMAL ATATURK	38
IV THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE	58
<div style="padding-left: 40px;">The President of the Republic—The National Assembly— The Structure and Functions of Local Government—The Republican People's Party and its Place in the Govern- ment—The Judicial System and the Liberty of the Indi- vidual—How Democratic is Turkey?</div>	
V AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PROBLEMS	79
<div style="padding-left: 40px;">The Use and Ownership of Land—The Central Plateau —The Forest Region—The Cilician Plain—The Coastal Fringe—The Eastern Districts—The Future of Turkish Agriculture.</div>	
VI INDUSTRIAL GROWTH	100
<div style="padding-left: 40px;">Early Industrial Development under the Republic—The Industrial Five Year Plan—The Development of Mineral Resources—Transport—The Four Year Industrial Plan— The Banking System—The Organisation of State Indus- try—Public Finances—The Extent of State Socialism— Working-Class Conditions.</div>	
VII FOREIGN TRADE AND LOANS	135
<div style="padding-left: 40px;">The Lausanne Settlement and After—Industrialisation and Foreign Assistance—Effects of the War.</div>	
VIII RELIGIOUS AND LEGAL CHANGE ; WOMEN WIN THEIR FREEDOM	148
<div style="padding-left: 40px;">Disestablishment of Islam—Legal Revolution—Emancipa- tion of Women.</div>	
IX EDUCATION AND THE ARTS ; THE HEALTH SERVICES	159
<div style="padding-left: 40px;">The Educational Ladder—The People's Houses—Develop- ment of the Arts—Health Services.</div>	

CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
X	FOREIGN POLICY	180
	The Proposed Partition of Turkey—The Bases of Turkish Policy—Relations with the Soviet Union—Early Relations with Eastern Neighbours—Relations with the Balkan States—From the Autumn of 1934 to the Spring of 1939—Anglo-French Guarantees and the European War.	
XI	MILITARY POWER AND STRATEGIC POSITION	205
	The Conscript Army and its Officers—The Navy and Air Force—Materials of War—Turkey's Strategic Position—The Anglo-French Need of Turkey.	
XII	CONCLUSIONS	221
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	233
	APPENDIX : PROGRAMME OF THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY	235
	PART I—Principles.	
	„ II—The Essential Characteristics of the Republican People's Party.	
	„ III—Economy.	
	„ IV—Finance.	
	„ V—National Education and Instruction.	
	„ VI—Social Life and Public Health.	
	„ VII—Interior, Judicial, and Foreign Policy, Public Servants, People Engaged in Free Professions.	
	„ VIII—Defence of the Fatherland.	
	INDEX	253

LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

	FACING PAGE
1. TURKEY—PHYSICAL MAP	<i>page</i> xi
2. THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST NEAR ANTALYA	4
3. THE EASTERN HIGHLANDS	5
4. THE BLUE MOSQUE, ISTANBUL	52
5. KEMAL ATATÜRK—DEMONSTRATING THE NEW ALPHABET IN PUBLIC	53
6. PRESIDENT ISMET INÖNÜ—ADDRESSING PEOPLE'S PARTY CONFERENCE—NOTE PARTY SYMBOL (THE SIX ARROWS ON RED CLOTH)	70
7. FORESTS IN THE TAURUS	71
8. AN IMMIGRANT'S FARM ON THE CENTRAL PLATEAU	84
9. COTTON-PICKING IN CILICIA	85
10. TURKEY—INDUSTRIAL AND RAILWAY MAP	<i>page</i> 107
11. THE LARGEST COTTON MILL IN THE NEAR EAST—KAYSERİ	110
12. WORKERS' HOUSES AT KAYSERİ :	
(1) BACHELORS' QUARTERS	
(2) MARRIED QUARTERS	111
13. THROUGH THE TAURUS—SECTION OF BERLIN-BAGDAD RAILWAY BUILT PARTLY BY BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR	118
14. A TRADITIONAL INDUSTRY—POTTERY MADE AT KÜTAHYA	119
15. CLASSROOM AT SCHOOL OF COMMERCE, ANKARA—NOTE DIFFERENT PHYSICAL TYPES AMONG PUPILS	162
16. A MODERN GOVERNMENT BUILDING, ANKARA—SCHOOL OF CIVIL AVIATION	163
17. ANKARA—ATATÜRK BOULEVARD—NOTE CONTRAST BETWEEN OLD TOWN ON HILL AND MODERN GOVERNMENT OFFICES	206
18. A MECHANISED ARMY	207

NOTE

EXCHANGE RATE OF TURKISH POUND

The present official rate of exchange of the Turkish pound (one Turkish pound = one hundred piastres or kurus) is 5·23 to the £ sterling. For some months before the outbreak of war it stood at 5·93. It had gradually risen to this point from a rate of about 10 to the £ sterling in the years 1929-31.

June 1, 1940

MODERN TURKEY

The country has always been to the Western mind one of strange contrasts. A mighty empire, ruled by an ineffectual dynasty ; the unreal splendour of mosques and minarets, in a land of disease and unspeakable squalor : all the ardour of Islam coupled with the barbarity of Oriental custom—these are the impressions on which the European's conception of Turkey was based. The brooding horror of Racine's "Bajazet", Kinglake's good-humoured disdain, perhaps too the fantastic extravagance of G. K. Chesterton's "Lepanto", helped to form these impressions ; for the present generation even, an atmosphere of effete luxury still clings to the word "Turkish", and the opprobrium associated with the epithet "Turk" has not yet altogether disappeared.

Because these impressions have outlived the fact, Turkey is still a land of contradiction. The traveller will look in vain for the traditional fez. In the palace of the Sultan, he will be a sightseer inspecting the relics of a fallen empire, and when he emerges he will be confronted by modern buildings that might belong to Hamburg or Lille. He will still meet survivals of the earlier tradition, perhaps in the dirty alleys of Istanbul, or in the lost villages of the Taurus : but he will see them as anachronisms, hemmed in by the powerful growth of a new Turkey.

It was not until 1923 that the Turkish people became master in its own house. The predecessor of the Turkish Republic was the Ottoman Empire, the cosmopolitan state which for many centuries covered the greater part of South-Eastern Europe, Western Asia, and North Africa. During the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, from 1520 to 1566, the power of the Ottoman Empire was at its zenith, and it extended from the gates of Vienna to the Red Sea, and from the Atlas Mountains to the Crimea and the Caucasus.

ANATOLIAN LAND AND PEOPLE

Its decline, however, was rapid, though its final collapse was long delayed by the rivalries of would-be inheritors competing with each other for concessions which would give them control of its resources. Until 1878 its territory still included the greater part of the Balkans and stretched as far east as the south-western coast of the Persian Gulf; but it was not until the long wars of 1911-23 that the Ottoman Empire was finally overthrown and the Turkish Republic created.

THE LAYOUT OF THE COUNTRY

The greater part of modern Turkey consists of the peninsula of Asia Minor, frequently known as Anatolia (Anadolu), and the mountainous districts of Armenia in the east. It also includes the eastern part of Thrace, which belongs to the European continent. Although small in size, this piece of territory has a large part of the country's population and includes the former capital of Constantinople (Istanbul). The total area of the Turkish Republic since the acquisition of the Hatay in July 1939 is about 296,356 square miles; it is thus larger than Greater Germany as it was in the summer of 1939, and it is over three times as large as Great Britain. The Turkish "homeland" is bordered by Greece and Bulgaria in Europe and by Syria, Iraq, Iran and the U.S.S.R. in Asia. Its sea coasts are as much as a third longer than its land frontiers.

There are few countries in the world that have a greater variety of soils and climates. The interior of Asia Minor is ringed round by mountains which cut off much of the possible rainfall. This produces a territory which is very like the Central Asiatic steppes, and which in the centre, near the salt lake of Touz Gol, is almost complete desert. In summer this central plateau is dry and burnt up and in

MODERN TURKEY

winter snow-covered and windswept. It produces a hardy and partially nomadic population. This area is excellent for cereal growing and gives a distinctive character to the wool of the Angora sheep and goats.

The mountains surrounding this plateau are largely clothed with forests which have been recklessly destroyed in recent centuries but still cover a great area. The north coast of Turkey has a heavy rainfall and is similar in vegetation to most of Central Europe : the Ægean coast has a climate that is generally "Mediterranean" in character. Both the north and west coasts produce the fruits, nuts and tobacco for which Turkey is famous. To the south, on the narrow strip between the Taurus and the sea, the climate and products are sub-tropical. In the east the Armenian highlands have long cold winters and late summers. These areas form magnificent grazing grounds which slope down through foothills to the Syrian and Mesopotamian plains. The rough, mountainous character of a large part of the country has produced unnavigable rivers which are wild in winter and sluggish in summer. Many fail to reach the sea and flow into the landlocked basins of the central steppe round Konya and of Lake Van in the east.

ITS INHABITANTS

Turkey is a very thinly peopled country ; at the last census (1935) its population totalled 16·2 millions, an increase of 18·4 per cent on that of the previous census (1927). This was due in part to the fact that many persons escaped the earlier census in the remoter districts. The present birth-rate (23 per 1,000) is one of the highest in the world. The acquisition of the Hatay with a population of about 220,000 and the continuing natural increase and immigration should have made the population in 1940

THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST





THE EASTERN HIGHLANDS

ANATOLIAN LAND AND PEOPLE

about 18.5 millions. Despite this rapid growth the density of its population is only 54 per square mile compared with 468 in Great Britain. The greater part of the inhabitants are settled on the north coast and on the borders of the *Ægean* and Sea of Marmora. This paucity of population is due in part to the wildness and mountainous character of the country. There are, however, many fertile areas which were thickly populated in classical and Byzantine times, but thanks to the depredations of malaria and other diseases and to the drain of man-power which took place in the latter days of the Ottoman Empire the present population is often sparse. For throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Anatolian peasantry were continually called on to provide the necessary military force to maintain Ottoman supremacy over rebellious non-Turkish peoples. This drain was finally ended by the long wars of 1911-23 which destroyed the Ottoman Empire.

Under a quarter of the country's population is urban in character. The rest is rural, living in villages or isolated hamlets. There are seven towns with more than 50,000 inhabitants. Of these the largest is the old capital Istanbul (Constantinople) which has 740,000 inhabitants. The next largest are Izmir (Smyrna) (170,000), Ankara (Angora), the new capital (122,000), and Adana (76,000). Greater Istanbul claimed to have about 1,125,000 at the outbreak of the Great War. It declined, however, by about a third, partly owing to the removal of many Greeks, Armenians, etc., and partly as result of the transfer of the capital to Ankara. The new capital, Ankara, has grown very rapidly in recent years. It is intended to be an administrative town rather than a commercial and industrial centre. Izmir has been rebuilt since the fires which wiped out its

MODERN TURKEY

Greek quarters at the end of the War of Independence. Like other provincial towns it is acquiring a new cleanliness and dignity.

A cursory glance at the population of modern Turkey is sufficient to reveal its mixed origins. The mass of the population is definitely white in colour. In many ways it resembles in appearance the other peoples living in the countries bordering the north side of the Mediterranean. The ground stock of the Anatolian population, however, is the type which is commonly called "Hittite" or "Armenoid", with broad heads and large and frequently hooked noses. This type has been modified by later invasions, but it is still widespread, particularly in parts of Cappadocia and Armenia. The hair of Anatolians is usually dark, but blue eyes are very common and fair hair is frequent in some districts, particularly among the Circassians and the villagers of the central plateau. Mustapha Kemal himself had fair hair and blue eyes. Mongol features are often seen, particularly in the eastern parts of the country. In Cilicia and the south-east generally, Arabic features are borne by many besides those speaking Arabic. A sprinkling of negroes, descendants of former slaves, exists in Istanbul and most of the towns, where they often act as waiters. Despite some inter-marriage this small negro minority has maintained a separate existence.

THEIR ORIGIN

As a country situated at the gateway of Europe and Western Asia, Anatolia has naturally come under the rule of most of the great empires covering that part of the world ; it has thus been a meeting-place of populations which have mixed one with another. The modern pride in race has

affected the Turks in the re-writing of their history since the advent of the Republic. It is still widely claimed that the great mass of the population of modern Turkey is Turanian in origin and came from the original Turkish homeland between the Urals and Altai. The archaeological discoveries of the present century are used as a basis on which to build this theory. Some Turkish historians, however, admit that many of the early invaders of Anatolia spoke Indo-European languages, but seek to get over this racial difficulty by asserting that the Indo-Europeans came originally from the same branch of the human race as the Turanian peoples.

Great as have been the historical discoveries in recent years about the past history of Asia Minor, there still remain an enormous number of gaps which require filling before any certainty can be claimed as to the origin of the modern Turks. From a study of archaeological remains and burial-places it can be said that the population of Anatolia has changed very little in physical types in the last 4,000 years. It would appear from the little that is known of many of the earliest languages spoken in historical times in this area that they were Asianic in character, of the same type as Georgian, Lazi, Chechen and others still surviving in the Caucasus. Wherever the earliest known inhabitants came from and whatever kind of languages they possessed, they were early influenced however by conquerors known to have come from outside.

The most important of these invaders undoubtedly arrived from the steppes of the Eurasian plain round both sides of the Black and Caspian seas. Some of the early invaders of the Near East may have had Turkish languages. So far modern research has not found any Turkish-speaking peoples at an early date in Anatolia, save

perhaps the Gutu¹ who were conquered and absorbed by the Kurds. The latter, like a large number of these early invaders from the north, were undoubtedly Indo-European in language. This was also the case with the dominant people which unified the Hittites and created a long-established empire in Central Asia Minor and Northern Syria. An earlier Armenia was likewise conquered and assimilated by Indo-European conquerors who gave it their language. When the Hittite empire fell hordes of other Indo-European peoples, such as Phrygians, Bithynians and others, crossed the Bosphorus and settled much of western and central Asia Minor. Much later still the Celtic Gauls conquered and settled the province of Galatia round Ankara. In the meantime the Greeks, also Indo-European in language but mixed in origin, had settled the coastlands. Under the Macedonian, Roman and Byzantine empires they gradually hellenised all Anatolian peoples save the Armenians, Lazes and Kurds of the eastern frontier districts. In addition to these "Nordic" Indo-European strains, there has also been strong Semitic influence. At a very early date Assyrians played a big part in the commercial life of the country; Arab influence has been extensive, especially in the south-eastern part of the country, since the early Middle Ages.

The Turkish conquest, which has given the country its name and language, must have been carried out by a considerable migration of Turkish-speaking peoples. Modern Turkish historians claim that civilisation first started amongst the closely related peoples living between the Urals and Altai. Then when desiccation set in there these peoples were forced out in search of new homes. It is undoubtedly true that many of the great world conquerors, from Attila to Tamerlane, were of Turkish or Tartar origin. The

¹ Their language may also have been Asianic.

invasions of these peoples carried them not only as far as Western Europe but down into India. Many of these invasions, however, have left few traces as the survivors of the hordes were absorbed by the people they conquered, as happened in Bulgaria. Even where their languages survived, as in Finland, Hungary and Anatolia, Ural-Altaic invaders intermarried with and absorbed the people they conquered.

The early Turkish-speaking peoples were probably an amalgam of Alpine with some Mongol elements from a very early date. They certainly brought numbers of Mongol-featured people with them in their invasions of Western Asia. These Turkish nomad bands became Moslems early during their travels, and arrived in Central Anatolia late in the eleventh century. From there they gradually penetrated the surrounding and richer coastlands, whose inhabitants became in large part assimilated in language and religion to the invaders. A number of Turkish and Mongol adventurers had come westward before the battle of Manzikert in 1071, which destroyed the greatness of the Byzantine Empire. These earlier migrants had frequently become the mercenary troops of Eastern Rome. Some of them became Christian and Greek-speaking, and were given lands on which to settle. In the exchange of populations in 1923 a number of isolated Mongol-featured villagers who were descended from such mercenaries were removed to Greece, their religion being Christian and their language Greek.

The change in religion and language on the part of the Anatolian population took place rapidly both before and immediately after the capture of Constantinople. Anatolians found it no more difficult to become turkified than they had previously to become hellenised. The extensive tribute

of boys which Christian parents had to make to fill the Sultan's civil and military services undoubtedly assisted this movement. From the Turkish conquest onwards there appears to have been a steady change of allegiance until after the Ottoman Empire had reached its zenith. After about 1700 this movement slowed down. For it then became more advantageous to belong to the Christian minorities, who not only benefited from commercial privileges but also escaped military service. During the nineteenth century the continual military burden on the Turkish soldiery undoubtedly led to an increase in the proportion the Christian minorities formed in the total Anatolian population. By 1890 there were about 3 million Greeks and Armenians out of a population of about 13 millions; most of these were descended from Anatolians who had not changed their religion, although many of them spoke Turkish in addition to their own language. This minority was much smaller than many Western Christians at that time believed. In very few districts did either Greeks or Armenians form a majority of the population. In none of the big seaports was there a Greek preponderance, although in Smyrna (Izmir) they probably numbered just under half of the inhabitants. In the Armenian provinces Moslems formed three-quarters of the population. Only in nine out of the 159 kazas in "Turkish Armenia" was there a majority of Armenians, and there it was narrow.

Not only has the population of Turkey been affected by mass migrations, but there has been a steady infiltration of outsiders throughout the ages, particularly during the long centuries when the country formed part, first of the Hittite and then of the Persian, Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. In particular Constantinople (Istanbul) and the principal seaports such as

ANATOLIAN LAND AND PEOPLE

Smyrna (Izmir) and Trebizond (Trabzon) have received immigrants from the lands with which they traded. The composition of the population has been considerably affected in recent years by the massacre and expulsion of most of the Christians and by the Moslem immigration which has taken place from former Ottoman territories. The majority of the Armenians who remained have been turkified. For during the attacks made on them in 1915-16 it is estimated that about 200,000,¹ mostly women and children, became Moslems or were taken into Moslem homes in various capacities and have since been absorbed by the ruling people. Many of the Turks who have returned to the "homeland" from the Balkans are descended from native inhabitants who were assimilated by the ruling people of the Ottoman Empire at an early period. These, however, are very similar racially to the present inhabitants of Anatolia.

MINORITIES

The present population of Turkey is primarily Turkish in speech. At the last census (1935) about 85 per cent of the population gave Turkish as their mother tongue ; many of the others were also able to speak it. The figures for the different languages were :

	ooo's		ooo's
Turks	13,828	Circassians	92
Kurds	1,473	Jews (Spanish, Yiddish, etc.)	79
Arabs	145	Armenians	77
Greeks	109		

The rest were divided amongst smaller groups, such as Albanians, Lazes, etc. Only 319,000 (about 2 per cent) declared themselves as non-Moslems ; of these the Jews

¹ Sir J. Hope Simpson : *The Refugee Problem*, p. 34.

were the most numerous minority (79,000) ; the Greek Orthodox were 78,000. One group of the Armenians form a separate church, the other belong to the Catholic Uniates. The acquisition of the Hatay increased not only the number of the Turks but also of the Arabs and Armenians. A large number of the latter, however, who had settled there after their earlier flight from Turkey, again migrated south when the cession was announced.

The Kurds are far the largest of these linguistic minorities and also inhabit neighbouring parts of Iraq and Iran. Being a border and nomad people they maintained much tribal independence in the past. The creation of the Turkish Republic aroused great discontent among them, partly because it increased the authority of the central government and partly because Mohammedan fanaticism was outraged by Mustapha Kemal's policy of secularisation. There were a number of serious Kurd rebellions from 1925 onwards. These have been ruthlessly crushed and tribal autonomy has practically vanished.

Extensive rights were given to minorities by the Treaty of Lausanne. The Republican government, however, soon found a way to avoid carrying out such provisions. For according to the Turkish constitution all persons born on Turkish soil were declared to be Turkish, irrespective of creed, race or language. In recent years the government has steadfastly followed the policy of Turkification. Many Kurdish rebels have not only been suppressed but moved and forcibly settled in other parts of the country. Every attempt is being made to teach them Turkish when they attend school. It is hoped that they will soon be assimilated by the ruling people. Many of the Moslems, such as Albanians, Bosnians and Circassians, who have returned from Balkan and other countries to Turkey are not Turkish

speaking. Great care is taken in settling such immigrants to see that they do not form compact groups which would be difficult to absorb.

The disestablishment of Islam and the general westernisation of the country have removed many of the differences between the Turks and such Greeks, Armenians and Jews as still remain, principally in Istanbul. If any of these minorities wish to be Turkish citizens there are no legal barriers separating them from the mass of the population. Recent elections for the National Assembly have seen the return of two Greeks, an Armenian and a Jew amongst its members. Many of those formerly belonging to the minorities have been anxious since the establishment of the Republic to count themselves as Turks. This is particularly so outside of Istanbul.

IMMIGRATION

There still remain about 1½ million Turkish-speaking people within the former territories of the Ottoman Empire but outside the boundaries of the Turkish Republic. Practically all of these are in Europe. About 800,000 of the Moslems of Bulgaria are Turkish in language; there are 200,000 Turks in the Rumanian Dobruja; 150,000 in Macedonian Yugoslavia and 80,000 in Greek Western Thrace. The Turks also maintain that a large part of the other Moslems in Yugoslavia, such as the Bosnians and Albanians and also the Pomaks of Bulgaria, who are Bulgarian-speaking Moslems, are Turkish in sympathy. The majority of these non-Turkish-speaking Moslem groups now seem to have accepted citizenship within their respective countries, although there is still some migration from among them to Turkey.

As the Ottoman frontier has retreated there has always

been a steady movement of Moslem peoples in general and Turkish-speaking inhabitants in particular within the new Turkish boundaries. Thus there has been a considerable migration of Tartars from the Crimea and of Circassians and Lazes from the Caucasus as Russian rule became established in these territories. Such a movement also took place when the various Balkan states were set up. This became a flood during and after the Balkan wars of 1912-13. For these reasons it seemed natural to the Turkish government after the defeat of the Greeks in 1922 to exchange the Turkish minority in Greece for the Greeks remaining in Anatolia ; 400,000 Turks thus came back from Greece following the Lausanne Treaty. These formed part of a total of 772,000 immigrants who came into the Republic between 1923 and 1937. In recent years the Republican Government has made treaties with other Balkan states to stimulate the migration of their Turkish minorities. Since 1936 an average of 14,000 Turks has left Rumania every year under a scheme for the systematic transference of a large part of the Turkish population, district by district, over a period of five years. Arrangements were made in 1938 with Yugoslavia for transference of most of her Turkish minority within six years. The most recent statistics, which are for the four years 1934-7, show a total immigration of 144,000 persons, principally from Bulgaria and Rumania. In contrast to the Balkans there are very few Turks remaining in the former Ottoman territories in Asia outside Cyprus, where they form 18 per cent of the population. These are confined to small isolated minority groups in northern Iraq and parts of Syria. For since the cession of the Hatay all of the mixed Turkish-Arab border lands have come inside the boundaries of the Turkish Republic, which has a substantial Arab minority in its south-eastern territories.

The immigrants have been settled largely in eastern Thrace, which, outside Istanbul, has now become a solid Turkish area in contrast to the very mixed population it had before 1912. Other immigrants have filled the lands along the Aegean coast around Smyrna, which the Greeks deserted following their disastrous defeat. Much of the settlement of western and central Anatolia has followed the railway lines which have thus enabled the settlers to market their wheat and other crops. It has also meant, incidentally, that the railways on extending their staffs have drawn to a considerable extent from the immigrant villagers along their routes.

The Turkish government hope to transfer all of the Turkish-speaking minorities in the Balkans and many other sympathetic Moslems to the "homeland". In spite of the fact that these Moslems return "home" to a secular country which removes their distinctive fez on arrival, there has been no falling-off in the flow of Turks back to Turkey, although the immigration of other Moslems seems to have declined. Certainly the Republican government can afford to treat all these immigrants with a certain amount of generosity in its desire to fill up empty spaces. The immigration of Turks is particularly welcomed by the government as decreasing the proportion of linguistic minorities in the population.

Outside the limits of the former Ottoman Empire are probably about 25 million people speaking various Turkish languages. Most of these are within the U.S.S.R., where it is claimed there are forty-eight distinct Turkish-speaking groups. These form the majority of the population in the Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazak, Kirghiz, Bashkir, Crimean, Chuvash, Tartar, Azerbaijan, Daghestan and Karakalpak republics and autonomous provinces. Most of these peoples

form a solid block in Central Asia, but the Tartar invasions have left large Turkish-speaking groups on the Volga and in the Crimea. The Turks of Azerbaijan settled in their present home during the migrations which brought Turkish tribes into Anatolia. There is also a large Turkish-speaking element in various parts of northern Iran and Afghanistan, which is the outcome of the same migrations. Iranian Azerbaijan, where the majority of these reside, adjoins the Soviet republic of the same name. Farther east a large part of the population of the Chinese province of Sinkiang is also Turkish speaking.

Whereas these various Turkish-speaking peoples use languages which closely resemble modern Anatolian Turkish, they have their own distinct historical tradition. In the eastern part of Central Asia they have a strong Mongol admixture ; in Iran, the Caucasus and southern Turkestan, on the other hand, there has been considerable intermarriage with the Iranian and other peoples they have conquered. In either case these various peoples differ very considerably from the Anatolian Turks. Modern historical teaching in Turkey and the linguistic ties, however, have created an interest and sympathy for these fellow-Turks among Anatolians.

CHAPTER II

THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

THE Ottoman Empire at its climax in the sixteenth century recruited its governing class by a unique procedure. Supreme authority was vested in the Sultan and the status of ministers and provincial governors was that of personal slaves. Seven to eight thousand slaves had to be recruited every year. Some were bought, some captured in war, but probably as many as half the number were taken by way of tribute from the Balkans, western Asia Minor and the southern and eastern shores of the Black Sea. At regular intervals every district had to contribute its quota. The boys were almost always of Christian parentage (those who were of the Mohammedan faith might not be enslaved in this way, and for this reason the eastern dominions of the Empire escaped the levy); and although no attempt was made at their forcible conversion they soon forsook the religion to which they had been born and embraced that of Islam.¹

One in every ten of these boy slaves was given a course of training which fitted him to fill a position in the palace, sometimes a humble, sometimes a very exalted one, or to become a Spahi of the Porte. These Spahis were the commanders of the feudal levies in time of war, and in time of peace were provincial administrators governing the freeborn population. Even more than Western Europe

¹ See A. H. Lybyer : *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent.*

during the Middle Ages, the Ottoman Empire was a society of warriors who had settled down for a temporary respite upon the land but retained their military organisation. Those slaves who did not belong to the fortunate minority—the remaining nine out of every ten—received a severe course of military training and constituted the standing force of Janissaries, paid foot-soldiers who were the body-guard of the Sultan. As the Empire had grown in extent and absorbed the greater part of the Balkans, it had become more and more difficult to marshal the whole force of horsemen who assembled at the Sultan's call from the lands which they held by military service. Thus it was a weakness of the Ottoman army in the early sixteenth century that the men who held land in return for military service (the Timariots) could not assemble at any point in the Empire before the late spring because of the vast distances they had to travel. For the same reason they had to disperse early in the autumn, so the periods of campaigning were short and the enemies with whom the Ottoman Empire was engaged—the Hungarians, for example—could usually rely upon winning back by counter-attacks in the winter what they had lost in the summer. So the standing forces of the Sultan had to be expanded as the Empire grew, and under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66), during whose reign the Empire reached the height of its power, the Janissaries' numbers were increased to some twenty thousand.¹

This method of recruiting the secular rulers of the Empire by a tribute of young Christians had two advantages. It meant continual fresh conversions to the Mohammedan faith ; and it surrounded the Sultan with a non-hereditary ruling class who depended solely upon him for their position

¹ See Sir Charles Oman : *The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*.

THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

and who were throughout their lives, no matter what their position, his slaves.

Although the Sultan was a despot ruling the Empire through his slaves, there was an institution which he was compelled to respect. This was the Mohammedan Institution ; religious in its character, but linking together not only priests but teachers, lawyers and judges throughout the Empire. Its members were "men who embodied and maintained the whole substance and structure of Mohammedan learning, religion and law in the Empire". Indeed, the authority of this Institution extended beyond the boundaries of the Empire itself. The Sultan as Caliph was at the head of the religious organisation, but the Sacred Law of Islam which it administered defined the limits of his despotic power. He could not alter it by his decrees ; it was the embodiment of the conservatism of the mass of the people over whom he ruled, and of their attachment to custom which the Sacred Law sanctified.

The Sultan was obliged to observe it in making war ; in punishment of criminals ; in his treatment of Christian minorities ; and he was obliged to yield a large part of the revenue of his Empire to religious foundations.

THE PATCHWORK EMPIRE

The Empire which these two institutions, the secular and religious fraternities, held together, was a patchwork one. Contrasts of race, religion and language made the task of government difficult. From the fifteenth century the Sultans to simplify the tasks of their government gave a wide autonomy to the minorities. The peoples who were not Mohammedans, and so not subject to the law of Islam, were organised into separate communities (" millets ") according to the religions which they professed ;

these communities had a considerable degree of self-government. Among these millets were Greek-speaking Anatolians whom the Turks had not absorbed, Armenians and other groups who refused to adopt the religion of the ruling people. All of them managed their own religious affairs, educated their children and communicated with the Sultan through the communal leaders—like foreign nationals communicating with him through ambassadors. The system split up the Empire and weakened the authority of the sovereign power; the millets not only squabbled among themselves—habitually there were riots in Jerusalem over the Holy Sepulchre—but even made arrangements with foreign powers against the interests of the Ottoman government.

The core of the Empire was a great tract of land centred in Asia Minor and administered under uniform regulations. Beyond this were regions administered under special regulations, tributary provinces, and protected vassal states. Beyond this again, running through Hungary, southern Poland and southern Russia and down the Iranian border was a strip of disputed territory—a no-man's-land whose inhabitants lived in fear of raids from the Turks and no less destructive counter-attacks by the Hungarians, Poles, Russians, or Iranians.

The Ottoman Empire was organised, its institutions show, as an army of occupation. Booty formed one source of its revenue, the lands of those over whom its rule was exercised the other. Some of the lands were held by Mohammedans who paid to the Sultan a tithe of up to one-tenth of their products; this was the rule predominant in Arabia and Bosnia. Others were held by Christians (or, as in the case of some lands in Syria, Mesopotamia and Egypt, had been granted to Christians) and paid a heavier tax in

THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

the form of a lump sum or of a share as large as one-half of the produce. The remaining lands were held by the Sultan and were granted away to religious foundations or to Mohammedans who held them in return for military service which they rendered when required.¹

The Empire had been built up in two and a half centuries. It was as late as 1307 that Osman, the son of Ertoghrul, declared his independence of the Seljuk kingdom of Rum. He then possessed nothing but a small fief in the north-west of Asia Minor which his father had received for his military services. With that as a base he and his successors extended their power until they controlled the whole of Anatolia. The peninsula, despite invasions by the Saracens, had retained its Byzantine civilisation, and the Turks when they came from the East first conquered and then absorbed the Anatolian population.

In 1358 the Ottoman forces got their first foothold in Europe at Gallipoli and, after overrunning Bulgaria, in 1453 were able to take Constantinople itself. The power of Byzantium had declined and its provinces one after another fell into Turkish hands before the city itself was successfully besieged. The empire was rent by internal quarrels and there was very little resistance to the Turkish attack. The peoples of the Balkans were, moreover, divided among themselves and their antagonism to western Europe was such that they would rather see the turban of Mohammed in Constantinople than the tiara of the Pope. The kingdom of Serbia was the first to be attacked by Mohammed the Conqueror when Constantinople had fallen ; it was swiftly conquered and 200,000 of its inhabitants carried away to be trained for military service or settled in other parts of the Empire. Greece, Albania,

¹ See A. H. Lybyer : *The Government of the Ottoman Empire*.

Bosnia and Herzegovina were in turn subdued and by 1483 the whole Balkan peninsula except for the tributary republic of Ragusa and parts of the principality of Montenegro was under Ottoman rule. Despite papal appeals the states of Italy, the Empire and the West of Europe had failed to unite; they were too intent on quarrelling with one another or—as in the case of Venice—on negotiating favourable trade terms with the Turks. Pius II, who before and during his tenure of the Papacy had summoned Christendom to a new crusade, died at Ancona in 1464 in grief at the pitiful force which was all that had come together in response to his appeals. An ambitious attempt to construct a coalition of all the enemies of the Turks including the Duke of Burgundy, the Iranians and all the principalities of the Near East proved equally fruitless.

In the latter part of the fifteenth and the early years of the sixteenth century the Turks were extending their Empire in Asia and Africa so that Europe was left comparatively free from their pressure. Then in 1520 the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent came to the throne. His predecessor had embarked on the siege of Rhodes and this Suleiman successfully completed. He then took Belgrade and with an army of at least 100,000 men broke the Hungarians at the Battle of Mohacs (1526). The new king of Hungary, John Zapolya, was obliged to make peace. This success opened the road to Vienna and in 1529 Suleiman lay siege to the city. Even with so immediate a threat the European rulers gave little help; but Vienna withstood the siege and Suleiman retired to Constantinople.

His reign lasted forty-six years (1520–66); during it the Ottoman Empire was at the height of its power. To quote Sir Edward Creasy:

THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Sultan Suleiman left to his successors an Empire to the extent of which few permanent additions were ever made except the islands of Cyprus and Candia and which under no subsequent Sultan maintained or recovered the wealth, power and prosperity which it enjoyed under the great lawgiver of the House of Othman. The Turkish dominions in his time comprised all the most celebrated cities of biblical and classical history except Rome, Syracuse and Persepolis. An Empire of more than 40,000 square miles, embracing many of the richest and most beautiful regions of the world, had been acquired by the descendants of Ertoghrul in three centuries from the time when their forefather wandered a homeless adventurer at the head of less than 500 fighting men.

CAUSES OF DECLINE

The Ottoman Empire, based on nomad traditions and directed by a despotic Sultan with a ruling class of soldier-slaves, could expand, but it could not progress. Indeed, when it had reached the size it had attained in 1566, there were serious obstacles even to further expansion. Such machinery of administration as existed was so centralised that the huge army of the Sultan could only move as a unit in one campaign at a time. It could not do more than hold the frontiers of the Empire when, as was the case in the latter part of the sixteenth century, more than one of them was attacked at once. There was no attempt to set up frontier garrisons. The inhabitants of the provinces in the periphery were not sufficiently interested in remaining within the Empire to defend the frontiers themselves, and no attempt was made to plant colonies of veterans for defence as the Romans had done in the border provinces of their Empire. The Janissaries had not been allowed to marry until the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, and even when they had legitimate families, they were too fond of fighting and plundering to tolerate the less exciting work of consolidation. Proud

of their privileged position—the Sultan himself was nominally one of their number and drew his pay regularly—and conscious of their political influence, they preferred to remain near the Sultan whether at the centre of the Empire or on campaign. Like the Pretorian Guard when the Roman Empire was collapsing, they were not men whose wishes could be disregarded; and in the later years of the Ottoman Empire they were makers and destroyers of Sultans.

The failure to garrison the frontiers permanently and adequately was merely one aspect of the failure of the Sultans to organise their Empire. Their rule was suffered so unwillingly by the populations over which it was exercised that only a gigantic military machine could have maintained order. The money to maintain such a machine could barely have been secured from the primitive agriculture of the Empire even if none of the money which was collected in taxation had been devoted to religious foundations or to maintaining the magnificence of the court. Today, in the Treasury of the Sultan's Palace in Istanbul, jewelled dresses and gold and silver equipment of almost unbelievable splendour bequeathed by successive Sultans are on show. The price which was paid for the golden thrones and the enormous jewels was the gradual collapse of the Empire.

As far as Europe was concerned, the battle of Lepanto in 1571 broke the spell of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish fleet was destroyed; and, although the Sultans set to work to build another while the princes of Europe merely went on quarrelling among themselves, the terror of a Turkish invasion no longer hung over the continent. Before that the use of the Cape route to India and the growth of trade with America had meant that the trade-

THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

lines of Europe were ceasing to run through the Ottoman Empire and bring dues to the Sultan's treasury.

The attempt to administer Spain, the Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire, as well as dominions in South America, drove the Emperor Charles V into a monastery. The prospect of administering an Empire almost as vast and more varied with less goodwill from the subjects, less money available and far worse communications, drove the later Sultans of the Ottoman Empire into the harem. There began to spread through the Empire a consciousness of futility. Custom and corruption ruled ; and those at the head of affairs contented themselves, except for spasmodic strokes of boldness which brought further disaster, with maintaining existing conditions.

The last Sultan who personally led his armies died in 1640. Much of his energy was perforce expended in putting down a revolt of the Spahis ; but when he had re-established his authority he fought in the East against the Iranians. His successors were men of little account and their armies were commanded by their viziers. As late as 1683, the Turks made their last thrust into Europe and besieged Vienna for the second time. It was a mark of their decline that on that occasion their forces had to be officered by Frenchmen and that the soldiery had to be driven to the assault by threats. Such an army could not expect success and John Sobieski, relieving Vienna, inflicted upon them a smashing defeat which cost the Turkish commander his life when he returned to Constantinople.

DECLINE CREATES "EASTERN QUESTION"

After this failure to take Vienna, the Turks ceased to be the ever-present menace to Christendom, and sixteen

years later came the Peace of Karlovitz--the first dismemberment of the Turkish dominions in Europe. The Turks were forced to yield Transylvania, and were effectively shut out of Hungary. Although no longer a menace, they remained a factor of importance in the politics of Europe. Turkey's friendship was of some value and France traditionally enjoyed it until the time of Napoleon. The interests of England--who at the time of the Armada had sought a Turkish alliance against Spain--were primarily commercial, and the objectives of English policy were to increase the trading facilities enjoyed in the Turkish dominions by her nationals and to decrease those enjoyed by the nationals of other states.

As well as a positive significance, Turkey had a significance which might be described as negative, while her military power and her administration alike disintegrated. The states of Europe regarded her as a potential victim no less than as a potential ally. As early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were signs of that "Eastern Question" which agitated the minds of statesmen throughout the nineteenth--the problem created by the break-up of the Turkish Empire and the danger of the gradual absorption of its territories by Russia. In a Europe made up of states whose security depended obviously upon the maintenance of a rough-and-ready balance of power, the complete decay of a rich and extensive empire naturally created for the whole continent a diplomatic problem of the first importance. The danger that Russia might grow to gigantic power by swallowing up at least the European part of the Turkish Empire was not an unreal one. Early in the eighteenth century Peter the Great had taken Azov and so secured for Russia an outlet to the Black Sea. Later he campaigned too in the Caucasus against the

vassals of the Turks. Catherine II had conquered the Crimean Tartar State which lay along the north of that sea and so had pushed the Ottoman power back almost into the Balkans. And in 1774 by the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji Russia not only gained territorial concessions which enabled her to dominate the Black Sea, but—more important, as events were to show,—secured for herself the right to speak on behalf of the Rumanian Principalities and the Orthodox Church in Turkey. For years too the Russians had been competing with the British for a favourable commercial position in Turkey. At one stage the British persuaded the Turks to compel the Russians to close their embassy in Constantinople, and further intrigued to delay the reopening as long as possible.

Just as the Sultans permitted the religious minorities within the Empire a substantial autonomy, so they allowed to foreigners who came to trade a range of privileges (Capitulations) which in the end threatened the independence of the Empire. Groups of foreigners of the same nationality in Turkey were subject to the laws of their own country ; and when as individuals they came into conflict with Turks they were given very privileged treatment. Foreign business concerns were almost entirely free of any Turkish control, and quite free of taxes ; this immunity had been freely granted by the Sultans to help the development of the country, but it had the effect of concentrating such economic effort as there was in the hands of aliens. Moreover, the administration was not completely free to levy import and export taxes, so that cheap goods could be unloaded on the Turkish market. The whole system as it developed from the sixteenth century down to the twentieth was riddled with abuses, and contributed to the economic decay of the country and to the loss of its real independence.

The decline of the Ottoman Empire was gradual. Napoleon believed actual collapse to be imminent, but the Empire retained sufficient vitality to join with Britain and Russia in an alliance against him. It was the oppressed races within the Empire and not the old external enemies—the Iranians, Russians or Poles—who were destroying it. The peasant peoples of the Balkans were foremost with their demands for independence. They desired freedom from the troublesome taxation which the Ottoman Empire imposed, and the higher-spirited of them sought refuge in the hills to become bandits and rebels in their lives and national heroes after their deaths. The Sultan's Government could counter them, not by the threat of any military strength, but only by an endeavour to exploit the religious and racial differences among them. Thus, when in 1801 the Janissaries in Belgrade feared some loss of their privileges and massacred the leading inhabitants, the government in Constantinople threatened to send an army "not of Turkey, but of another fashion and another race". The wide dominions were never really at peace throughout the time their oppressed minorities were seeking their independence.

The Greeks had a specially privileged position under the Sultan, for he had managed to use their church as his instrument to an extent which made them hated by the other oppressed peoples of the Balkans. Despite this, discontent was strong in Greece and independence was secured by 1830. The Powers had at first been unsympathetic to the rising but finally recognised that it was impossible for the Sultan to re-establish his authority in Greece. The danger to be guarded against, accordingly, was excessive Russian influence over the new state. Count Metternich of Austria and the Duke of Wellington (who

THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

was British Prime Minister at the time) agreed that the country should become an independent kingdom, and placed Otto of Bavaria upon its throne.

Thereafter the customary policy of Britain was one of support for the Ottoman Empire to prevent Russia absorbing large parts of it. This policy was not seriously challenged until the eighties, when Gladstone roused Britain with his campaign against the atrocities committed by the Turks against the rebels in Bulgaria. In pursuance of this policy Britain opposed Mehmed Ali, who from his powerful position as Pasha of Egypt threatened the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. By contrast, it was the policy of Russia to support every disruptive and secessionist movement within the Turkish Empire, whether in Europe, Asia or Africa. The turns and twists which followed from the conflict of these two policies and their interaction with the diplomatic fluctuations of the state of Europe in other parts were very curious. Thus, to take one example, the desire of Britain, associated with France, to force an agreement between Mehmed Ali and the Sultan because they feared the rebels' complete success, drove the Sultan to make an alliance with the Tsar. But it was a concert of the four Powers, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, that finally imposed a settlement and coerced Mehmed Ali into an acceptance of it.

The British government were under no illusions about the condition of the Turkish Empire. The position was summed up by Tsar Nicholas I in his famous remark to the British ambassador : " We have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man ; it will be a great misfortune if one of these days he should slip away from us before the necessary arrangements have been made." The British, however, put a good deal of faith in reforms which would

revive the "sick man" at least for a time; and they certainly viewed with no pleasure the privileged position which Russia was seeking to secure. The Crimean War (1854-6) was in essence a struggle between Britain and France on the one hand and Russia on the other for predominance in the Ottoman Empire. It arose immediately out of a Russian attempt to put pressure on Turkey which Turkey, acting above all on the advice of the British and with the expectation of their aid, rejected. By her defeat in that war, Russia was forced to yield up some Balkan territory, to accept the navigation of the Danube being put under a European Commission and to agree to the closing of the Black Sea to warships including her own. Turkey on her side was admitted to the Concert of Europe and her integrity guaranteed by Great Britain, France and Austria; in return the Sultan announced those reforms—guarantee of the civil rights of his Christian subjects, and so on—that the Western Powers believed would strengthen the Turkish bastion against the Russians. The programme of reform, however, proved a fiction; and the administration of the Ottoman Empire remained as corrupt and oppressive as ever.

This was shown unmistakably by the events of the years that followed. In 1860, the Sultan's government set the Druses to suppress a revolt of the Maronites, a tribe in the Lebanon who had been made desperate by poverty arising from shortage of land. It was by just such methods of divide and rule alone that the Ottoman Empire could be maintained. Two years later Turkey was at war with Montenegro; she was victorious, and the Montenegrins—whose proud boast it had been that they had always remained independent—had the Convention of Scutari thrust upon them. There followed disturbances in Serbia

THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

and the Principalities and a rising in Crete. The Greeks gave some help to the Cretans, who by 1869 secured some concession in the form of a constitution. Sporadic revolts in Bulgaria were sufficient to secure the granting of independence to the Bulgarian church.

The war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria and that of 1870 between France and Prussia gave the Russian government the opportunity of advancing its interests in the Balkans unhindered by the united diplomatic opposition of the rest of the continent. In 1870, Sebastopol was refortified and a Black Sea fleet built by the Russians—two actions taken as a sign that Russia was ready at the first opportunity to overturn completely the settlement of 1856. Pan-Slav sentiment rose throughout the Balkans and when in 1875 a rising took place among the peasants of Herzegovina, it awoke a response through the whole peninsula. The rebels gained some successes; the Albanians and the Bulgarians revolted in 1876, and first Serbia and then Montenegro declared war on Turkey. The Powers of Europe saw that they might be faced with the complete collapse of the Ottoman power in Europe, and Austria and Russia agreed that if the latter were forced to enter Bulgaria, the former might occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

PENETRATION BY FOREIGN CAPITAL

The whole of Europe was interested in the Eastern Question, not solely because the absorption of the Turkish dominions by Russia would upset the balance of power, but because of the vast sums of capital that had been sunk in the Turkish Empire. Between 1854 and 1875, Turkey contracted an external debt of some £T.200 millions. (In fact, the Turkish exchequer did not receive the benefit of more than 60 per cent of this—the remainder was swal-

lowed up in the expenses and commissions and endeavours to make the Turkish loan attractive to investors.) The extravagance of the Sultan's court, the military expenses of the Empire, and the service of previous loans used up among them the greater part of the money. Barely 10 per cent, it has been calculated, was used in such a way as to increase the economic strength of the country.

A good deal of this money had been put up by financial interests in Britain, and Disraeli's government offered mediation—with the avowed object of saving the Ottoman Empire from ruin. Such a line of policy was made difficult by the public opinion aroused in Britain by Gladstone at the atrocities committed by the Turks in their counter-offensive. The Turks, however, took a certain amount of wind out of Mr. Gladstone's sails by announcing another of their impressive schemes of false reform for the Empire. The Disraeli government, which had been waiting for an excuse for continuing traditional British policy, urged the calling of a conference at Constantinople on the basis of the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire. The Powers, including Russia, accepted the principle of the conference, but there was so little agreement that the Turkish representatives had to be excluded from the discussions. When a plan had been agreed upon which would have increased the size of Montenegro and Serbia and given administrative autonomy to Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and imposed upon the Turkish Empire an International Commission supported by Belgian and Swiss troops to ensure that these terms were carried out, the Constitution already announced was solemnly proclaimed and the plan of the Powers rejected.

That was in December 1876; five months later, after further deliberations had produced no result, the Russian

armies crossed the frontier "to obtain by force what the united efforts of the Powers had been unable to obtain by persuasion". By promises not to go too far, the Russians bought the neutrality of Austria and Britain, and after eight months of fighting had advanced as far as Adrianople and seemed well on their way to the imperial capital. This success made the governments of Britain and Austria fear that the Russian undertakings of moderation (by which Russia had kept them out of the war) would be broken; and both governments demanded that the settlement after the war should be European—that is, one in which they together would be able to prevent the Russians from securing the full fruits of victory.

The Treaty of San Stefano was concluded in March 1878 between Russia and Turkey without any reference to the wishes or interests of the other governments of Europe. It amounted—or would have amounted, had it ever been effective—to the formal dissolution of the Ottoman power in Europe. A huge war indemnity was to be exacted; Serbia and Montenegro were to be independent states with accessions of territory; Rumania was to be independent; Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be given free institutions under the protection and control of Russia and Austria; and, most important of all, a gigantic autonomous principality of Bulgaria was to be erected, bounded on the north by the Danube, touching the Ægean Sea on the south, including Macedonia and so dividing what remained of Turkey in Europe into two unequal parts, one consisting of a strip running a hundred and fifty miles along the Ægean coast, and the other based on what is now the Italian province of Albania, extended to the Ægean by a strip lying between the frontiers of Greece and the proposed Bulgaria. Such a settlement would have meant

Russian domination of the Balkans, for the Bulgarian state was to be established under the guidance of a Russian Commissioner and an army of occupation.

In Austria a large sum was voted for military purposes. Britain called out reserves, strengthened the garrison at Malta, and arranged to bring troops from India. In this atmosphere the Congress of the European Powers opened at Berlin in June 1878, and the threat of force secured for Britain "Peace with Honour". Russia still got access to the Danube by the cession of Bessarabia; Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro were given independence and additional territory; order in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be preserved by Austria; and the autonomous principality of Bulgaria was much reduced in size and divided into two. Not its own strength but fear of the consequences of collapse had come to the aid of Turkey in Europe.

The war with Russia wrecked the Ottoman finances. By the late seventies the payment of interest on the foreign loans absorbed half the revenue; in 1875 the payment had had to be on a reduced scale and in the following year it was suspended completely. The added strain of the unsuccessful war meant that an international financial control had to be established in 1881. Certain sources of revenue were put under this control; the total debt was scaled down to a figure of some £T.140 millions on which interest was to be paid at 1 per cent rising to 4 per cent as the revenues earmarked for the debt service increased.

After the Congress of Berlin the conditions in the Balkans changed—above all by the development of German initiative so far as Turkey was concerned. Until 1882, there was virtually no German capital in Turkey; but between then and the war of 1914 a partnership between the German Government and the German financial houses existed

to increase influence in Turkey. In that period the German share of the Turkish government debt rose from 5 to 20 per cent, while investment in industrial ventures (mainly in the Bagdad railway), rose from 40 to 60 million marks. Despite this growth, however, German holdings did not equal the French. French investors had in fact sunk more money in the government of Turkey than had those of any other country; they controlled the Ottoman Bank which brought out the loans in Paris. The Ottoman Debt Commission of seven members nominated by national groups of bondholders gradually extended its control over more and more of the normal sources of revenue as year by year the total of foreign indebtedness rose higher and higher. The whole economic life of the country was mortgaged. In the period after 1908 when the finances had fallen into completest confusion :

It was not only in response to government demands that foreign capital moved into Turkey. All organised large-scale enterprise was dependent upon it and owned by it. The Turkish banking system was entirely foreign and foreign banks conducted the official business as well as private business. The railroad was financed almost entirely from outside as were irrigation works, ports and bridge construction, mineral exploitation and municipal public utilities.¹

The Balkan states which had been carved out of the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire were, by the turn of the century, mortgaged to the same extent. Greece took her loans mostly from England and by 1892 was paying half her revenue in interest upon them; Serbia was in debt from the year when it gained its independence, for the war it fought against Turkey was financed by

¹ H. Feis : *Europe : The World's Banker*. The preceding paragraphs are mainly based on this book.

Russia ; and Bulgaria too had a similar burden on its state finances. In all three cases control by an international administration had to be accepted over some one or other of the main sources of the national revenue.

THE END OF THE EMPIRE

From 1876 to 1909 the Sultan was Abdul Hamid II. Cruel and arbitrary, playing on the superstitions of his people by use of his religious authority, he typified an Empire in decay. These methods maintained him in power until 1908 when the Revolution of the Young Turks forced upon him the acceptance of a constitution. The leadership in this revolution was in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress - a conspirators' club whose members wished to effect a reform of the imperial administration. They did not, however, restore the independence of the country by breaking foreign economic control, for that required more courage and capacity than the Committee of Union and Progress ever possessed.

The objective of the 1908 revolution was to maintain possession of Macedonia, which it seems that the Sultan's government was likely to lose - its method was to be the establishment of a parliamentary government in which all the nationalities in the Empire were to have their freedom. The politicians whom Abdul Hamid had exiled flocked back and took up ruling positions ; but the change of personnel meant no real change in the imperial system, and the months which followed were disastrous. Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina ; Greece seized Crete ; Bulgaria declared itself independent of Ottoman suzerainty ; there were revolts in Albania and Arabia. In 1911 the country became involved in war with Italy and in the following year was engaged by a Balkan coalition which

reduced the Turkish possessions in Europe to even smaller dimensions than they are at present.

While this was taking place the State finances were falling into still greater confusion ; more and more sources of revenue had to be taken out of the ordinary budget and placed under the creditors' organisation. The Young Turks looked at first towards Britain and France for loans. But the attempts of France in 1910 to impose certain political and economic conditions in granting these loans caused the government to turn to Berlin. Germany was well aware of the importance of the Ottoman Empire and had been planning the building of the Berlin to Bagdad railway. As the Kaiser wrote on this occasion, " We must help Turkey financially without condition, with the aid of Austria, so that she will not come permanently under Anglo-French domination."

The rivalries of the Great Powers who controlled her economic life and the naïve ambition of the Young Turks involved Turkey in the war of 1914-18. The military operations and the exploitation by her enemies of the national feeling of the Arab tribes destroyed the Ottoman Empire ; but despite the apparent completeness of her defeat Turkey alone of the defeated countries secured the benefits of a negotiated peace. The reason for this lies in the sudden rise of a movement within the country itself associated with the name of a remarkable man—Mustapha Kemal.

CHAPTER III

KEMAL ATATURK

THERE are two Mustapha Kemals. One is that sitting before you, the Mustapha Kemal of flesh and blood, who will pass away. There is another whom I cannot call "Me". It is not I that this Mustapha Kemal personalities, it is you—all you present here, who go into the furthestmost parts of the country to inculcate and defend a new ideal, a new mode of thought. I stand for these dreams of yours. My life's work is to make them come true.

These words of Kemal's spoken to the leaders of his Party sum up not unfairly the place which he occupies in the history of Turkey. He was a statesman of uncommon abilities, but he was no less a symbol to Turkey and to the whole of the Middle East, and his personality and career still provide an inspiration.

Today portraits of Ataturk and quotations from his speeches are to be found everywhere in Turkey. In offices, shops and public buildings, Turkish men and women have his picture before them and probably a text selected from his speeches to guide them. Almost every school classroom has its corner adorned with portraits of Ataturk (and perhaps of his successor in the Presidency, Ismet Inonu), and by maps, tables and press-cuttings the children may learn the life-history of the creator of Modern Turkey. He is the favourite subject of Turkish artists, and the pictures of him vary from the full-length portraits in oils to be found in a college, or in the board-room of a factory, to the coloured prints which are hung on the walls of a country inn and are so crude that it is not always

KEMAL ATATURK

certain which of the two Presidents they are intended to represent.

Sometimes the portraits show Ataturk in the military uniform which his career in the army entitled him to wear ; more usually he is shown in civilian dress of that Western style which he induced his countrymen to adopt ; while most frequently he wears full evening dress. Not only is the style of dress shown in these portraits shocking to the old-fashioned Turk, but the portraits and busts themselves are revolutionary in that their mere existence is a defiance of the Mohammedan ban on representations of the human form.

The meaning of " Ataturk ", a title which Kemal adopted towards the end of his career, is " Father of the Turks ", and it is under the leadership and inspiration of this man that present-day Turkey has been created. The cast of his face gives a good enough indication of his character. It is that of a man determined, capable and unillusioned, able to arouse devotion and to justify it ; an energetic man who burnt all his candles at both ends, but an iconoclast and an originator rather than an administrator. He was the kind of man around whom legends grow quickly.

CONSPIRATOR

His birth was humble ; but the Turkish Empire did not stultify the ability of poor men. (It possessed this quality more because of its inefficiency than because there existed in the minds of those who governed it—so far as it was governed—any desire to 'utilise all the ability available.) Mustapha Kemal's father—who was a minor official in the Ottoman Debt Administration in Salonica, and later a merchant in a small way—left very little money when he died in 1890. His only son Mustapha was nine years old,

and had a hard childhood relieved by the charity of an aunt who paid for him to go to school. Most of the time, however, he worked on the land the hard life of a labourer and did not find school congenial. He succeeded, at last, against the will of his mother, in getting to an Officers' Training School in Salonica. At fourteen he was sexually precocious and throughout his life his relations with women left nothing to be desired by the most sensational biographers.

From the Training School at Salonica he moved on to a Senior school at Monastir ; and from there to the General Staff College at Constantinople where he had completed his military training by the age of twenty-four. Before he went to Constantinople, his biographers tell us, he had read Voltaire and Rousseau—and at the Staff College itself he found plenty of likeminded young men whose inclinations turned towards revolution when they saw the tyranny and decay of the Empire which they were being trained to serve. The liberating scepticism of Voltaire must have been particularly congenial to Kemal, who regarded with a fierce impatience the whole clumsy machinery of the Ottoman Empire and that obscurantism in which religious and secular elements were mingled and which was intended to confirm the allegiance of the ignorant masses to the Emperor.

One of the most efficient parts of the administration, however, was the police-spy network ; and Kemal, with some other members of the revolutionary organisation established in the College, soon found this out for himself. After graduation he was arrested and imprisoned for his political activities ; but the capacity which he had shown in his studies secured him a pardon and he was sent to join a cavalry regiment in Damascus. This was engaged, as was so much of the Turkish army, in holding down the

Arabs ; fighting, it might well have seemed to Kemal, who had seen what the capital was like, a perpetual rear-guard action on behalf of the Empire. The Druses—who were the Arab tribe inhabiting this part of the Turkish dominions—were too wary to give battle, and preferred the guerrilla tactics for which they had all the obvious advantages. All that the Turkish forces could do was to lay waste villages to inspire respect for law and order. Such a life was as disillusioning to the officers as that of Constantinople—judging by the ease with which Kemal was able to organise a new section of his subversive organisation. The range of his contacts among officers and on the military side of the state administration (in the War Office notably and in the police) protected him and completely defeated an attempt to arrest him when for political purposes he paid an unauthorised visit to Salonica.

After two years of service he was ordered to return permanently to Salonica, where he found himself in the centre of opposition activity. The movement was dominated by the Committee of Union and Progress which at this time had no more than three hundred members, soldiers and merchants who vaguely desired reform. Their approach and methods were very different from those of Kemal, whose thoughts were cast in a more practical and nationalist mould. This difference of attitude sapped his enthusiasm and made him critical of the leaders of the Committee.

Although Kemal found them too casual and unpractical, the Committee were able nominally to take over the Government in 1908, after a small rising which took place in Macedonia under a member of the movement had exposed the internal weakness of the Ottoman Empire. Regiment after regiment of the army refused to march against the enemies of the Sultan Abdul Hamid. When later the

MODERN TURKEY

Sultan tried to deprive the newcomers of so much as the appearance of power, the Committee of Union and Progress appealed to the military—to the garrison in Macedonia. Kemal and Enver Pasha, then a young officer who had been one of those leaders of whom Kemal had been critical in Salonica, were both with this Macedonia force, Enver as commander of a cavalry detachment and Kemal as Chief of Staff. They helped the commander to decide to oppose the counter-revolution which the Sultan was organising, and they marched with the forces to Constantinople to carry out that decision.

The power of the revolutionaries whom Kemal had known was now more of a reality; but the policy which they followed did not satisfy him. The Powers, and Germany in particular, were trying to dominate Turkey by sending military advisers and by seeking diplomatic and economic concessions. The government did not resist this penetration or seek to use the concession-hunters for Turkey's own ends as Kemal wished. Once again Kemal as a conspirator urged a new nationalist revolution, but devoted a great part of his time to his military duties.

SOLDIER

From 1911 until 1918 Kemal's main attention was given to soldiering. Turkey was at war with the Italians in Tripoli, then with the Balkan states, then with the Allies in the World War, and finally with the Greeks in the War of Independence. Between the outbreak of the War in Tripoli and the 1918 Armistice, Kemal was engaged in North Africa, on the Balkans' frontier, on the Dardanelles, in the Caucasus and in Syria. In Tripoli he found himself under the command of Enver, and the two men quarrelled as before. In 1912, this fighting was brought to an end by

the First Balkan War in which Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece attacked Turkey. Kemal returned home and was posted to Gallipoli as Chief of Staff to a division which was facing the Bulgarians and had to prevent their taking the road to Constantinople. This was one of the last lines of defence—for the advance of the invading armies over Turkish territory had been very swift. Again disaster produced violent political change. Enver returned from Tripoli and organised a coup d'état in which the Minister of War, himself a reformer who had been put in his position by the Young Turks, was shot dead. Enver took control, but the military operations which he directed (and in which Kemal took part) were unsuccessful; Turkey did not recover anything of what she had lost in Europe until 1913, when she reoccupied Adrianople.

So far Kemal had been an able and energetic soldier, but his career had not been outstanding. After his participation in the unsuccessful fighting at the end of the First Balkan War, there followed three years of inactivity. For most of the time he was military attaché at Sofia, and was not recalled until February 1915, when Turkey had already been at war for some months. The German General, Liman von Sanders, was striving to bring some order into the organisation of the Turkish armies. He assigned Kemal to the force which was being prepared to repel the anticipated British attack on the Dardanelles. Here Kemal first won real distinction as a commander; in particular he secured credit for his initiative in risking an attack on the Australians after their landing at Anzac Bay on April 25, 1915. For months he commanded the troops holding the ridge and preventing the Allied forces from moving towards Constantinople. During those months he had to contend not only with the enemy but with the inefficiency of his own

superiors. He did not conceal his anger at the scanty attention paid to his reports and proposals ; and there is an often-told story that von Sanders' Chief of Staff called him on the phone and asked his opinion of the situation. Kemal angrily replied that since his reports and proposals had been ignored there was only one way to save the situation : von Sanders should put all his troops under Kemal's command. " Is that all ? " asked the Chief of Staff. " Will they not be too many for you ? " " They will be too few," replied Kemal, and rang off.

He did not get all the troops which he had arrogantly demanded, but von Sanders recognised his ability by making him commander of all the troops holding the line on the north of the peninsula. He was thus responsible for meeting the attacks from Suvla Bay, and by his energy and personal fearlessness succeeded in repelling them. In December 1915 the Gallipoli campaign came to an end with the withdrawal of the Allied forces, and Kemal was hailed as the Victor of the Dardanelles and the Saviour of Constantinople.

Returning to the capital, he did not hesitate to criticise severely the ministers who were bungling the war. He was publicly scornful of Enver—now Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces—and since he was an awkwardly forceful critic, he was posted to the army fighting the Russians in Armenia. There his problems were less due to enemy action than to the failures of his own Higher Command and the supply services of the Turkish army. The army in Armenia, ill-equipped and ill-provisioned, suffered from disease and exposure ; the collapse of Russia in 1917, however, relieved any pressure from the enemy and made it possible for Kemal to attain a satisfactory strategic position.

KEMAL ATATURK

Shortly afterwards he was sent with the Crown Prince of Turkey on a military mission to Germany. The German High Command including the Kaiser himself did all in their power to impress the visitors ; but Kemal who had never liked the alliance with Germany and had ceased to have faith in German victory, took every opportunity of destroying the effect. He concealed none of his antipathy and his scepticism about German claims ; and made it clear that what he had seen convinced him of ultimate German defeat. This journey gave him the opportunity of becoming intimately acquainted with the Turkish Crown Prince whom he believed he might use as a figure-head for his revolutionary objectives.

On his return he was again posted to a hopeless command, this time with the army in Syria, which had been as ill supported as that in Armenia. Again he was under von Sanders, and took the responsibility for allowing the British to occupy the whole of Syria by withdrawing his army practically to the present southern frontiers of Turkey. By the time that this retreat had been carried out, the Turks signed the armistice of Mudros (October 1918).

THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE

Kemal was now thirty-seven years of age. He had shown himself an efficient and energetic military commander of some distinction—but that was all. Enver and the others whom he had known in Salonica when he was a young man had achieved positions of much greater eminence. His experiences, however, had strengthened him and deepened his revolutionary convictions ; what he had seen in Armenia and Syria had increased his contempt for the Turkish government machine even when directed by those who talked glibly of “ Union and Progress ”. At the same time

he had learnt to appreciate the qualities of the common soldiers who faced so doggedly the dangers of war, and bore from their superiors inefficiency which was tantamount to treachery. These bitter experiences had shown him a foundation on which Turkey could be rebuilt, and when he heard German generals sneering at the Turkish soldiery as cattle who only knew how to run away he burst out angrily that the Turkish Army did not know the meaning of fear and fled only because their commanders set them the disgraceful example.

Kemal's democratic faith was no part of the Western individualist tradition. It did not derive so much from a reading of French and English liberals as from confidence in the masses of the Turkish people. To Kemal democracy meant the realisation of the wills and aspirations of the peasants who formed the forces he commanded. The menace to their liberty and self-realisation in Turkey in 1918 came above all from the Western Powers and their agents, who were proposing not only the partition of the Ottoman Empire but of Turkey itself.

The tactical problems which confronted Western Imperialism in the peace settlement were exceedingly complex. As far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned the Allies had during the War entered into a number of not easily reconcilable commitments. The Greeks as the price of the support they had given demanded a part of Turkey, and with the acquiescence of Lloyd George they began to occupy it in May 1919.

Kemal had spent the winter in Constantinople engaged in political manœuvring and intriguing which did little but strengthen his conviction that the fabric of the Empire was rotten beyond repair. He had tried to persuade the former Crown Prince, now the Sultan, to show some spirit,

to defy the Allies and put himself at the head of a nationalist movement. After all his negotiating, however, he found that the Sultan still looked to Enver and his associates ; it was scarcely to be expected that a man brought up in the seclusion of the Palace, insulated from the outside world, would be able to comprehend Kemal's nationalism or the sources of his confidence. Faced with the immediate threat of partition, Kemal turned to the people. He had secured an appointment as Inspector-General in the interior where already a nationalist association, The Anatolian Defence Rights Association, had been formed. On May 19, 1919, he landed at Samsun.

Years later at a congress of the People's Party in 1927, he told the story of the months that followed. His speech took six days to deliver and the translation of it into English runs to seven hundred closely printed pages. It includes documents, detailed reports of negotiations, and descriptions of military operations ; it constitutes the official account of the capture of power by the People's Party. Its business-like opening, " I landed at Samsun on 19 May, 1919 ", dates the beginning of the War of Independence and the Kemalist movement from the moment when he turned his back on Istanbul and sought the foundations of the new Turkey in the interior.

Almost precisely at the time that Kemal was landing at Samsun the Greeks were landing at Smyrna, and their advance acted as a spur to his movement. Nevertheless he had difficulties of all kinds to overcome. The general commanding the Erzurum garrison was conscientiously faithful to the Sultan, and Kemal had to convince him by patient argument that his loyalty must be not to the head of the State, who was controlled by the Allies, but to the people in whom sovereignty ultimately rested. An expres-

sion of this sovereignty was given by a conference of delegates held at Erzurum in the summer of 1919. The machinery of the Eastern Anatolian Defence Rights Association had been used to get this gathering, and the assembly marked a new phenomenon in Turkish life. It was not a Committee composed of a few score conspirators, but a body of delegates representing hundreds of thousands of the Turkish people ; the congress at Erzurum was the forerunner of the People's Party with its million and a quarter members, and it signified the participation of the masses in the Turkish revolution. It was by Kemal's insight at this time that he showed his stature as a statesman.

"Henceforth Stamboul does not control Anatolia but Anatolia Stamboul," he declared. He secured the signatures of other nationalist leaders to a declaration that the Sultan's government was entirely under foreign control, and that the activities of the various Nationalist organisations throughout the country must be co-ordinated by the summoning of a congress representative of the whole of Turkey. Kemal and his associates were challenging the Sultanate and urging that obedience should be withheld from all officials who were not in sympathy with the nationalist cause. The logical consequence of this, which Kemal argued the other leaders into accepting, was a Nationalist Provisional Government. It was now a conflict of allegiances ; each Turk must choose which of the two governments of his country he would recognise and obey. When the Sultan telegraphed instructions to the Governor of Erzurum to arrest Kemal, the loyal soldier disobeyed and affirmed an allegiance to the other authority.

The All-Turkey Congress met at Sivas in September 1919. The task before it was "to place in action the national forces under the sovereign will of the people". Kemal as

President of the Congress had to use all his abilities to convince the delegates of the need for determination, and to inspire them with his own confidence. Some of those who spoke believed that Turkey could only be saved from extinction by becoming a mandate of Britain or of the United States ; others, unwilling to go so far as this, shrank from the idea of resistance to any demands of the Allies and from any possibility of civil war. The Allies did not abstain from threats—while the Congress was sitting, four battalions of British troops were landed at Samsun, but could do little but re-embark. The Sultan too continued to instruct local officials to arrest Kemal and disperse the Congress—but without effect.

When the tactics of suppression failed, the Sultan tried other means of maintaining his position. He shuffled his ministers and declared elections to the Assembly which met at Constantinople in January 1920. Kemal had been almost alone in urging that its place of meeting should be in the interior, preferably at Ankara, a small country town, “ a cloud of dust near the railway line ” as someone described it, which had become the Nationalist Headquarters. The Assembly did not choose Kemal as its President, but, meeting in Constantinople under the very noses of the Allies, it affirmed the National Pact, which had been drawn up by the Nationalists and defined their objectives. The pact recognised self-determination for the Arabs who had been under Ottoman rule. It demanded the same right for the Turks themselves. It declared that Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora must be secure. It asserted the rights of the minorities in Turkey. And lastly it demanded complete independence and the ending of restrictions—so that national and economic development might be assured under the direction of a more up-to-date and regular administration.

The Allied reply to this was to occupy Constantinople and to arrest forty members of the Assembly. The Assembly moved to Ankara in April 1920 and organised resistance. It was a long struggle ; it was October 1923 before the last foreign troops left the country. At the beginning of the struggle the Allies were in Constantinople, the Greeks had occupied Smyrna and its hinterland, the French and Italians had taken zones in the south of Anatolia, and it appeared that the Kurds and the Armenians would be used by the Allies against the Turks. All the external support that the Nationalist movement had was from the new Russian government, which was faced with similar interventionist forces on its own territory.

Kemal's principal military collaborator was Ismet, who had been his chief of staff when he held the command with the army in the Caucasus in 1916. To Ismet belongs the credit of the first great victory over the Greeks—at Inonu in January 1921. (Ismet was in future to take the name of this battle as his surname.) Most of the others who surrounded Kemal had been soldiers. Exceptions were Dr. Adnan and his wife, Halidé Edib, intellectuals who shared with Kemal and two or three others the honour of being sentenced to death in their absence by a court-martial in Constantinople for their treasonable Nationalist activities. Kemal, however, was unquestionably the leader ; as Ismet, who enjoyed his confidence more fully than any other in the group, once said, " Mustafa Kemal is the master. We are only assistants."

The Greeks, despite their defeat by Ismet at Inonu, rallied and launched an offensive. They took the railway junction of Eskişehir—where the line from Constantinople to Ankara meets the line from Constantinople to Adana ; and they forced the Turks back beyond the Sakaria river.

KEMAL ATATURK

In the middle of 1921 Kemal was made Commander-in-Chief—at a time when the struggle seemed to be lost and the Turkish army was outnumbered by four to one. A few days after this appointment, however, the Greeks were defeated at the battle of the Sakaria and Ankara was saved. In the succeeding months Kemal had to struggle to maintain his position against those who wished to limit the President to the performance of little more than ceremonial functions ; and at the same time he had to remodel the Turkish army. He succeeded in both his tasks and in August 1922 he was able to declare to his soldiers that their goal was the Mediterranean. A fortnight later the Turks had recaptured Smyrna, which had been the Greek base, and had driven the invaders out of the country.

But Kemal's greatest triumph was still to come in the incident at Chanak which led to the overthrow of Lloyd George. After the occupation of Smyrna, Kemal sent a column of troops to the Dardanelles, where an Allied force was stationed. The French and Italian contingents withdrew, leaving the British alone to block the way to Europe. Public feeling in Britain was such that there would have been little support for any military action against the Turks, and the Garrison at Chanak was in no position to maintain itself ; accordingly the Allied Powers meekly agreed to yield to the Kemalist government the bridge into Europe by ceding to the Turks Adrianople and Eastern Thrace, which the Treaty of Sèvres had attached to Greece.

The military success determined the course of the subsequent negotiations with the Allied Powers and gave to Turkey, alone of the defeated in the Great War, the benefits of a negotiated settlement. Ismet was sent as the leader of the delegation to the Conference at Lausanne, and there

in 1923 concluded the Treaty which secured the independence of Turkey.

STATESMAN

Ataturk's victory had its repercussions throughout Europe and Asia, above all in the Arab lands and in India, where nationalist movements against the European imperialist powers were growing in strength. In Central Europe too, among the defeated states which had been allied with the Ottoman Empire, the liberation of Turkey aroused enthusiasm, and the Hungarian Prime Minister, visiting Ankara, presented Kemal with a sword of honour in recognition of his victory. If at this time Kemal had been less wise, he might have entertained plans of reviving the Ottoman Empire or of playing on Pan-Turanian or Pan-Islamic sentiments. Enver Pasha, his one-time collaborator, and later partly successful rival, had tried to realise such projects. After being forced to take flight after the Armistice, he had tried to set up a Turkish state in Turkestan. and after a chequered career as a leader of a force of soldiers he appeared in September 1920 at a congress of the oppressed peoples of the East convened by the Communist International at Baku. This congress was unimpressed by his cleverness and asked for proof of his revolutionary convictions. Enver failed to give these proofs and was finally killed as a rebel in Russian Turkestan. But Kemal knew that the military successes which the Turks had won came from a desire to preserve the integrity of their country, and that there was no guarantee that popular support would be given to him if he embarked upon an ambitious campaign of conquest.

Moreover, there was other work to be done if Turkey was to remain independent. It was not only formal indepen-

dence in the sense of freedom from being partitioned, or assigned as a mandate, but emancipation from the financial control to which the Ottoman Empire in the days of its decline had become subject. Kemal had no preconceived plans except in the broadest outline. He recognised, however, the technical triumphs of Western Europe, and was forced to the conclusion that Turkey must adopt Western methods if it wished to maintain what had been won by force of arms. The obstacles hindering the adoption of these methods must be swept out of the way.

As a preliminary the Sultan had to go. For this the moment had had to be chosen carefully since many in the Nationalist Party looked for a reconciliation with the Sultan and a change of heart on the part of the entourage of the court at Constantinople. Kemal was given his opportunity by the support given by the Sultan to the demand for two delegations—one from the Nationalists and one from the Sultan's party—at the Conference of Lausanne, so that Turkey would have spoken with a divided voice to her enemies. Kemal could declare to his indignant supporters that henceforth there would be no more Sultans in Turkey and that sovereignty had now been resumed by the nation ; but at the same time he made a concession to conservative sentiment by asserting that the religious functions—the Caliphate—remained attached to the former imperial family. But its lay power was at an end.

It was not long, however, before the Caliphate shared the fate of the Sultanate. It became the rallying point for opposition elements, including some of those who had been Kemal's supporters but did not like the trend of events. A message to the Caliph from some leading Indian Moslems which was prematurely published in the Turkish papers, offered the pretext for a campaign against the Caliph's

position and gave the occasion for a declaration of the policy of westernisation of which the expulsion of the Caliph was an integral part.

But social customs, linked with religion and standing in the way of the new life that the Kemalists planned for Turkey, could not be overturned so easily as the Sultanate or the Caliphate. Soon after the expulsion of the Sultan, Kemal announced a change which aroused fiercer opposition and struck at the established habits and customs of the people—the prohibition of the fez. The method by which this change—which had far-reaching religious implications, because the Western hats which had to be worn instead made it impossible to lay the forehead upon the ground in prayer—was carried out, is an interesting example of the cautious way in which Kemal had to work. First, peaked caps were issued to the army ; then the other forces followed suit. The Gazi began to appear himself in Western clothes and a panama hat, and finally in a speech in September 1925 he declared in his forthright manner, “ We will wear boots and shoes, trousers, shirts, waistcoats, collars, ties. We will add brims to the coverings we place on our heads, or to speak more plainly, we will wear hats. We will dress in morning coats and lounge suits, in smoking jackets and tail coats. And if there are persons who hesitate and draw back, I will tell them that they are fools and ignoramuses.”

On the last night that a Turk could legally wear a fez there was rioting ; and for years, it is said, old men continued to put on the forbidden headgear in the evenings and in the privacy of their homes. But no concessions were made ; sentences of as much as ten years’ hard labour were imposed on those who were obstinate in public.

More far-reaching and scarcely less dramatic was the

substitution of Latin for Arabic script. Here again Kemal gave personal leadership. A few tentative steps were taken—the Latin letters were used by Kemal in private correspondence, then on the postage stamps, then on paper money and then in scientific courses at the government colleges. Finally in the summer of 1928 Kemal set up the blackboard in the palace of Dolma Bagtche and acted as school teacher to the high officials of the government. After three months of this kind of propaganda the matter came before the national assembly, introduced by the President himself in the first speech to be broadcast in Turkey, and it was unanimously agreed that after the beginning of June 1929 there should be no further use of the Arabic script. The whole population was reduced for a short time to illiteracy and the printing trade was paralysed—only one book was published during the whole of 1929, and government assistance had to be given to put the newspapers on their feet. But the advantages were overwhelming; it now took two months to learn what had previously taken two years, so that the ability to read might be the possession of the whole population instead of the privilege of a few.

So in every field, Kemal led by precept and example. It was so even with his marriage, for he chose as a wife a woman who was as modern, emancipated and independent-minded as he declared all Turkish women, in defiance of the Mohammedan customs, ought to be. But Kemal for all his principles could no more stand marriage to someone with pretensions to be his equal than he could tolerate the irksome life at home where his mother and sister fussed over him. The marriage was a failure and Kemal himself curtly declared its formal dissolution.

Until his death in 1938 Ataturk continued to be univers-

ally recognised as the leader of his people. He was not an absolute dictator in the sense that his measures were not subject to criticism and amendment, but that criticism and amendment must come only from those who accepted the principles of the Kemalist revolution. In making reforms, as the examples of the transformation of clothes and the introduction of the Latin script show, new methods unknown to any previous Turkish government had to be used, for these changes demanded a break with customs which had ruled the lives of the mass of the people, and consequently they could not be imposed purely by force. The Kemalist government could achieve its ends in the long run only if it felt its way carefully to secure a degree of collaboration on the part of the masses. Kemal formed the Republican People's Party in 1923 as the vanguard of a constructive revolutionary movement, intending that its hundreds of thousands of members should consciously constitute a leadership in every town and village in the country; but at the same time he was the embodiment of the new regime and its inspiration. That the masses of the people should be broadened in their outlook, that they should be shaken out of the traditional ruts in which they moved, that opportunities for technical and general education should be given to them—these were necessary if his aim was to be accomplished, and if the independent Turkey, enriched by industrialisation and by a more productive agriculture, was to play a part of its own in world affairs.

He exercised his leadership during fifteen years of peace. He retained to the end the energy and decision which he had shown in his military career, although venereal disease, which he contracted while military attaché in Sofia, ruined his strong constitution, so that periodically he was rendered completely helpless by illness. Some of his biographers

have relieved their political narrative by highly-coloured pictures of the drinking bouts which he had from time to time, when he cared for no company but that of a small clique of drunkards and debauchees, whose political influence however he strictly confined to precisely nil. This relief from the strain of politics further weakened his health, and contributed to the arbitrary temper which showed itself at intervals in acts of personal despotism. There is one example from the last months of his life. The newspapers had been forbidden to make any reference to his illness. One of them was so unwise as to report a temporary recovery and to write in glowing terms of the relief with which the Turkish people would hear this news ; it was suppressed for three months.

That illness ended in his death in November 1938, and by then Kemal's life work was well done. His country had maintained its independence, established a position among its neighbours and farther afield which was stronger by far than that which the Ottoman Empire had had ; the foundations of Turkish industry had been laid, and everything indicated that within a generation of 1923 the habits and outlook of the people of Turkey would have been revolutionised. Ismet Inonu, once his Chief-of-Staff, more recently his Prime Minister, succeeded him. At first some said that he was pro-German, others that he was pro-Soviet. Some feared a reaction, perhaps even a revival of that religious influence which Kemal had always despised, while others again believed that Ismet Inonu would follow faithfully the principles on which his predecessor had worked. It was certain, however, that in the coming years all of Kemal's statesmanship would be required if Turkey was to maintain the position he had won for her.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

THE Constitution of Turkey is a concise but comprehensive document. It was drawn up by Ataturk himself and voted in 1924, and shows the influence of American, French and British examples. Some of its articles have since been amended to give effect to the more important social changes which have been effected. So, for example, one article was amended in 1934 to extend the suffrage to women (and incidentally to increase the voting age from eighteen to twenty-one). Under this written constitution, as it stands, Turkey is declared to be a republic with a President at its head. The legislative and executive power is exercised by a single chamber of deputies—the National Assembly—indirectly elected by universal suffrage. The Constitution further outlines the judicial organisation and the broad principles of local government; and it includes a section entitled *The Common Law of the Turks* which defines and asserts the rights of the individual. Amendments to the Constitution must be voted by a two-thirds majority of the chamber of deputies—but no proposal to amend the first article declaring the State to be a republic is to be entertained.

To classify the written constitution according to its various features does not reveal the balance of political power in a modern state. It is necessary to examine the practice of the constitution as distinct from its form, to discover the personnel of the government and to see what part is played in political life by voluntary associations—

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

and in the case of Turkey by the one party in existence, the Republican People's Party. Moreover, as the working of the Turkish constitution in the past fifteen years has shown, a great deal depends upon the personality of those in leading positions; the relative importance of different posts and the use which is made of the powers attached will depend upon the men who fill them.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

The head of the State is elected by the National Assembly from among its members for its own term of office, which is four years. At the end of that period according to the Constitution he may be replaced or re-elected; the decision is in the hands of the new Assembly.

While in office he presides over the Assembly on ceremonial occasions—and in case of necessity over the Cabinet; he represents the National Assembly as supreme commander of the army and in time of war names the military commander-in-chief with the advice of the General Staff and the approval of the Cabinet; he selects the Prime Minister from among the members of the National Assembly and is responsible for promulgating within ten days the laws which the Assembly passes. He has what amounts to a suspensory veto in the case of legislation, since he may send any law back to the Assembly for reconsideration; but if the Assembly stands by its decision he must give way.

These powers do not seem extensive, but the President of the Republic has been far from being a figurehead—on the contrary he has been until now the leader of the Turkish Republic in a very real sense. Atatürk held the position of President from the foundation of the Republic until his death in 1938, and was during that time unquestionably the dominating figure in the life of the country and director

MODERN TURKEY

of the sweeping changes made. His popularity and his remarkable powers assured him authority, but he was not able to act in complete disregard of the Assembly or of the sentiment of the people. Take as an example the abolition of the fez with all the implications that that had. He was not able to enact this change without careful preparation and sounding of opinion in the Assembly and, where he knew that his proposals would be sympathetically heard, in the army. In other cases proposals which Ataturk perhaps initiated had to be brought before the Assembly by the Cabinet (for the President may not himself take part in the discussions of the Assembly) and there be discussed and amended.

Ataturk has been succeeded by Ismet Inonu, who was for many years Prime Minister under him. His is a far less clear and forceful personality; but again the most experienced statesman in the country rather than some dignified nonentity has been elected President. Ismet Inonu's qualities appear rather to be those of an organiser and administrator than of an initiator of changes. It may well be, however, that this is precisely the type of leader and example that the Turkish people need now that the fundamental changes have been made.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

In the words of the Constitution the National Assembly—the *Kamutay*—"exercises both legislative and executive functions, the former directly and the latter indirectly through the President of the Republic and the Ministers of State". It is to this Assembly that anyone who wishes to understand the government of the country and to find its sovereign must direct attention. For Turkey is a country where the experience and views of the leaders are con-

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

stantly to be supplemented by the experience of the representatives of the masses of the people. Explicit safeguards are inserted in the Constitution to prevent the President from usurping power ; for example the Assembly meets annually on a certain date even without being summoned, and the President is specifically forbidden to use his prerogative of annulling or commuting sentences in the case of Ministers whom the Assembly has impeached.

In times of emergency such as have arisen since the outbreak of the present war the Assembly may vote extraordinary powers to the government. The authority of the Assembly is made clear, however, by the fact that the government is obliged to ask for such powers which are granted only for a definite purpose.

The Assembly is in session for at least six months every year and the annual Budget must be placed before it at the beginning of the session. It makes its own rules of debate and elects its own officer to preside at its meetings. This President of the Assembly must temporarily take the place of the President of the Republic if he is ill or abroad or if his office is vacated by death and a successor has not been chosen. According to the Constitution the functions of the Assembly are the making, amending, interpreting and abrogating of laws ; concluding treaties ; declaring war ; examining and ratifying the laws drafted by the commission on the Budget ; coining money ; accepting all contracts and concessions involving financial responsibility ; decreeing amnesties ; mitigating sentences ; expediting judicial investigations and penalties and executing sentences of capital punishment handed down by the courts.

The choice of the Prime Minister from among the members of the National Assembly rests in the hands of the President of the Republic ; and since there is no system

of competing parties as in most countries with representative institutions this would seem to be a very real responsibility. The Prime Minister selects his cabinet from the Assembly ; there are sixteen members, including some ministers without portfolio. It is this cabinet which directs the government of the country, but the individual members of the Assembly are called on to play a very real part in the work of administration. No member of the Assembly may accept any government post—as a governor of a province, for example, or as an ambassador—and continue to hold his seat ; and any member who without good reason absents himself for two months from the meetings of the Assembly must resign.

Each member is attached to one of the permanent commissions of the Assembly which discuss projects of legislation and make amendments to them before they come to a plenary session of the Assembly for approval or rejection. A member will belong to the commission dealing with the subject which particularly interests him and on which he has special knowledge ; he may attend the meetings of other commissions if he wishes but can only have full voting rights in one. The deputies themselves explain that they do more work in their commissions than in the plenary session ; for a piece of legislation will go possibly to more than one commission (a plan for an irrigation scheme would go to the Agricultural Commission, the Budget Commission and probably to the Public Works Commission as well) and ministers will be invited to attend the commissions to explain their plans. The final decision may, however, have to be taken in the Assembly because of differences of view arising between the commissions interested.

The overwhelming majority of the members of the

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

National Assembly—386 out of 399 was the figure after the General Election of spring 1935—are members of the Republican People's Party and so attend the meeting of the parliamentary group of the Party. Here unlike the sessions of the Assembly the proceedings are secret. One day of the week is set aside for this meeting, which takes at least two or three hours and may last the clock round if important decisions have to be made. All members are free to speak and decisions taken there may not be challenged in the Assembly; it is probably here that members in practice exercise the right of initiative in legislation which under the Constitution belongs to them. The attendance at these meetings is good and the discussion is keen.

In 1930 Atatürk, after a study of democratic constitutions in Britain and elsewhere, decided that Turkey needed an opposition; contrary to the advice of the Party he authorised an experienced politician named Fethi Bey to form an opposition group in the Assembly and had arrangements made to see that this group—the Independent Republican Party—secured some seats in the Assembly at the General Election. The experiment in a controlled opposition, however, was not a success. The various social and religious changes had aroused opposition among the reactionary elements in the country and the existence of Fethi Bey's party provided a justification and focus for the expression of this opposition. There were street fights between supporters of the opposition and supporters of the government; members of the Independent Republican Party drifted back to the People's Party and the leader himself finally resigned. The regime was not sufficiently consolidated for opposition to it to be encouraged in this way.

What Atatürk had in view (apart from the conciliation

of democratic opinion abroad) was the education of the people in political issues, for he believed that that education would come from the open clash of opinion in debate in the Assembly. Since the death of Ataturk the project has been revived—this time with the approval of the People's Party. Twelve of the Party deputies were in the summer of 1939 instructed to form an opposition group of devil's advocates in the Assembly. They remain, however, members of the parliamentary group of the People's Party and even attend its meetings, although they may not vote or take part in the discussions there.

The elections to the Assembly take place every four years and are controlled carefully by the People's Party. The population as a whole elect—under the inspiration of the Party—the “electors” who are actually charged with the duty of choosing the members of the Assembly. The candidates who come forward at this second stage are discussed by the Party and finally a list of approved candidates is published, with more names for each constituency than there are seats to fill. Most of those approved will be members of the party, but a few individuals are placed on the list and perhaps eventually become deputies because of some special knowledge or technical qualification which the local People's Party believes would make them of value to the Assembly. After this sifting of candidates the actual selection by the electors takes place and the requisite number of members are chosen. The deputies are regarded as the means of contact between the people and the government; they are encouraged by the government to travel about the country and twice a year it is the custom of the deputies to go to their constituencies to attend meetings in villages or factories or in the different parts of towns to hear the opinions and the needs of their constituents.

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

This is not an obligation imposed by the Constitution ; but a deputy will quickly explain that if he did not render an account of himself in this way he would find at the following election that even if the People's Party placed him on the list of approved candidates he would not be chosen as a deputy by the electors.

For the ambitious, membership of the National Assembly offers perhaps the best avenue of advancement. It is not easy to achieve, since it takes a good deal of local public service to secure election, and the duties of a deputy are too onerous to enable, for example, a working farmer to perform them in his spare time. From the Assembly are recruited not only cabinet ministers and under-ministers but many of the ambassadors and some of the governors of provinces. There seems to be interchange in this way between the highest positions in the civil service and the membership of the Assembly ; but on the other hand the impression suggests itself that many of the members of the Assembly have no ulterior ambitions, but because of their local standing or past services to their country are judged by their neighbours to be adequate representatives and reliable rulers.

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

In a country which is so large and, despite the remarkable progress that has been made, even now so ill knit, the central government must seem remote to many of the inhabitants ; and local government institutions are consequently of great significance. Local government is under the control of the Ministry of the Interior and the country is divided into sixty-three provinces (*vilayets*), themselves composed of smaller units.

Each of these provinces is under the control of a governor

(the *vali*) appointed by the central government. He is the pivot of the administrative structure and upon his energy and personality everything depends. His is not a job for a bureaucrat or a routinier. The terms of his appointment require that he shall spend two months out of the twelve travelling round his province ; but a good governor will probably spend more time than that making contact with the people he governs and with the minor officials responsible for carrying out his instructions. He is assisted by two councils—one made up of officials, the other elected by the same electors that choose the deputies for the Assembly. If disagreements arise with this representative council they must be referred to the Minister of the Interior at Ankara for his decision.

Each province is composed of a number of districts (*kaza*) and each of these of a number of communes (*nahiye*) which in their turn are composed of villages or the wards of towns. The smallest units have their councils and their headman (*muhtar*) chosen by the villagers. The communes and districts have elected councils and in addition there are full-time officials. There is no rigid division of function between the various grades of this administrative hierarchy ; its purpose is to get the general instructions of the central government put into effect.

Take as an example the pressing question of education. It is the general policy of the government to see that every village in the country has a school—but it cannot afford itself to build this vast number. It is prepared to provide teachers and pay for them, but the villages must themselves be responsible for the building. The governor will be concerned to exhort the village people and explain the advantages that will result from the building of a school rather than to threaten them with penalties if they do not

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

comply. Some governors have had plans prepared for schools of different sizes for villages of varying populations ; and a governor will take particular pride in the progress which his province has made in building schools.

Education is not the provincial governor's only concern. In conjunction with the other officials he is responsible for building roads and hospitals as well as schools ; in addition he controls the police and calls up men for military service within his province. He is a man of such prestige and authority that he is able to do a good deal unofficially and probably can do much in this way to influence elections and to advance those whom he believes to be worthy of it.

The work done by the local government bodies is generally financed out of the proceeds of certain taxes which are specially retained in the province—the land, building and road taxes in particular. In addition to the income from these the provincial governments receive grants from the national exchequer for special purposes such as the building of hospitals and the promotion of higher education.

This machinery of local government has been almost entirely transformed by the Republican regime. There did exist *vilayets* and *valis* under the Ottoman Empire, but the division of the country was largely traditional and any progressive energetic spirit was lacking. The boundaries of the provinces have been adjusted now to make them more manageable—but natural features and economic factors have made it impossible to make all the provinces the same size. The central government chooses the holders of local government posts very carefully, but at the same time the officials cannot ride rough-shod over the wishes of the local inhabitants. The ultimate unit of the Turkish countryside, the village, not only takes charge of certain elementary services for itself but is encouraged to develop

these communal activities—as in building schools. This encouragement of communities to develop and elaborate their own services seems to be the essence of Turkish local government. The village council and the elementary democratic practice which it represents are no doubt well established in Turkey and a good deal older than the Republican regime ; but that regime has wisely built upon these institutions and sought to direct their activities and infuse them with greater energy.

Apart from the routine supervision of local government bodies by the Minister of the Interior an administration of inspectors-general has been set up in two parts of the country. The provinces of Thrace—Turkey in Europe—have been put under one of these inspectors while the east of the country has been divided between three of them. There is a military element in these inspectorates which are officially intended to work with the governors of the provinces and to ensure that the government's policy is carried into effect by them ; at the same time the collaboration between the governors of a group of provinces permits useful discussion of regional problems and large-scale non-military planning. The normal powers of these inspectors-general embrace public security, economy, the organisation of local administration where it is faulty or lacking, and the creation of People's Party organisations where necessary. It is significant, however, that the parts of the country which have been put under this organisation are on the borders—and in the case of the eastern provinces unsettled parts where there has been a good deal of hostility to the government. It is probable that other groups of provinces will be put under the same system of inspectors.

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AND ITS PLACE IN THE GOVERNMENT

An account of the National Assembly makes it clear that the People's Party is an intimate part of the administration of the Republic. A reading of the Constitution shows the same, for the six principles of the Party—republicanism, nationalism, popular sovereignty, state socialism, secularism and revolution—symbolised by the six arrows of the party badge were in 1937 inserted into the Constitution as the bases of the Turkish state. The system of government cannot, in fact, be understood without a description of the Party and its methods.

Although it is the only party which exists, the People's Party does not force itself on a visitor's attention. Its members do not wear uniforms and there are no elaborate storm-troop parades with flags and brass-bands. Even party badges, although they are on sale in a few shops, are rarely worn. There is no party youth movement; the members support the large patriotic organisations which exist for young people. Yet the party now has some 1,300,000 members—nearly one in twelve of the population—and upon it the government of the country rests.

Its structure is democratic and its organisation is based upon the governmental divisions of the country. The basic groups in the villages and town wards send their representatives to make up the party committee of the commune. These committees send representatives to form the district committee and these district committees in their turn send representatives who compose the committee for the province. Congresses are held on a provincial basis every second year and national congresses at Ankara every fourth year. These congresses are not merely to give a few

MODERN TURKEY

leaders a chance of making speeches but are for discussion of the needs of the people as a whole (no delegate may speak except in accordance with his mandate). The structure of the party is not functional—there is no organisation for, say, all the members who are railwaymen or all who are miners. In some cases (for example, that of the large government cotton factory at Kayseri) an industrial undertaking will be reckoned as a unit for the purposes of party organisation and will have its own party committee which sends representatives to the body above it in the hierarchy. The governor of the province keeps closely in touch with the Party organisation and pays attention to the proposals which are made through it. There was, in fact, at one time an attempt made to amalgamate the Party machinery with the state administration and the governors were the presidents of the Party in their provinces. This, however, proved unsatisfactory and in the last few years the connection between the Party and the State has been less intimate. The President of the Republic, however, is President of the Party. A large Party-organisation does not exist—apart from the Headquarters in Ankara the party seems to depend upon honorary officials directing small full-time office staffs. The organisation of People's Houses (*Halkevleri*)¹ is under the influence of the party and party members play a large part in the running of them.

The Party adopted in 1935 an extremely comprehensive programme which is declared to be "our intentions, not only for a few years but for the future as well . . . put together in compact form". This programme not only explains at length the six principles of the party but set out in some detail the lines to be followed in the indus-

¹ See page 169.

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

trialisation of Turkey, in the expansion of its agriculture, the management of its finance, the education and health of its people and the defence of its territory.¹ The Party, however, does not need an elaborate organisation (comparable, for example, with that of the Nazi Party in Germany), for it sees the government seeking to realise its programme and prefers that Party influence should be exercised by its members playing their part as Turkish citizens.

That is the essence of the Party—that it should be an organisation of the most progressive and politically conscious of the people. It was founded to provide a solution to the problem with which Ataturk found himself faced—how to give some reality to the principle of the sovereignty of the people in the conditions in which Turkey found herself at the end of the War of Independence. Ataturk saw the large and unpopular changes which would have to be made. In November 1922 he asked the intellectual leaders of the country for their opinion on the formation of an organisation to meet this need ; and later he toured Anatolia holding a series of conferences and discussions in which he explained publicly his proposals for forming a new sort of party—not as he explained like the parties of other countries based on controversial principles and economic interests. In one of his meetings he described his intentions as follows.²

Consider our people. You know our country is essentially agricultural. Consequently most of our people are peasants. When we think of that majority of peasants we think too of the large landowners. How many of these large landowners have we got in our country? What is the extent of the land which they possess? If we examine the question closely we see

¹ See Appendix.

² Quoted in Tekin Alp : *Le Kemalisme*.

MODERN TURKEY

that relative to the extent of our country there is not a single person in it who can be considered a large landowner. Consequently those landowners themselves need and deserve to be protected.

After them there are the craftsmen and the small traders operating in the towns. We are naturally obliged to safeguard the interests of that class of citizens at present and in the future. Just as there are no large landowners ranged against the peasants so there are no large capitalists ranged against the small traders. How many millionaires have we in our country? Not one. Consequently we cannot be the enemies of those who have a little money. On the contrary we shall work in order that we may have among us some millionaires and even some multi-millionaires.

Then there are the workers. Today the number of our factories and workshops is very limited. There are not more than 20,000 industrial workers, while for the revival of our country we need many factories and for that we need labour. We must therefore protect the workers who are no different from the peasants who toil in the fields. Then there are the intellectuals and the men of science. Can that class of our fellow-citizens isolate itself and act against the interest of the people? The duty of these citizens is to mix with the mass of the people, to guide them and to show them the best path to follow in order to ensure their progress and their renaissance.

That is how I see our people. The interests of the different groups can be reconciled perfectly and there are no means of dividing them into classes. All our citizens enter into the group which we call the People. Thus the People's Party will be a school of education in citizenship for our people.

Between 1922 and his death in 1938 Ataturk's ideas and those of the People's Party developed on political as well as on industrial matters. The Kemalist regime moved steadily in a more equalitarian direction, as can be seen by comparing the programme adopted in 1935 with the above speech by Kemal. The elimination, after due compensation, of the remaining large landowners has been widely discussed in government circles, although it has not yet been carried out. It is true that a number of

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

Comparatively wealthy persons exist in private trade and industry. High taxation and the growth of state socialism have discouraged the accumulation of large fortunes ; but neither party programme nor practice shows any objection in principle to the building up of such fortunes.

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE LIBERTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The religious and legal reforms which were carried through in the early days of the Kemalist regime necessitated a complete overhaul of judicial procedure and personnel. New judges were found from among those sympathetic to the changes which had been embodied in the new legal system. Once the reforms had been established an effort was made through the constitution to guarantee the independence of the judges and this point is given special emphasis in the 1935 programme of the People's Party. Decisions in the courts are announced in the name of the National Assembly, but neither the Assembly nor the Cabinet may attempt any kind of intervention against the judges or modify or delay the decisions which the judges have made (the President of the Republic has a limited power to annul or commute sentences in certain cases). There is provision under the Constitution for a High Court which shall include in its jurisdiction members of the Cabinet, of the Council of State and of the Court of Appeals in matters affecting their official duties. This High Court of which the decisions are absolutely final is to be composed of eleven members of the Court of Appeals and ten members of the Council of State and is set up when necessary by the Assembly.

The Constitution includes a statement of the rights of

citizens which recalls the American and French Declarations of the Rights of Man. All Turks are declared to be equal before the law ; no one may be arrested or deprived of his goods without due process of law. These rights, it seems, are actually realised in practice. Similarly freedom of conscience, of speech, of travel and contract, of the press, of assembly and of association are declared to be among the natural rights of Turks. Subsequent articles of the constitution, however, modify this principle somewhat and make it clear that these natural rights may only be enjoyed within the limits of the law. The programme of the People's Party makes limitations more specific.

For example, this programme declares that " no association shall be founded in Turkey with the purpose of propagating ideas of class distinction or of class conflict ". " Associations with internationalist intentions " come under a similar ban in the programme, and in fact the largest voluntary associations in the country—apart from the People's Party itself—are for objects which are wholeheartedly approved by the government and the Party.

In practice too the freedom of the press is subject to very considerable limitations. A large sum of money must be deposited before a newspaper can be founded and editors are naturally unwilling to risk the loss of it. Hence there is no independent working class press, although actual printing costs are extremely low. Most Turkish papers, to quote one eminent journalist, have no desire to offer keen criticism of the government so that difficulties do not arise. The government on its side by means of press conferences seeks to keep journalists informed of its problems and objectives. Atatürk was inclined to treat newspapers in rather an arbitrary way ; and there was a case of one paper which was temporarily banned because it defied his

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

edict that there should be no references in the press to his illness which ultimately proved fatal. Since Ataturk's death it may be stated the press has felt itself a good deal more free to discuss and criticise government policy ; although the more acute among foreign correspondents in Turkey suggest that this greater freedom shows itself most of all in a sudden suspicious sympathy shown by some papers for the activity of certain foreign governments and a tendency to serve their interests.

HOW DEMOCRATIC IS TURKEY ?

On the face of it there seems to be little democracy in Turkey. The dominant personality whose portrait and whose words are to be seen everywhere, the one party system and the one party house of representatives, the ban on internationalist associations and the absence of trade union organisation all suggest a parallel with the totalitarian states of Central Europe. But these resemblances are superficial only. First it must be borne in mind that Turkey has passed through a revolution which has meant very far-reaching social changes. She has sloughed off her empire, broken the power of her priesthood, emancipated her women citizens and begun industrialisation on the basis of state socialism. All this means that Turkey is free from the sharp social cleavages and class conflicts which exist in Germany and Italy. There does, in fact, exist, as the speech of Ataturk's quoted above suggests, sufficient community of interest between the different sections of the population to make a one party system reasonable. Second, for anyone who honestly accepts in principle the changes which have been made (in fact, the six principles of the People's Party now embodied in the Constitution), there is considerable freedom to criticise and to help mould policy.

The creation of the opposition group by the authorities has made it quite clear that it is not unpatriotic or treasonable to offer moderate and constructive criticism of the government. In Turkey, moreover, there is none of the uneasy laughter or pretending not to understand when a visitor wants to discuss politics ; nor do Turks who are critical, even of the leaders of the country, glance uneasily over their shoulders before they express their views. At the same time there is short shrift given to anyone who wishes to form an internationalist association—no matter how innocuous its purpose—or a militant party on a class basis.

It is ludicrous to suggest that in 1923 Atatürk should have set up a theoretically perfect democratic republic like the Weimar Republic which made only the mistake of leaving the reality of power in the hands of those who were not democrats ; or that interested parties inside and outside the country should have been encouraged to exploit conservative sentiment against the republican regime. That course would have led to a loss of all that had been gained by the War of Independence and by the expulsion of the Sultan. The method which has been used has been rather that of building on the democratic elements which already existed—upon the village councils, for example—and encouraging such democratic institutions as co-operative societies in which the masses of the Turkish people may get a training in self-government by managing the matters which most closely concern them. At the same time the people are given a real check upon the deputies by the system of election ; and as citizens or through the democratically organised People's Party can bring their needs and wishes to the attention of their rulers. It is true that the Turks have not carried out any important experi-

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

ments in industrial democracy. There are, for example, no wall newspapers in the factories and no trade union organisations controlling social insurance and the workers have no real share in the planning of industry. But even allowing for all this—the limits placed on voluntary associations and the bureaucratic manner in which industrial planning is carried out—the atmosphere and the general character of the regime is democratic. But the public opinion of Turkey—that is to say the opinion of the workers and peasants which finds expression through the People's Party—is better informed upon the details of home reconstruction than, say, upon the broader issues of foreign policy, and the organisation of the Party Congresses concentrates the attention of the membership on practical local questions which are of the keenest interest to them. Thus on broader national and international affairs the government may operate unchecked by reference to the views of the mass of the people. The educated minority which the policy of the Republic is increasing and scattering more widely over the country are capable of a more informed and independent view of these subjects, but the government's control over the press enables it within wide limits to mould opinion and exercise a very positive leadership. The mass of the population feel that they have a government which is seeking to serve their interests and in which their representative as a rank and file member of the National Assembly can play a very real part ; they feel that their country is a democracy and in an international conflict should range itself with the democracies. Throughout the speeches and writings as well as in the actions of Ataturk there was apparent a firm faith in the ordinary people, the peasants and workers of Turkey, and a real respect for their potentialities. No one can be in contact with Turkish

MODERN TURKEY

government at present without a sense that that attitude still survives and that there is a genuine desire gradually to awaken those workers and peasants to the issues which confront them, to end illiteracy and to give to the masses of the people the control of their country.

CHAPTER V

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PROBLEMS

FOUR-FIFTHS of the Turkish population depend entirely upon the land for their living. In this respect Turkey resembles the countries of the Balkan peninsula ; but there is this important difference—that she is relatively underpopulated while they are overpopulated. The wide variations of soil and natural conditions produce a varied range of crops ; and even a hasty impression of the country reveals that there are in its considerable extent some contrasts in the conditions under which the land is owned and worked.

It is difficult, since Turkish statistics are so poorly developed, to arrive at any worthwhile estimate of the total value of the country's agricultural produce. Some authorities put it at £T.500 millions. Wheat accounts for about a quarter of this ; while the remainder is made up chiefly of other types of grain, vegetables, fruit and such industrial crops as tobacco and cotton. The exports figures give perhaps the most reliable indication of the importance of agriculture in the country's economy—there are indeed no exports of any importance save minerals that are not agricultural.

THE USE AND OWNERSHIP OF LAND

Figures of the proportions of land put to various uses and of the methods by which it is owned are no more reliable than those of the value of agricultural production ; so that it is necessary to speak with the greatest caution. The

official statistics,¹ however, show 14 per cent of the land as cultivated every year, 14 per cent never cultivated, 12 per cent forest, 1.5 per cent devoted to vineyards and olive groves and the remainder—nearly 60 per cent—pasture. This probably underestimates the amount of uncultivated land ; it must be difficult to draw the line between this and the rough pasture which covers so much of the country. Turkey has very little artificial pasture.

There are three important types of landownership.² Some lands were formerly granted away to the church (they are now taken over by the State) and on these a tithe of one-tenth of the value of the produce had to be paid by the occupiers ; others are the property of the State, but may be granted away to a private individual who must pay certain dues ; and others again were in the past granted in perpetuity to individuals who had served the Empire as soldiers. No really satisfactory figures exist to show the effects of these systems of land tenure upon the proportions of the total which fall into groups according to the size of holding or the method of holding it ; nor do the various authorities, who can indeed only write from impressions, agree in their accounts. It may, however, safely be said that of the cultivated land a good deal is taken up by a comparatively small number of large holdings, since 2,000 to 3,000 individuals have upwards of 1,000 to 1,200 acres each and in some parts of the country much larger units are common. The large landowners are usually absentees and work in one of two ways : either they put in an agent who organises production and marketing with the help of hired labourers or they divide the land into small holdings worked by peasants who pay a certain proportion of their produce as rent to the landlord.

¹ *La Turquie en Chiffres*. ² M. Clerget : *La Turquie Passé et Présent*.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PROBLEMS

The church and state lands are for the most part worked in small holdings by peasant families—and like some of the land formerly in the hands of large landowners, some land of this kind may actually have passed into the possession of the peasant. A peasant family may indeed hold several small plots by different tenure. These small holdings account for a varying proportion of the land according to the region. In some parts as little as 15 per cent of the cultivated area and in others as much as 50 per cent will be divided in this way. The holdings themselves vary a good deal in size. A fair average appears to be five acres in the west, eight acres in the south and up to twenty acres in the districts where the industrial crops are grown. Some accounts put these averages higher, but agree that the standard of living of the normal peasant family on a small holding is barely above subsistence level—although there are, of course, local variations and opportunities for more prosperous enterprise. The fairly general recourse to additional sources of income confirms this.

Not all of those who live on the soil own or even rent the plot they work. The agricultural wage workers are mainly on large holdings and receive their remuneration sometimes in kind and sometimes in money. Some peasants work for wages on the land of their richer neighbours as well as cultivating a small plot of their own. The landless workers are not bound to the soil but, especially in the east, there may be whole villages which remain year after year working on a large estate. Government spokesmen are quoted as having said in 1937 that as many as half the peasants have no land—and no sweeping changes have taken place since.

It is not only cultivated land, however, that has significance. Although the division should not be over-

emphasised, cattle-raising and the cultivation of the soil may be separated to a greater degree in a discussion of the agriculture of Turkey than in that of many other countries. Cattle-raising provides the principal occupation of some of the tribes of the interior. Generally speaking, nomadic characteristics have survived most strongly among those living in the most inaccessible parts of the country—in the east in particular.¹ In the centre and west of the country the nomads settle for a part of the year at least. Over almost the whole country cattle move from one pasture to another according to the season. The summer pastures are on the hilltops and provide the richest grass, but the winter pastures are more sheltered. Even the herds of the agricultural college at Istanbul are driven away from the city to a winter pasture.

The agricultural population is the backbone of the country, and it was to the peasants that Kemal appealed for support in the War of Independence. The government has recognised this and has aimed at an increase in agricultural production with the object of raising the standard of living and of making the country self-sufficient in as wide a range of foods as possible. An expansion of the crops which are exported, such as tobacco and hazel-nuts, or which provide the raw material for Turkish industry, such as cotton, has also been encouraged. The government has declared repeatedly its desire to see every peasant family in ownership of sufficient land to provide a reasonable living. Although the government's efforts have been real the success so far achieved is limited. The peasant has been freed of tithe and of some other taxes, but the burden of taxation is still very heavy: to quote Lilo Linke, "The amount that the peasant has to pay is still so high that

¹ See map in Clerget: *La Turquie*.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PROBLEMS

he is nearly broken by the burden.”¹ Two million acres of land have been distributed, but there has been some slowing up of this distribution in the last four or five years.

The government has sought by a variety of means to improve agricultural education and to raise the technical level of farming. Ataturk himself was especially identified with attempts to popularise the most up-to-date methods of cultivation, and he founded near Ankara a large experimental farm which was intended to be an example of what could be done. At the same time efforts have been made to improve the seed available, and with a good deal of success research has been stimulated into plant and animal diseases. Irrigation schemes have been initiated under the Ministry of Public Works. The most important of these schemes was the Cubuk Barrage, completed in 1938, which provides the city of Ankara with a supply of good water. Most of the other irrigation schemes were in the western provinces—on the slopes of the central plateau and some rather serious damage was done to them during the period of the earthquake and accompanying floods at the beginning of 1940.

Last and in some respects most important have been the co-operative associations, and linked with them the endeavours to make credit available to those working the land. Altogether some 600 societies exist for the provision of credit to farmers and they are backed by a soundly based Agricultural Bank. This bank has granted considerable loans and commercial credits, and guarantees a fixed price for wheat by its own purchases. Government policy is to foster rural co-operatives, and since 1937 they have come into existence for marketing produce as well as for

¹ Lilo Linke in a contribution to L. Woolf ed.: *Hitler's Route to Bagdad*.


MODERN TURKEY

the function which they formerly fulfilled—the purchase of requisites and the provision of credit.

Government spokesmen point to the considerable increase in agricultural production since the Republic came into existence as proof of the efficacy of their comprehensive programme. The area cultivated rose from 15,500 square miles in 1927 to 29,900 in 1936. In that period the area under cereals and tobacco doubled and that under cotton almost trebled. Biggest increase of all, however, was in sugar, of which the production was directly encouraged as industrialisation proceeded. In ten years from 1927 the production rose from 5,000 tons to 70,000. Turkish agriculture still presents a variety of problems for solution ; but provided that a policy can be devised to meet these problems it has great potentialities.

THE CENTRAL PLATEAU

The sharpest and most obvious natural division of Turkey is between the coastal fringe on the one hand and the more—arid central plateau which covers the greater part of the centre and east of the country on the other. This plateau is indeed a part of the Asiatic steppe, bounded by the Taurus mountains on the south, and by several ranges in the north, sloping down to the coastal plain on the west and rising in the east to the heights around the town of Erzurum, Mount Ararat and Lake Van. Ankara and Kayseri fall within the central plateau. The traveller making a round trip from Istanbul through Ankara and Kayseri can get an impression of this plateau as he passes for hour after hour across an arid steppe which produces only corn and tufts of grass in summer and is covered by snow in the winter. At Ankara itself the planting of hundreds of thousands of trees has already begun to trans-



AN IMMIGRANT'S FARM ON THE CENTRAL PLATEAU



COTTON PICKING IN CILICIA

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PROBLEMS

form the country by attracting rain clouds and thus making the atmosphere more humid. The traveller will see cultivated patches stretching around the clusters of houses along the route of the railway, but each of the villages is separated from the next by a broad tract of the largely uncultivated steppe.

The principal products of this central plateau are grain and livestock, and the prevailing form of land tenure has for hundreds of years been peasant cultivation. There is no shortage of land in these parts of the country, but the average holding possessed by a family is scarcely large enough to ensure an adequate living. The technical level is still very low, although the government in recent years has sought to encourage farmers to use steel ploughs instead of wooden ones ; and there is no developed rotation of crops. On account of the limited amount of rainfall land is left fallow every other year to accumulate enough humidity for a single crop. What puts a limit to the size of a family's holding is the difficulty of working the land ; and cultivation is hindered not only by technical backwardness but also by the custom of dividing a holding on death among the male and female children surviving. This has led to a strip system under which a family's land will not usually be consolidated together in one place but will be dispersed all over the village. In some villages there has been a redivision of the land to remove the obvious inconveniences which arise from this, but such redivisions, because of the slight differences which exist in the quality of the soil, are difficult to arrange. At the same time a limit is set to the total size of the lands of a village by the difficulties of getting to distant strips and there is said to be a tendency for villages to split if the number of families rises above about thirty-five to forty.

MODERN TURKEY

The agricultural conditions of the central plateau are in fact very similar to those existing in England in the Middle Ages, except that the social structure is not feudal. For the most part in this region the peasants own and have for a long time owned the land which they work. It is here that most of Turkey's wheat is produced, of extremely high nutritive and baking qualities ; some barley is also grown and a little rye. In addition flocks of sheep are pastured and the celebrated Mohair goats are raised. It is the belief of the government that the productivity of the central plateau can be very materially increased by the application of agricultural knowledge and the use of machinery. Something has already been done in this direction even apart from the endeavour, which is probably only very partially successful, to substitute steel for wooden ploughs ; improved strains of wheat well-adapted to the conditions have been discovered by government research stations and an attempt made to induce the peasants to sow in the autumn instead of in the spring. Naturally this has been difficult ; first the experts from the research stations have been obliged to plant specimen fields in the villages to demonstrate the better yields which can be obtained. The following year the seed has been sown in land which the peasants themselves have prepared—this stage is to show that it is the new seed and not the preparation of the ground which is responsible for the better results. Then, in the third season, the peasants in the village are offered the new seed in return for their own supplies. By the use of this method about three-quarters of the peasants have been persuaded to sow in the autumn as compared with one-quarter who already sowed then before the attempt was made to change, but this has only been effected in the comparatively small number of villages

which the research workers and experts have been able to reach.

The scheme for the spreading of agricultural machinery—which, now that the steel works at Karabuk are open, Turkey can for the first time produce within her borders—is far more ambitious and will, when completed, revolutionise agriculture in the central plateau. The plan which has already been initiated is to set up centres of agricultural machinery called kombinats, each of which shall serve a group of villages. At first they are to be under government officials, but gradually representatives of the peasants themselves are to take charge of them. This agricultural machinery will enable fuller use to be made of the land of the central plateau where drought is the principal difficulty and irrigation schemes would be extremely expensive. The land will be ploughed in the spring after the rains and the ground broken again during the summer. This will prevent weeds from growing and conserve humidity in the ground ; sowing will take place in the autumn and the harvest be reaped the following summer. It is calculated that the saving of seed and the improved yield because of the better preparation of the soil will increase the crop from a given piece of land by some 50 per cent. Moreover the government research institutes are to turn their attention principally to the problem of grass cultivation on the central plateau ; and will endeavour to instruct the peasants in the sowing of grass. This is likely to be very difficult, far more difficult than changing the habits of the peasants in relation to the sowing of wheat, because so far the peasants have not been accustomed to sow grass seed.

The proposed kombinats are likely to transform agriculture on the central plateau. Not only will the output of grain and stock be increased and the peasants' standard

MODERN TURKEY

of living consequently raised but the burden of toil will be lightened and the workers on the land able to widen their interests. Moreover, the use of machinery under co-operative control is likely to weaken the individualist outlook and to make the petty boundaries between plot and plot of less significance. How far the government may wish to encourage an attitude of collective ownership and collective activity on the part of village dwellers is not clear, but there can be little room for doubt that the kombinat system will tend in that direction.

The greater production of the central plateau since the Republic has been in existence has increased the proportion of the output which is actually marketed for consumption in the towns or for export. The wheat which the peasants wish to sell may be disposed of to local merchants, and in fact peasants have in the past often been obliged by poverty to sell their crop before harvest. But there is now in existence a government office which is prepared to pay a better price, and the arrangements for agricultural credit through co-operative societies and the Agricultural Bank have taken away the small merchants' advantage. The wheat which the government buys is stored in silos and sold in the ensuing months to millers and bakers. Livestock is sold on the hoof to buyers who go from village to village and drive the cattle which they purchase to inland centres, where they are bought by the butchers, or to ports for export. A threat by the government to set up a purchasing office like that in existence for wheat produced an immediate improvement in the terms which farmers got from the dealers.

THE FOREST REGION

Forests cover some 12 per cent of the area of the country, mostly clothing the mountains which ring the northern,

southern and western edges of the central plateau. Much of the rest of the country is bare of trees, partly because of natural conditions and partly because of the deforestation which has taken place in the past. In some parts of the country this deforestation has been particularly destructive, as, for example, near Adana, where very large quantities of timber were cut for military purposes during the war of 1914-18.

For some years strict regulations have been in existence covering the treatment of forests. By a law of 1937 these regulations were tightened up and the greater part of the forests placed under state ownership and administration. To prevent illegal cutting, a number of the army's conscripts were organised into a special Forest Defence Corps which is doing excellent work in safeguarding the forests. Trees are now cherished not only for their economic uses but for amenity value and effect on the climate.

One result of this policy is that individuals are now forbidden to cut wood except with state permission. Usually this permission is granted to timber contractors if they agree to plant new trees in place of those they cut. The worst hit by these regulations have been the peasants, who made a meagre living by collecting firewood and taking it into the towns for sale ; all villages in forest areas, however, are allowed a timber quota for their own use. The government has already begun to carry out afforestation schemes ; nurseries have been set up for this purpose and foreign experts called in both by the government and the timber companies to advise them on forestry questions.

In the past Turkey imported considerable quantities of wood for fuel, but these figures have been cut down by the more careful exploitation of her timber resources, by

MODERN TURKEY

the development of better internal communications and by the use of alternative fuels. Turkey actually has an export trade in building wood from some parts of the country to Egypt and Syria and sends precious woods to European countries for veneering.

THE CILICIAN PLAIN

The Cilician Plain round Adana and Mersin is the seat of Turkey's large-scale agriculture, which is organised on a capitalist basis rather than one of peasant proprietorship. The dominant—indeed almost the sole—crop is cotton, and it provides the raw material for the State cotton factories at Kayseri, Eregli and Malatya, and the private enterprises of Adana. The cotton farms are large—up to two thousand acres and in exceptional cases even five thousand. Some of them are owned by absentee landlords whose agents hire labour and supervise cultivation. A good deal of the work of cultivation is done by share-croppers, who are responsible for weeding the fields and in return receive a percentage (sometimes a half, sometimes a third) of the crop. This would give them a poor living if they could not supplement it by working in the factories out of the cotton-picking season. Poorly paid peasant labour, which often comes down from the plateau, is used too for the picking of the crop. The government is taking some measures to improve the labour conditions in this district.

More machinery is used here than in any other area in Turkey. There are farmers who buy expensive American machinery and make good use of it. In one case a farmer recently estimated that he used his tractors two hundred and eighty days a year for twenty-four hours a day. The labour laws do not apply to agriculture so that this could be done by a two-shift system and the use of electric head-

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PROBLEMS

lamps on the machines. Generally, however, it is true to say that more extensive use of machinery for cultivation could effect very great saving of labour in this district. It would, however, destroy the living of the share-croppers ; and the extension of mechanisation depends certainly on some kind of State aid in the form of capital and probably on an alteration in the land system.

Government encouragement of the cotton industry has already been extensive. At the three government cotton stations one of which is near Adana, investigations have taken place into the most suitable type of seed ; and on the Cilician plain the Cleveland type is widespread. The government plan is to give facilities to farmers at the end of five years to exchange their cotton seed for a new type without cost to themselves. One such general exchange has already been effected and was the means of extending the use of the Cleveland type.

The whole Cilician cotton-growing district will be transformed by a large government irrigation scheme. A dam is being built across the river Seyhan and a main canal thirty miles long constructed through the cotton-growing district. The government will be further responsible for building the secondary canals and completing the system by irrigation channels which will bring the water to the surface of the farmers' land. This ambitious project, which is due to be completed in 1945, will increase the productivity of the region ; but it is going to involve awkward problems for the cultivators. First it will mean that the land will have to be surveyed by experts so that the farmer may take advantage of levels and slopes to utilise fully the available water supplies. Second, new machinery will have to be bought because much of that which has been satisfactory while the land was unirrigated will be unsuitable.

Last, the canals will cut across the irregular-shaped holdings and so strengthen the case for some form of nationalisation of the land, which has already been widely discussed in this area, and redivision into the most economic units for cultivation.

THE COASTAL FRINGE

The strip of fertile land around the coast is more varied in its products than any other of the natural regions of the country. The climate is warm and even sub-tropical in the south. Figs, raisins, cotton and tobacco are produced, while in Cilicia and the Hatay experiments have been made with coffee and near Trabzon on the Black Sea coast with tea. With the exception of the cotton farms of the Cilician plain the majority of the holdings are small, and compared with those of the central plateau they yield a good return. According to 1938 figures more than half of the value of the Turkish export trade, 80 million Turkish pounds out of 140 millions, is accounted for by five of the products of the coastal district—tobacco, seedless sultanas, dried figs, hazel-nuts and cotton.

Tobacco, which heads the list of Turkish exports, is grown more or less the whole of the way along the Black Sea coast, in the region of Izmir and on the coast of the Sea of Marmora. The trade is under strict state control exercised through the administration of a state monopoly. Until 1925 this monopoly was leased to a French company which operated factories near Istanbul, at Izmir and in other parts of the country. In that year it was taken under state direction, cultivation was extended and new factories built. With the assistance of the newly established Tobacco Research Institute the production of tobacco has increased, although there are considerable variations from

year to year. During the world depression, after the industry had been for some years under state administration, a number of difficulties arose because of the drop in sales. This was not of course a problem confined to Turkey ; it affected all the tobacco-growing countries. The monopoly administration imposed regulations upon its growth ; and actually forbade this in a large number of provinces, which were not well suited for production. This reduction of the area planted restored prices, and an attempt was made at the same time to expand the export of tobacco by the formation under the auspices of the monopoly administration and of the government banks, of a Tobacco Trading Company.

There is no monopoly covering the marketing and export of fruit, but there is a monopoly which has subjected alcohol to severe taxation and so in an indirect way has assisted the vine-growing districts to concentrate on fruit production. The fruit-producing districts are found in different parts of the country, the most important of them near Izmir from which dried fruits, figs and sultanas in particular are exported. As in so many other departments of agriculture foreign experts have been called in to help to raise the standard of fruit cultivation, and tree nurseries as well as stations for research into disease have been set up by the State. At present about one-half the vine crop is being used for the manufacture of syrups, for wine and for other purposes, while the other half is dried as raisins. There is, however, a field for the considerable expansion of this trade, and one of the directors of the I. G. Farbenindustrie of Berlin who recently studied the economic potentialities of Turkey wrote, " If Turkey did not produce anything but grapes the possibilities of her grape production would suffice to make her one of the wealthiest countries in the

world.”¹ These possibilities do not depend upon the coastal strip alone ; although it is this part of the country that is best suited for vine-growing there has been some development even in the heart of Anatolia.

Turkey also exports almonds, hazel-nuts and walnuts of very good quality. In addition she could produce more citrous and soft fruits, and export them fresh or in dried form. Already strawberries for the Istanbul and Ankara markets are grown on the Black Sea coast, bananas in the Adana and Antalya districts and still more in the newly acquired province of the Hatay. A British journalist, summing up the agricultural potentialities of Turkey, wrote as follows² :

Turkey could export immense quantities of grapes, apples, pears, peaches, apricots, strawberries, oranges, lemons, bananas, tomatoes, as well as pulps and extracts from these. She could also export all these fruits in dried form. Pekmez could be used for the manufacture of high-quality marmalades at a lesser cost. Similarly, tomato-juice could be produced in great quantities in many places in Turkey. Turkey possesses the largest number of olive trees in the Eastern Mediterranean. A thorough rationalisation of the olive and olive-oil production could make Turkey one of the largest—perhaps the largest—exporter of these products.

The production of olives and citrous fruits requires capital, since it is some years before labour put into the planting of the trees brings any adequate return. It may be this which has hindered development. For, with the exception of the Cilician plain, the land of the coastal region is split up for the most part into fairly small holdings. The government has done something for the fruit-growing industry by its encouragement of research, by the provision

¹ Quoted in *Turkey : An Economic and Financial Survey*, reprinted from *The Banker*, April 1939.

² *Turkey : An Economic and Financial Survey (The Banker)*.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PROBLEMS

of modern storage facilities at the ports and by the supervision of packing and shipping, but it has not expanded this industry on the scale that the natural conditions would seem to justify.

Fruit, cotton and tobacco do not exhaust the potentialities of the coastal region. Opium is produced in the west around Izmir and the country behind it, as well as on the Black Sea coast and in the east ; it stands high upon the list of Turkish exports. The whole crop is taken over direct from the producer by a government monopoly which was set up in 1932 as part of an agreement with Yugoslavia. These two countries supply the greater part of the opium which is needed by the chemical industry in the world market. Cut-throat competition had brought prices down ; the agreement, however, brought them up again.

Experiments are being made in new crops, of which Turkey hopes in the end to produce enough for her own needs. For example, the growing of tea is developing in the north-east near Trabzon ; and hemp is produced in a number of districts, again especially on the Black Sea littoral.

THE EASTERN DISTRICTS

The east of Turkey presents from the point of view of the system of land tenure a contrast with the central plateau no less than with the highly developed and capitalist Cilician plain. Until recently the land was controlled by tribesmen. Flocks and herds were more important than cultivation of the land ; for natural conditions were specially suited to stock-raising and the inhabitants were nomads. The Kurdish tribesmen were accustomed to move from the plains of Mesopotamia and from the land around Diyarbakir to summer pastures on the heights. These move-

MODERN TURKEY

ments were—and to some extent still are—real mass migrations in which whole families and communities take part.

The improvement of transport facilities in the east is likely to have the effect of making some of the products of the district available for the town market and for export. Farming and dairy industries might be developed in the east itself, and a milk-powder factory has already been put up at Kars. A meat-pressing plant at Trabzon and sugar refineries at other points are proposed; and the cotton grown at Igdir on the Soviet frontier will go to be spun at a mill which is to be built in Erzurum. The motor road now practically completed from the Iranian frontier to the Black Sea coast will contribute, too, to the opening up of the eastern vilayets and to realising their not inconsiderable potential wealth.

THE FUTURE OF TURKISH AGRICULTURE

Agriculturally Turkey is a country of great potentialities. The Republican government, recognising this, seeks to realise these potentialities and at the same time to awaken to activity the peasants who compose so large a part of the population. Since so much of Turkish industry is state controlled the siting of many of the large factories has been determined in accordance with a social policy and the government has, in fact, avoided industrial concentrations. Scattered over the country, many of the factories absorb the farmer's produce as their raw material and all of them provide those who work the land with an alternative source of income. Workers come from as far away as a hundred miles to factories such as that at Kayseri; while they are employed there they see something of the power of machinery, live in a solidly built concrete house, go to a cinema and return to their villages with new

experiences and ideas which they undoubtedly spread. At present the experience of the factory directors is that they do go back to their villages—after they have worked for two years or so and accumulated a small sum of money. In Turkey the factory is not yet accepted as it is in an industrialised Western country; many of those who work in them are peasants so far as their ambitions are concerned and remain in them only for a season perhaps, when there is nothing to do on the land, or for some two years until a small sum has been saved.

It is not only in this indirect way that the outlook of the peasant is being broadened. Elementary education is spreading in the villages; the period of compulsory military training is important, too. For the young peasant from a village where there is no school has the opportunity then of learning how to read and write and gets a daily lesson in general knowledge of a type calculated to destroy any religious superstitions which he still retains and to impress him with the might of his country. Then again the People's Houses which cover the whole country attach great importance to the despatch of small teams of teachers and social workers into the surrounding districts.

Enlightenment is not merely imposed from above. Not only are the villagers urged to build their own schools but they have opportunities through the People's Party and through such congresses on Rural Problems as that held at Ankara towards the end of 1938 to make their needs and wishes known to the government. The co-operatives for the purchase of requisites and the sale of products depend for their effectiveness on the interest shown in them by those for whom they are intended to cater. The kombinats, too, are to be co-operatively controlled after an interim period. All this means encouragement to the

MODERN TURKEY

peasants to use new methods and to work together, learning to control their own future.

Despite these activities of the government the largest single problem which has to be faced in agriculture is that of getting the results of research to the peasants so that they make use of the latest knowledge. Agricultural research has been expanded very fruitfully. The most suitable strains of wheat have been discovered, for use on the central plateau ; cotton seeds have been tested with the result that a new type has been introduced in the Adana district ; and the research workers can say that as a result of their work cattle disease is no longer a serious problem. This knowledge, however, is not being fully used and the remedy must be sought, as many Turkish agricultural administrators recognise, in a nation-wide agricultural advisory service probably organised under the provincial governors.

In the new agricultural production which is being developed Turkey does not aim at more than self-sufficiency. The increased grain production will not—unless the conditions of the world market in a year happen to be particularly favourable—be made the basis for exports. The tea which is being grown experimentally in the north-eastern corner of the country will not become an export crop—but the Turks believe that they will be able to supply the demands of the home market by the production here.

The agricultural products which Turkey partly imports and which it is to be presumed the government will in the future seek to supply from home sources, are sugar and wool (imports of raw wool were valued at nearly 1 million Turkish pounds in 1938). There is every indication that the sugar production and refining carried on in Turkey will more than equal the present consumption in

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PROBLEMS

a short time. The expansion of the sheep and cattle population of the country might be continued almost indefinitely as the kombinat system spreads in the central plateau. The latest figures available show a total of just over 15 million sheep and nearly 6 million head of cattle—an increase of 35 per cent and 20 per cent respectively over the figures for 1923. The Four Year Plan launched in 1938 provides for meat-pressing factories at Trabzon and Bursa.

CHAPTER VI

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

UNDER the Ottoman Empire economic enterprise was the preserve of foreigners and of members of the national minorities—the Armenians and the Greeks. Industry and commerce were undeveloped ; there was a little carpet weaving, a few workshops and small cotton mills, a small-scale exploitation of the coal resources on the Black Sea coast, a tiny chemical industry, and in some districts tiles and pottery were made. The number of industrial workers in the country was well under 20,000. In so far as the country had exports they consisted of tobacco and fruits, both controlled to a large extent by foreign businessmen. The principal public utilities—the tramways, telephones, water supply, gas and electricity of the largest cities in the country as well as the dockyards of the Bosphorus and the harbour at Smyrna, were in foreign hands—usually French or British or the two together.

The principal banking institution was the Ottoman Bank which was under British and French control and occupied a peculiar place in the economy of the country, linking the Ottoman Empire with the more powerful and economically stable empires of Britain and France. Founded in 1856, the Bank had become the Imperial Ottoman Bank in 1863 ; most of the government loans taken up abroad were issued through it. In addition, it took a leading part in the negotiation of public works contracts in the construction of the French- and British-owned railways and in the establishment of a variety of companies which made some handsome

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

profits out of such agricultural and mineral resources of the country as were exploited. Last, the Ottoman Bank played an important part in the setting up of the Ottoman Debt Administration which overshadowed the politics of the country.

EARLY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE REPUBLIC

To the Republican government the industrialisation of the country had an importance which was far more than economic. "In order to endow the State with a structure capable of making up for centuries of indifference, of restoring what was wrongfully destroyed—that is, one fit to stand the severe tests of modern times," wrote Inonu while he was Prime Minister, "it was necessary first to remove the causes of economic weakness." Industry, in fact, was a necessary buttress of Turkish independence. Although even now little more than 10 per cent of the occupied population is engaged in industry, mining and transport, a full understanding of the conditions in modern Turkey is impossible without some knowledge of the course and problems of industrialisation there.

In the first ten years of Republican government private enterprise expanded rapidly under state encouragement. A Law for the Assistance of Industry, passed in 1927, gave a number of advantages to industrial enterprises, increasing in proportion to their size and applying to all but the smallest. Land and buildings required for factories were provided by the State free or on easy terms, and if formerly in private hands could be acquired by compulsory purchase; factories were freed from a number of taxes; customs duties were remitted—so far as the economic clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne allowed—in the case of materials necessary for industrialisation.

MODERN TURKEY

This first period lasted from 1923 to 1933 ; and in view of the condition that the country was in at the beginning of the period the results were striking.

The greatest expansion of enterprise was in mining, food manufacture, the treatment of agricultural products, and the textiles and wood products industries. The number of workmen employed in workshops and factories enjoying the benefit of the code of laws for the assistance of industry was over 62,000 by 1933—a very substantial advance on the 16,000 to 17,000 workers of ten years before.

THE CONDITION OF TURKISH INDUSTRY IN 1933 ¹
(Excluding Transport, Banking, &c.)

Character of the Industry.	Number of Concerns.	Investment in Machinery (in £T.000)	Number of Workers.	Percentage of Workers.	Average Wage (in £T. per annum.)
Mining . . .	18	9,790	9,620	15.5	262
Agriculture . . .	614	21,806	18,028	28.9	175
Textile . . .	335	8,658	16,121	25.9	192
Timber . . .	115	5,525	6,181	9.9	192
Paper . . .	41	2,067	1,392	2.3	424
Metal . . .	77	1,747	1,754	2.9	342
Building . . .	36	2,493	2,033	3.2	248
Chemicals . . .	54	2,858	1,313	2.1	259
Composite . . .	68	4,848	4,619	7.5	133
Miscellaneous . . .	39	3,162	1,154	1.8	250
Total . . .	1,397	55,882	62,215	100	207

¹ Based on material in O. Conker and E. Witmeur : *Redressement Économique et Industrialisation de la Nouvelle Turquie.*

The average units, as these figures show, were small, poorly capitalised and employing few workmen. They were, however, tending to grow larger—the aggregate value of the equipment of the industries and the total number of

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

workers employed was larger in 1933 than in the preceding year, but the total number of enterprises was smaller. In the following year 1934 the number of enterprises again showed a decline, but the figures of capital equipment and labour force employed showed new advances. The total amount paid out in wages in the course of 1933 was just short of £T.13 millions.

As early as 1923 the State controlled a number of factories of which the most important were one for the production of shoes and three for the manufacture of cloth, all situated near Istanbul. A state institution—the Industry and Mining Bank—was brought into existence to act on behalf of the State in their management ; and in addition it provided money for, and so participated in the management of a large number of factories very varied in their products.

Most direct state aid and encouragement in the first period was given to the sugar industry, initiated in 1926 by the setting up of two refineries. Turkey was importing considerable quantities of a commodity of which the raw material could conveniently be produced at home. By 1933 two more refineries were being built and about half the sugar consumption of the country was covered by home production.

In addition to these comparatively large private and state concerns there continued to exist a very large number of small workshops employing up to two or three workers each. The census of 1927 showed the total number of industrial enterprises as over 65,000, employing between them more than a quarter of a million small masters and journeymen. The most important of these were agricultural industries, metal and wood work, building and textiles ; and the total value of their products was returned as some £T.432 millions. To get a complete picture of

MODERN TURKEY

Turkish industry in 1933 it must be remembered that a large proportion of the small-scale industry shown as pre-dominant in 1927 still survived.

In some cases no doubt traditional industries declined. Carpet-weaving, for example, which formerly employed thousands of people in west and central Anatolia mainly in small weaving sheds, slumped from 1927 onwards. In western Anatolia, for example, the number of looms employed fell between 1927 and 1935 from 6,660 to 2,500. The export of carpets declined sharply and steadily; partly because of the greater popularity of cheaper machine-made goods and partly because of the lack of publicity and sales organisation.

This intensive industrialisation was not carried out altogether without some protest from the workers affected. There was a number of strikes, particularly during the years 1927-9, and the small Turkish Communist Party was declared illegal. The larger industries employed a large number of women—in 1933, 25 per cent of the labour force in the factories which benefited from the Industrial Assistance Law consisted of women and 4 per cent, numbering 2,500, were children under 14.

THE INDUSTRIAL FIVE YEAR PLAN

Private enterprise with state encouragement and supplemented by a very modest measure of direct state ownership did not lead to a pace of industrialisation sufficiently rapid to satisfy the government. There had to be resort to direct state control and deliberate long-term economic planning—which began in 1933; the decision was probably affected by the success of the first Soviet Five Year Plan. Certainly this planning of Turkish industry was undertaken only after a credit of sixteen million Turkish pounds (eight million gold

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

dollars) had been secured from the Soviet Union. The scarcity of foreign currency, the desire to raise the standard of living of workers and peasants and the favourable situation of international trade at the time all combined with the desire to secure independence by self-sufficiency, and produced a Turkish Five Year Plan.


The Plan had two sides—it was directed to the establishment of certain consumption goods industries and to equipping the country with certain basic industries which would furnish the means of production. The consumption goods industries which were to be established were textiles (cotton, hemp, woollen and artificial silk goods), paper, glass and bottles, porcelain ; basic industries were coal and coke, iron, chemicals, copper and sulphur. When the government launched the Plan it announced that in working out the details it had three objects in view. First, it aimed at enabling the country to meet its own requirements rather than to seek exports on a large scale, consequently the scale of the industry to be established would depend upon the home market, and neither capital nor labour would be wasted in an attempt to compete in the world market with countries whose industry was already well established. There were two exceptions to this, copper and sulphur, which might perhaps be exported on a large scale. Second, the government was concerned to erect factories which would use raw materials—cotton, timber, iron and coal, sulphur and marble (for use in the glass works) produced within the country. Third, the government had included in the Plan other industries which private capital was unable to establish efficiently.

At the same time it was envisaged that the development of the state industries would stimulate the growth of private enterprise. When, as was the case in textiles, the State

was entering a field where private industry was well established, no attempt was made to drive the existing firms out of business. The establishment of basic industries in particular would, it was anticipated, facilitate the growth of smaller secondary industries which might be in private hands and would receive their manufactured materials cheaply from the state enterprises.

The aggregated capital expenditure which it was calculated would be required to finance this plan was over forty million Turkish pounds—far in excess of the credit which had been negotiated with the Soviet Union. Cotton and iron between them accounted for well over half of this sum. In order to finance and control industry under the Plan the government established in 1933 the Sumer Bank which replaced the former Industrial and Mining Bank. The Sumer Bank, under the law which created it, was given the functions of exploiting the factories which it took over from the Industrial and Mining Bank, administering the state participations in private firms, preparing reports and plans of all new state industrial installations, creating and managing these enterprises and supporting to the extent of its financial capacity industrial enterprises of which the creation would benefit the national economy.

Credit was not the only problem which had to be solved in the execution of this Five Year Plan. What the government was proposing was to carry out in the space of five years a process which in the Western industrialised states had taken fifty or more. There was not a sufficient supply of technical experts, of skilled workmen (except for a small range of industries and even for these only near Istanbul), or even of men and women accustomed to working in factories of the modern type that the government were proposing to erect. When a factory had to be put up, especially



INDUSTRIAL AND RAILWAY MAP.

in a remote part of the country, as some of them were under the government plan, the problems in the transport of materials and the recruiting of the range of experts for the building of the factory as well as for its equipping and operating were considerable.

The siting of the factories was of course a matter of deliberate policy. Not only was proximity to raw materials and availability of transport taken into account in deciding where a factory should go ; the Sumer Bank in making its decisions had to bear in mind the desirability of spreading industrial development as widely over the country as possible and so avoiding dense concentrations of population and factories such as exist in England. Partly this was due to obvious strategical considerations ; partly, too, it was due to the fact that the Republican government looks upon industrial centres as means of providing an alternative occupation for the peasantry ; consequently it does not wish to see the benefits which they believe follow from controlled industrialisation confined to the inhabitants of Istanbul and the large towns of the west and withheld from the majority of the population in the interior. The largest plants constructed so far under the government plans have been at Karabuk (which it is interesting to note is near the coal field but far from the iron mines near Divrigi, where the ore was not discovered until the plant at Karabuk was already in an advanced state. This is thus in contrast with Britain, where the tendency of recent improvements in technique which result in fuel economy has been to encourage the establishment of iron works near the source of iron ore). A large cotton mill has been set up at Kayseri and another at Malatya, neither of them actually in the cotton-growing district but both sufficiently near it for raw materials to be transported without much difficulty

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

and far enough from the coast to be safe in event of invasion. Eregli, where another cotton mill has been set up, is a little nearer the source of raw material but is about a hundred miles inland. Most of the remaining industrial enterprises which have been set up are in the west—at Nazilli or on the shores of the Sea of Marmora.


The major developments of the first Five Year Plan were in the textile industry. Between 1931 and 1938 the total number of spindles rose from 72,000 to 189,000. The Five Year Plan provided for the addition of 10,000 spindles to an already existing factory near Istanbul and the construction of factories at Eregli and Nazilli with 16,000 and 25,000 spindles respectively.

The largest factory has, however, 33,000 spindles and is situated at Kayseri, which the government is developing as an industrial centre. The town has a long history—it was the Roman Cæsarea—and its appearance today is still far from western. Its streets are dust tracks with occasional stretches of cobbles, many of the houses look dilapidated and the town centres on the ruins of the massive Seljuk castle. Old men carrying umbrellas ride along its streets on donkeys and get in the way of the town's occasional taxis or still more occasional private cars; the peasants drive in to market looking as though they came out of an illustrated Bible. Only a mile away, however, is the cotton mill—and in another direction factories assemble aeroplanes. The mill has been employing more than 2,000 men for two shifts of eight hours each and has been working since 1935. Most of the workers and technicians live in the town—but there have been put up near the factory a comparatively small number of cottages for employees with families and larger barrack-like buildings for the single men and women. Attached to the factory is a small but adequately equipped

hospital, a well-decorated canteen, a swimming-pool, a sports ground and a riding club. Lodging for single men and women can be obtained for one Turkish pound per month while the rent of the cottages attached to the factories is six pounds a month and upward. The competition to secure both these lodgings and cottages is very keen as their cost is a small percentage of earnings for unskilled workers and foremen respectively. Nearly all those who have married and settled down as permanent workers appear to hold responsible positions.


Most of the labour is recruited from the villages within a radius of a hundred miles. At Kayseri mill there is a shortage of labour at harvest time because so many of the peasants who have come there to work go back to their villages then. Their places, it seems, are taken by school-boys on holiday. The men do not normally stay to become skilled workers but go back to their villages for good after they have earned enough to set up as farmers. It usually takes about two years to earn the money they want. Nevertheless a minority remain to secure the higher wages of skilled workers, and by the summer of 1939 the factory had been able to dispense with the Russian experts who had been indispensable in its first years.

The centre of private enterprise in the textile industry is Adana. The largest mill there is the personal property of four men who began as traders in the bazaars and gradually built up fortunes which must be among the largest in the country. This factory has had to raise its wages in the last few years because it must compete for labour with the state factories where the trend of wages has been upward ; it relies upon labour recruited from the countryside and has had the same experience of a comparatively rapid turnover of labour as the Kayseri mill. It too has




THE LARGEST COTTON MILL IN THE NEAR EAST, KAYSERI

KOCHIN LIBRARY
KOCRAJAN



Bachelors' Quarters



Married Quarters

WORKERS' HOUSES AT KAYSERI

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

a well-equipped hospital, but the living quarters and canteen provided for the workers are not so well appointed as those at Kayseri. Free cinema shows are given regularly and a reward for specially good work is a ticket to go to the town cinema. As well as this inducement the factory has a cheap and simple method of urging on the workers to greater efforts. Coloured discs are hung above the machines to show which are the best and which are the worst workers. In addition to these factories, which produce cotton textiles, three of those founded by the Sumer Bank and half a dozen more in private hands produce woollen yarns and textiles—to the extent of some 5 million yards in 1938.

The second group of consumption goods industries developed under the industrial plan include paper, glass and ceramics. Most of the factories concerned have been built near Istanbul. A paper mill recently opened at Izmit has very modern equipment and a production equal to half the total consumption of the country. Most of its raw materials are already produced in Turkey, with the exception of cellulose ; this is at present imported but will in the future be home-produced, for a cellulose factory is actually in course of construction near the paper mill. At Pasabagce, also near Istanbul, there has been set up a glass factory which again is calculated to meet about 50 per cent of the total demand of the Turkish market. Its capacity is about 5,000 tons a year. As far as porcelain is concerned little seems to have been done in fulfilment of the Plan—except the state encouragement in some districts of small-scale pottery-making.

The part of the Plan which relates to the establishment of basic industries—iron, steel and chemicals—has been carried out. A sulphur factory was opened at Keciborlu

in 1935 and turns out some 4,000 tons of flowers of sulphur a year ; factories for sulphuric acid are under construction near Zonguldak and for chlorine and caustic soda at Izmit. A revision of the Plan after its original promulgation provided among other items for a new cement factory, recently built at Sivas under the control of the Sumer Bank.

Although these items have their importance the future of Turkey as an industrial country depends in the last resort upon the development of heavy industry. The two centres which are being developed are Zonguldak on the Black Sea coast and Karabuk, some hundred miles inland and connected with the former by rail. An anthracite works has been built at Zonguldak with an annual output of 70,000 tons ; and at Karabuk there was opened in September 1939 the iron and steel works (constructed by the English firm of Brassert Ltd.), on which so many of the plans for Turkey's future are based. In industry, agriculture and military affairs, Karabuk plays an important part in the calculations of Turkey's rulers. Rail communication is to be improved—to make Karabuk more accessible from Istanbul, and to link it with the port of Samsun.

The greater part of the first Five Year Industrial Plan was financed and controlled by the Sumer Bank, which on its foundation in 1933 had a capital of 20 million Turkish pounds. That capital has been increased during the execution of the plan to more than 80 million Turkish pounds. Usually the control exercised over the enterprises for which the Bank was responsible was direct and strict. In some cases similar factories were grouped together in a company under the Bank ; this was the case, for example, with the cotton textile industry where the four principal state-controlled mills were grouped in a limited liability company described as "Fabriques Réunies des Fils et

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

Tissus de Coton de la Sumer Bank". Associated with the Sumer Bank in some of its promotions was the Ish Bank (the Commercial Bank), which in addition controlled a number of smaller enterprises inside and outside the National Plan. Its position was unique. Kemal Ataturk held a controlling interest in the Ish Bank—which was set up in 1924 with a capital of a million Turkish pounds and had a capital of 5 million in 1939—and bequeathed this interest to the People's Party. Though the Bank is thus technically a private bank it is in fact a national institution and is described by the government in an official account of the banking system of the country as "known both in the domestic market and abroad as the best and soundest of our national credit institutions". It took a leading part in the exploitation of the Turkish coal resources and the building of the anthracite works at Zonguldak. It financed the sugar-refining industry, which will soon cover home requirements. It also organised the Turkish insurance business—which had previously been entirely in the hands of foreign firms.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MINERAL RESOURCES

The State has planned the exploitation of Turkish mineral resources. Again a bank—the Eti Bank—has been the institution through which the State has operated the control ; but the outlines of its work were laid down in a Three Year Plan announced in 1937.

The country has considerable mineral resources, but these were not fully investigated and exploited until after the foundation of the Republic. For nearly a century coal had been mined at Zonguldak, but the annual production had been irregular and never rose above half a million tons. In 1923 production stood at slightly under 600,000 tons, but

by 1937 it had risen to more than 2,300,000 tons and the following year exceeded 2,500,000. The production of coal, however, has not increased very rapidly in the past few years and could certainly be much greater than it is at present. Experts attribute this to the lack of modern coal-cutting machinery, and point out that the mines have not been any more successful than the factories in attracting and retaining a permanent body of workers. When the miners drift back to their villages to help bring in the harvest it is not so easy to replace them by holidaying schoolboys for a few weeks. The State, however, has bought out the private operating companies; modern equipment is being introduced and foreign experts brought in as supervisors. It is calculated that the output will be materially increased in the next year or two.

The other minerals which were mined have advanced in economic importance in the past fifteen years. To take one example, the exports of chromium ore increased from 3,400 tons in 1923 to 192,000 tons in 1937; while the production of lignite, which is found in a number of districts in Anatolia, went up from 4,610 tons in 1925 to well over 100,000 tons in 1938. The study and development of the mines has been undertaken by the State Institute of Mining Study and Research; its surveys show that in addition to chromium the country has deposits of iron (at Divrigi), lead, zinc and copper. There was some export of copper even before the war of 1914-18, but mining of it has been considerably developed in recent years and the Eti Bank has acquired and is either working or preparing to work three copper mines in the east of the country.

Such mining operations as were carried out before the foundation of the Republic were mainly directed by foreign concessionaires and a part of the Turkish mineral resources

are still owned by them. To take chromium as an example, about one-third of the total production is in the hands of the Fethiye Soci   , which is a French concern ; another fifth is in the hands of a German concern ; while a fraction of the production is controlled by a British company. A small part of the remaining mines are in the hands of a Turkish private company ; but the greater part, amounting to nearly one-third of the total production of the country, is controlled by the Eti Bank working through a company of its own foundation. Its share of the chromium resources of the country is the very rich mine at Gulemen which was opened up comparatively recently by the Institute of Mining Study and Research. Under the Three Year Plan at present being operated it is proposed that the foreign holders of mining concessions should be bought out by the Eti Bank so that at the end of the period the whole mining industry will be in the hands of the State.

The Eti Bank was also made responsible for developing the power resources of the country. Slow progress only was made in this sphere, however, until the adoption of the Four Year Plan. A contract for the construction of a large power station at Catalagzi on the Black Sea coast near the Zonguldak coalfield was signed with Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Co., Ltd., in April 1940, as part of a £1,500,000 electrification scheme under this plan. Much drilling for petrol has taken place and in the spring of 1940 an oilfield in the southeast near Siirt was struck. It is claimed that its output, in conjunction with Turkey's 10 per cent share of that of the Mosul oilfield, will meet the current needs of the country. Whether this is so remains to be seen.

MODERN TURKEY

TRANSPORT

In Turkey's industrial revolution the improvement of communications has naturally taken a large place. The country is large, and travelling, because of natural features and the sparsity of population, is difficult. The problem of transport has been met by state control and enterprise ; further improvements are projected on the same lines.

Before the Republic Turkey was badly served with railways. There was a stretch of the unfinished Berlin-to-Bagdad railway from Edirne to Istanbul and from there south to the junction at Eskişehir, and then through Konya to Adana and to Aleppo and then along the present Syrian boundary for some 600 miles. There was a line from Eskişehir eastward into the plateau—reaching as far as what was then the small market town of Ankara ; and there were some lines covering the western fringe of the country, connecting the Istanbul-Adana railway with İzmir. That, apart from some local lines and a few tracks laid down by the Russians for military purposes in the east of the country, was all.

Practically all of these railways were owned by foreign companies whom the State has had to buy out at a fairly high price. For the three largest railways, on which agreement was reached in 1928, the government had to pay some 55 million Turkish pounds. The process of extending state control over the railway system and buying out the foreign holders has steadily proceeded and now only the line on the Syrian border is in foreign hands. The private holders in the last years of their control, when they were awaiting nationalisation, neglected the railways and omitted urgent repairs and necessary purchases ; so that a good

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

deal of attention has had to be given to reconditioning the lines which were taken over.


While it was still buying out the foreign holders the State was spending large sums every year—which have amounted in the aggregate to some 300 million Turkish pounds—upon railway construction and extension ; so that at the present time the length of newly constructed lines is somewhat greater than the length taken over from the foreign companies. The railways in the government view were to provide a service rather than a profit ; so all passenger trains had to carry third-class coaches, fares were reduced and freight charges for all Turkish products cut by half. The result was a marked increase in business.

The first large piece of railway construction by the State, carried through mainly by Turkish contractors employing only a few foreign engineers, was the line from Ankara to Kayseri, Sivas and Samsun. Since then there have been lines built from Kayseri to the junction of Ulukisla on the old Istanbul to Adana track and a series of tracks intended to develop the east of the country. This last project is merely one side of the general policy of opening up this area both commercially and militarily and has already been in part completed. Sivas on the one hand and Adana on the other have been connected with the new industrial centre of Malatya ; and from there the track continues, via the mining centre of Ergani to Diyarbakir in the heart of the Kurdish country. It is planned that from there it shall be extended along the line of the Tigris and through the mountains to Lake Van. At a later date further extensions across the frontiers to Teheran and Mosul are envisaged. Farther to the north a historic stage in the opening up of Eastern Turkey was reached by the completion of the Sivas to Erzurum line in September 1939 ; the

Turkish and Russian systems were thus linked. Meantime the line running along the Syrian frontier has been continued by the operating French company to Mosul which was reached in March 1940 and is under active construction to Baiji, where it will link up with the line from Bagdad.

There is a further railway plan in contemplation. A line is to be built across the north of the country providing a direct link between the Karabuk-Zonguldak area and Istanbul and shortening the train journey from Istanbul to Ankara, so it is said, by a number of hours. It will also link these districts with the port of Samsun and will run from Amasya (on the present Sivas-Samsun line) to Erzurum, with a branch line to Trabzon. This railway development is of the clearest importance in industrialising the east and bringing it into closer contact with the more advanced parts of the country. In the eastern vilayets the traveller can at present get from place to place only by horse or by donkey or by the infrequent, irregular and temperamental lorries which make the journey from one centre to another. Less attention has been given to the roads than to the railways, but the government has recently completed a motor road from Istanbul through Thrace to the Bulgarian border and another road across the east of the country from Trabzon to the Iranian frontier. Along this road it is anticipated a great deal of the Iranian transit trade will pass ; by its construction the Turkish government has contributed to the commercial progress of the whole of the Middle East.

Apart from these two main highroads communications are principally maintained along unmacadamised tracks which serve well enough for motoring in summer but may well become impassable in bad winter weather. The total length of macadamised road in the country according to the official figures does not amount—apart from the two



THROUGH THE TAURUS

Section of Berlin-Bagdad Railway built partly by British prisoners of war



TRADITIONAL INDUSTRY
Pottery made at Kutahaya

new highroads—to much more than 10,000 miles. To remedy this defect a comprehensive programme of road construction was initiated in the autumn of 1939 which aimed not only at providing trunk roads where necessary but at feeding the railways and ports. Under the scheme 20,000 miles of road are to be built in the course of ten years at a cost of some £T.120 millions.

Under the Ottoman Empire a mercantile marine under the Turkish flag was practically non-existent. A few old passenger vessels belonged to the State and were used as troop-ships in the innumerable wars. Under the Treaty of Lausanne coastwise traffic was reserved from 1926 for Turkish vessels. In 1930 the principal salvage company, which was British-owned, was bought out by the government. A new mercantile marine was gradually built up with state assistance ; the main firms concerned were first amalgamated and then finally taken over by the State, which today owns all the larger vessels flying the Turkish flag. Only the smaller schooners and coasters now remain in private hands. This state marine organisation also owns the docks, lighthouses, harbours, etc., and operates traffic on the inland lakes. A special bank, the Deniz Bank, was created to finance this new mercantile marine. It was later merged, however, with the Sumer Bank and control of sea transport passed to a separate department of the Ministry of National Economy.

Turkish sea transport, particularly coastwise traffic, has developed rapidly in recent years. The Republic's long coastline makes this method of transport a very convenient way of handling many goods. Many additions have been made or are under order for Turkey's merchant fleet which is intended to play an active part in overseas trade as well as coastal traffic.

MODERN TURKEY

The Government has been very assiduous in its attempts to encourage civil aviation—but so far it has not had much success. Istanbul has been linked with the European civil aviation system by a Lufthansa service, but the main route from Europe to the East by air passes south of the country. There is only one internal passenger service run—from Ankara to Istanbul—and that is maintained only by large government subsidies. Services between Ankara and Izmir, Diyarbakir and Van are projected.

THE FOUR YEAR INDUSTRIAL PLAN

What has been done so far in the way of industrialising the country, however, does not mark the completion of the process. In 1938 a new plan—due to be completed in four years—was announced ; it was based on the foundation of heavy industry, the expansion of the consumption goods industries, the exploitation of the mining resources and the improvement in communications which had already taken place. The new Plan provided first of all for the further development of the Zonguldak-Karabuk district. A power-house was to be constructed near Zonguldak ; a cement factory at Karabuk was to use the waste of the steel factory ; and a modern port from which the coal and steel may be shipped was to be built on the Black Sea coast. The new Plan also provided for further improvements in railway communication—by the purchase of locomotives and rolling stock abroad and by the initiation of a train-ferry service across the Bosphorus. A large part of the Plan was devoted to the partial industrialisation of Eastern Turkey—by the establishment of a spinning factory at Erzurum (using cotton from Igdir, hundreds of miles away on the Soviet border), a cement factory at Sivas, two sugar refineries in the East, and by improvements to the port of Trabzon and

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

the building of meat-canning works there. The remainder of the country, however, was not neglected, for there were proposals for a housing programme and an agricultural implements factory at Ankara, the expansion of the jute industry in the Antalya district on the Mediterranean coast, where the raw material is being grown, as well as a power house and synthetic petrol plant at Kutahya (where the necessary supplies of lignite are available) and a meat-pressing factory at Bursa. Another sugar refinery, an aluminium factory and an internal combustion engine factory were to be put up in other parts of the country. The development of Turkish shipping also fell within this Plan, which provided for the purchase of twenty-eight ships of various tonnages.

The advent of war in the autumn of 1939 profoundly affected this programme. For firms in the combatant countries were unable in many cases to carry out the contracts which it had necessitated. After various trade negotiations, however, most of the urgent contracts were placed with the Western Powers, who undertook to do their best to secure their execution. Naturally first preference was given to those parts of the Four Year Plan which increased the country's military strength. The taking over of public utilities from foreign companies was also steadily proceeded with and is now nearly completed.

THE BANKING SYSTEM

The banking structure of the country has all along been closely related to industrial needs. The propaganda booklets issued by the government draw attention to the appearance of a new national spirit in banking after the establishment of the Republic ; they assert that henceforth Turkish financial institutions were no longer controlled

from outside. Except for the Ottoman and Agricultural Banks, which have a continuous history from Ottoman times, the present-day Turkish banks have grown up since the Great War.

The Ottoman Bank remains a joint-stock company of which the shares are held by British and French nationals and according to the propaganda booklet "is managed by two committees, one in Paris and the other in London. Its Istanbul managers and board of directors consisting of three members, all nominees of the Turkish government, have little if any influence on its administration. Nevertheless, under the recent agreements its General Manager is appointed subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance." Some of the powers and privileges of the Ottoman Bank have been whittled away and its note issue is severely limited ; but it is still to some extent exempt from taxation and is the principal agent of British and French interests in Turkey.

The institution which is now responsible for the issue of paper currency is the Central Bank which began operations in 1931. This has a subscribed capital equal to 15 million Turkish pounds, of which 70 per cent is paid up. Its shares are divided into four classes. All those in the first class are held by the State ; those in the second class by the new national bank, which has absorbed the Sumer Bank and the Eti Bank ; those in the third class by other banks and concession-holding companies ; and those in the fourth class by individual Turkish citizens and corporations. It has eight directors, of whom two are elected by the government, one by a committee of delegates from chambers of commerce (influenced by the Ministry of Public Economy) two by the agricultural co-operatives, two by the shareholders of the second and third class and one by the shareholders of

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

the fourth class. The government also controls the appointments to the main executive positions.

The note circulation is backed by Treasury bonds made over to the Bank by the government. The by-laws under which the Bank operates safeguard its position as the sole fiscal agent of the government—although just at present and for a few years to come it is likely that the State and other public bodies will deposit their funds with national banks other than the Central. Originally there might be no increase of the note circulation, except for foreign exchange purposes, and then the issue had to be covered by gold foreign exchange and trade bills and approved by a committee of delegates from the banks. A law which was approved in July 1938 modified the statutes of the Bank and relaxed these restrictions. The Central Bank assumed the obligation of meeting the monetary needs of the state commercial and agricultural concerns by the discounting of bonds which they issued on Treasury guarantee; and so that it might perform these functions satisfactorily the Bank was permitted to issue supplementary paper money.

In addition to the Central Bank and the institutions which have been set up to finance and control different aspects of the development of the national resources there exist smaller banks for special purposes or serving particular districts. Among the most important of these are the Agricultural Bank which provides agricultural credit and the Municipalities' Bank founded in 1933 to provide townships with money for public works and other purposes of economic importance. The most important of the private banks, the Ish Bank, is really state controlled. This institution has not only taken a large part in the industrialisation of the country but has been particularly successful in the mobilisation of private savings.

MODERN TURKEY

THE ORGANISATION OF STATE INDUSTRY

In the course of 1939 some extremely significant changes took place in the central organisation of Turkish industry. The state banks, that is the Sumer Bank, the Eti Bank and the Ish Bank, lost the functions of control and direction over industry which they had exercised since their foundation. The control had been fairly strict, and there were some cases of able and well-paid officials resigning from state concerns and taking corresponding positions in private industry because they found the control of the Sumer Bank irksome. Too strict a control over the details of expenditure was the commonest complaint ; it led to delay and so in the long run to waste. The Sumer Bank and the Eti Bank (which had between them in the preceding months absorbed a number of the smaller state banks such as the Deniz Bank which controlled the state shipping combine) were amalgamated and their functions in respect of industry were cut down to the provision of finance. The planning side of their work and that of the Ish Bank was taken over by the Ministry of National Economy which was to work through a series of boards, one covering each industry. In this way it is hoped that the control of the State will be more complete but less restrictive. It is too early yet to say how the new organisation will work ; it certainly seems that it should facilitate the orderly planning of industry as a whole while leaving greater autonomy and responsibility to those in charge of particular industries than in the past. In conception the new scheme would appear to have borrowed a number of ideas from planning machinery in the U.S.S.R.

PUBLIC FINANCES

The first aim which the Republican government set itself in the field of finance was to balance its budget. As in

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

the other branches of the administration conditions were chaotic in the later years of the Empire. In 1925 the government abolished the tithe which had been levied on all agricultural and forest products and had been collected through tax farmers. The tithe which constituted a considerable burden upon the peasant population had been the main source of revenue—and all that the Republic imposed in its place was a very moderate increase in the land tax and a small duty on export of corn. Despite this sacrifice the government was enabled by an overhaul of the tax administration and by the growing wealth of the country to balance its budget and increase the scale of public expenditure.

The size of the annual budget rose fairly steadily between 1924 and 1930 from an expenditure of £T.131 millions to one of £T.213 millions (financial year 1929/30). Customs duties, income tax and state monopolies all yielded larger sums which made this increased expenditure possible, and in addition new direct taxes were imposed on profits, capital and stock exchange transactions.

The depression hit Turkey and reduced the state revenue. The realised ordinary receipts were some 6 or 7 per cent below the estimates in 1929/30; and the position the following year was a good deal worse. In 1932/33 total revenue was lower than it had been in any budget period since 1924/25, but after that there was steady recovery until in 1937/38 the total revenue amounted to £T.323 millions. The budget continues to grow in size.

The estimates for 1939/40 showed that 39 per cent of the normal budget expenditure (excluding extraordinary expenditure) is absorbed by armaments and 13 per cent by payment in respect of the public Debt. This public Debt has been increased in the last few years by such projects

MODERN TURKEY

as the purchase of the Telephone companies of Istanbul and Izmir and other utilities which were in the hands of foreigners. From these there are of course compensatory revenues.

The full estimates for 1938-39 and 1939-40 were as follows :

	1939-40 £T.millions.	Percentage of Total Expendi- ture.	1938-9 £T.millions.	Percentage of Total Expendi- ture.
National Defence.	125·815	39·3	108·995	35·4
Public Debt	42·864	13·4	43·639	14·1
Public Works	29·864	9·3	37·801	12·3
Finance, Customs	28·814	9·0	27·935	9·1
Economy, Commerce, Communications	7·320	2·2	7·890	2·6
Agriculture	8·030	2·8	7·844	2·5
Public Instruction	16·551	5·1	15·569	5·1
Hygiene and Public Assistance	12·471	3·9	12·572	4·1
Gendarmerie and Police	18·747	5·8	17·734	5·8
Other departments	29·505	9·2	27·893	9·0
Total	319·981	100·0	307·872	100·0

Of the total revenue a fair proportion of that included in the ordinary budget was obtained from the state monopolies ; in the last few years the aggregate of their profits has risen from £T.30 millions to £T.37 millions. The 1937/38 figures showed profits as follows :

	(In £T.000.)
Tobacco sales	29,159
Salt sales	4,670
Spirits sales	8,041
Powder sales	1,040
Sundry receipts	1,250
Total	44,160

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

Against this had to be set expenses amounting to £T.6,243,000 and amortisements (£T.480,000) so that the budget actually benefited to the extent of £T.37,435,000.

The monopolies fall under the control of the General Monopoly Administration which was formerly part of the Ministry of Finance but has since 1932 been of sufficient importance to constitute, with the administration of customs and excise, a separate Ministry. These monopolies are now run directly by the State but in some cases the State formerly farmed out its monopoly to private companies. Direct control has proved the more successful method ; private companies paid for the privileges of exercising the gunpowder and spirits monopolies but in both cases they got into difficulties and the State took over.

The largest and by far the most profitable of the state monopolies is that of buying and selling tobacco. This was formerly in the hands of a private French company which did very well out of it ; when the concession expired in 1925 the State paid compensation and took the business into its own hands. It has been operated since then with great success. The number of workers employed has risen from just under 5,000 to just under 10,000 and the profits which stood at £T.12 millions in the first year of state operation have more than doubled.

THE EXTENT OF STATE SOCIALISM

Since the incorporation in the constitution in 1937 of the main points in the programme of the People's Party, Turkey has claimed to possess a State Socialist economy. How far is this claim borne out by the facts ?

It cannot be denied that Turkey, in fact, possesses a mixed economy ; publicly-owned enterprise exists side by side with private enterprise. The State, however, undoubtedly

MODERN TURKEY

as the purchase of the Telephone companies of Istanbul and Izmir and other utilities which were in the hands of foreigners. From these there are of course compensatory revenues.

The full estimates for 1938-39 and 1939-40 were as follows :

	1939-40 £T.millions.	Percentage of Total Expendi- ture.	1938-9 £T.millions.	Percentage of Total Expendi- ture.
National Defence.	125·815	39·3	108·995	35·4
Public Debt	42·864	13·4	43·639	14·1
Public Works	29·864	9·3	37·801	12·3
Finance, Customs	28·814	9·0	27·935	9·1
Economy, Commerce, Communications	7·320	2·2	7·890	2·6
Agriculture	8·030	2·8	7·844	2·5
Public Instruction	16·551	5·1	15·569	5·1
Hygiene and Public Assistance	12·471	3·9	12·572	4·1
Gendarmerie and Police	18·747	5·8	17·734	5·8
Other departments	29·505	9·2	27·893	9·0
Total	319·981	100·0	307·872	100·0

Of the total revenue a fair proportion of that included in the ordinary budget was obtained from the state monopolies ; in the last few years the aggregate of their profits has risen from £T.30 millions to £T.37 millions. The 1937/38 figures showed profits as follows :

Tobacco sales	(In £T.000.)
Salt sales	29,159
Spirits sales	4,670
Powder sales	8,041
Sundry receipts	1,040
	1,250
Total	44,160

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

Against this had to be set expenses amounting to £T.6,243,000 and amortisements (£T.480,000) so that the budget actually benefited to the extent of £T.37,435,000.

The monopolies fall under the control of the General Monopoly Administration which was formerly part of the Ministry of Finance but has since 1932 been of sufficient importance to constitute, with the administration of customs and excise, a separate Ministry. These monopolies are now run directly by the State but in some cases the State formerly farmed out its monopoly to private companies. Direct control has proved the more successful method ; private companies paid for the privileges of exercising the gunpowder and spirits monopolies but in both cases they got into difficulties and the State took over.

The largest and by far the most profitable of the state monopolies is that of buying and selling tobacco. This was formerly in the hands of a private French company which did very well out of it ; when the concession expired in 1925 the State paid compensation and took the business into its own hands. It has been operated since then with great success. The number of workers employed has risen from just under 5,000 to just under 10,000 and the profits which stood at £T.12 millions in the first year of state operation have more than doubled.

THE EXTENT OF STATE SOCIALISM

Since the incorporation in the constitution in 1937 of the main points in the programme of the People's Party, Turkey has claimed to possess a State Socialist economy. How far is this claim borne out by the facts ?

It cannot be denied that Turkey, in fact, possesses a mixed economy ; publicly-owned enterprise exists side by side with private enterprise. The State, however, undoubtedly

MODERN TURKEY

occupies a dominant position in the Turkish economy. Industrial and agricultural developments in recent years have practically all been initiated by the State, which controls by far the greater part of the large-scale enterprises in the country. All the important banks, with the notable exception of the Ottoman Bank, practically all transport (by rail, sea or air), the new industries created under the Five and Four Year Plans, and most of the mines are publicly owned. Developments now taking place will create further state enterprises in fields such as power and oil, and will lead to the complete taking over of all public utility services and of the remaining privately owned mines. In addition, municipalities have been expanding the scope of their activities and the State and the co-operatives have been playing increasingly important parts in controlling the production and marketing of agricultural products. It should be noted that all these public concerns are subject to detailed criticism by the various Parliamentary committees which supervise them. The plans for the recent re-organisation of the state industries, for example, were considerably modified by discussions which took place during the passage of the necessary legislation by the Assembly.

Private enterprise still covers a very large field, although there are few big businessmen apart from the larger land-owners, the owners of the private textile mills and various agents and middlemen. The vast field of small enterprises, particularly in the traditional industries, fills a great part of the industrial picture. Figures are not easy to get, but it seems that at present more than 100,000 workers are engaged in the industries which enjoy the exemptions and privileges of the law for the encouragement of industry (these exclude transport, the banks, etc.). At the present time only some 30,000 to 40,000 would appear to work in

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

the state factories and monopolies which are included in this group of industries. The total capital of industrial firms founded by the State, apart from the railways, docks and monopolies, stood at £T.12 millions in 1927, £T.53 millions in 1934 and £T.131 millions in 1938, and should have amounted to more than £T.220 millions had the Four Year Plan been carried out as originally suggested. During the period of planning the total production of the large industries, state and private, increased from £T.104 millions to £T.266 millions (1933 and 1938 figures).

It will thus be seen that private enterprise still covers more than half of the industrial field in Turkey. The general tendency quite definitely appears to be towards an extension of state enterprise ; following the recent industrial development the stress on the national economy produced by a war situation in the world around is undoubtedly accentuating this growth. It would be wrong, however, to imagine that there was any important school of thought in Turkey which wants to see complete socialisation. The present rulers on the whole favour government ownership of all large-scale concerns but are prepared to leave traditional industries in the hands of private enterprise and to leave some scope for such few entrepreneurs as the country may produce in the field of non-essential consumption goods for export or home use. In the summer of 1939 the government actually removed certain restrictions which had been imposed in the interests of planning upon the opening of new factories. The fact that there are so few big businessmen or persons with any large amount of private capital, however, makes it unlikely that any serious challenge will be made to the general policy of state socialism by individual firms anxious to build up large-scale private enterprises.

MODERN TURKEY

WORKING-CLASS CONDITIONS

The growth in the number and importance of the industrial workers led the government to interest itself in their conditions. A lead was given in the establishment of better conditions by the various state factories. Following the experience which was thus obtained, a comprehensive Labour Law, governing all industrial concerns, state and private, which employed more than ten men, was introduced in 1936 and gradually brought into operation in the following three years. The government's policy was based upon the People's Party's desire to establish a classless society on a nationalist basis. It thus sought to prevent the creation of the social problems which industrialisation had brought in the West and to build up a skilled and contented labour force. This was to be attempted, however, without allowing strikes or the building up of trade unions, which were considered anathema both as class and as international organisations.

In the larger factories, both state and private, great care has been taken to create social services in the way of clinics and facilities for the enjoyment of leisure. These have been most extensive at the new industrial centres in rural areas where housing, hospitals, sports grounds, bathing pools and in some cases even riding tracks have been provided. Needless to say, the employees of the old-established and small-scale private firms have no such advantages.

The Labour Code introduced an eight-hour day and extensive workmen's compensation provisions, primarily to deal with conditions in private industry, as the state concerns had already tried to establish good working conditions. Inspectors were appointed both to enforce safety measures and investigate complaints made by the workers. They were given the power to place information about any

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

breach of the Labour Code in the hands of the public prosecutor so that he could take any necessary action. This Inspectorate is organised on a regional basis and appears to carry out its duties effectively.

Under the Labour Code wages were to be fixed by negotiation between a special *ad hoc* committee selected by the workers in all concerns coming under the law, and the management. In the event of a breakdown of negotiations the dispute was to go to persons appointed under the code to act as arbitrators. How this machinery will work in practice it is yet too soon to say, although by the summer of 1939 the members of the workers' committees had been selected where necessary. It is possible that this machinery might develop in time into some form of self-government. Other forms exist in a greater degree in the People's Houses and People's Party branches, which are usually connected with the larger industrial concerns ; these of course cannot occupy the same position with the employees of smaller units, although the latter may join outside organisations of this kind which may have a considerable influence indirectly on their conditions. So far no steps have been taken to improve the position of the employees of firms employing less than ten persons, a very large proportion of the whole, or of those employed in agriculture who are not covered by the Labour Code. Many of the inspectors favour an extension of the code to cover all firms employing more than five persons. On the whole it can be said that the workers in the larger concerns have much improved their position under the Republic. This has been due not only to the definite policy of the government but to the difficulty of getting labour, especially skilled labour. For the mass of the people still work on the land and look on industry as a source of obtaining the means of buying a small holding

MODERN TURKEY

rather than as a permanent career. Hence it has been necessary to attract labour and try to keep it in industry.

The lack of adequate statistics makes it very difficult to say how the workers as a whole have fared during Turkish industrialisation in the absence of any independent organisations to represent them or any special press to voice their grievances. There are no comprehensive wage figures and the only estimates with any pretence to authority are given as follows ¹: 30 per cent of the workers get 25 piastres per day; 50 per cent 40-50 piastres; 15 per cent 50-100; 4 per cent 100-200 and 1 per cent 200-300. Even allowing for the fact that lower wages are paid in agriculture than in industry these figures would not indicate very high wages by western standards. It is probable, however, that wages in industry generally have gone up because of labour shortage.² The wages paid for unskilled labour—and to a lesser degree for skilled—probably vary a good deal from place to place, according to the local supply and demand. This is suggested by the government figures of daily wage rates for various trades in different towns over a period; which suggest that the tendency of wages to rise in recent years because of a shortage of labour ² has been most marked in Adana, where there is competition for the available labour between state and private factories.

		1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
		Purs.	Purs.	Purs.	Purs.	Purs.
Cotton textiles	Istanbul . .	97	101	109	104	106
	Izmir . .	120	133	112	130	121
	Adana . .	73	86	93	89	108
	G. Antep . .	51	56	53	59	58
	Içel . .	55	53	69	73	76

¹ By a Turkish author in a French periodical, *Voix Européennes*, June 1937.

² This is stated as a general tendency in the *Dept. of Overseas Trade Report on Turkey* (1939).

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

		1934 Ptrs.	1935 Ptrs.	1936 Ptrs.	1937 Ptrs.	1938 Ptrs.
Woollen textiles	Istanbul . . .	100	118	110	110	102
	Kocaeli . . .	98	98	99	106	100
	Izmir . . .	104	107	105	95	117
	Ankara . . .	117	122	138	113	112
Vegetable oils	Istanbul . . .	160	150	134	135	138
	Içel . . .	89	99	107	108	121
	Adana . . .	99	121	131	139	125
Leather	Istanbul . . .	124	124	126	125	124

A 1939 estimate of wages of workers engaged on constructional work shows even an ordinary labourer as receiving 80-120 piastres and the wages of such skilled men as bricklayers, plasterers, carpenters and electricians ranging between 300 and 500 piastres.¹

Meanwhile the cost of living according to International Labour Office figures, which refer solely to Istanbul, has been falling steadily.²

	1929.	1930.	1931.	1932.	1933.	1934.	1935.	1936.	1937.	1938.
All items . .	100	92	87	85	76	75	69	70	71	70
Food only . .	100	83	72	66	55	59	57	60	61	59

The cost of living figures for the city prepared by the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Industry show a similar though less pronounced trend. On this *The Department of Overseas Trade Report*, prepared by the Commercial Secretary to the Treasury, comments rather surprisingly that the cost of living in Istanbul appears to be increasing rather than decreasing.

The cost of living, like wage rates, varies a good deal from one district to another. It is higher in Ankara than in Istanbul, and this is probably true, although to a lesser

¹ *Dept. of Overseas Trade Report on Turkey* (1939).

² *International Labour Review*, January 1940.

degree, of most inland centres of any size. The only conclusion which can be drawn from the scanty evidence available on the working-class standards of living is that the workers have not done as well in view of the increased wealth of the country as they would have done had they had the opportunity of independent trade union organisation. This is probably due to the government's desire to retain in industry or to collect in taxation all the resources they can for further industrialisation. Despite the comparatively high rate paid in some places, especially for skilled work, there is still an enormous amount of poverty, particularly in the agricultural districts.

The effects of the war have certainly upset the operation of the Labour Code. The government has obtained emergency powers to regulate industry. As already explained, the tendency towards state action in the industrial field has been accentuated. This policy has been accompanied by the suspension of many of the provisions of the Labour Code. First the government permitted a nine-hour day to be worked in a number of essential industries. In the spring of 1940 it permitted a twelve-hour day and allowed women and children to work night shifts in certain circumstances. It has also issued regulations to prevent miners from giving up their jobs to take other kinds of work. Whether these emergency provisions are going to destroy the operation of the whole Labour Code it is impossible to say. It certainly looks, however, as though the operation of the code will be seriously interfered with.

CHAPTER VII

FOREIGN TRADE AND LOANS

TURKEY'S industrialisation had to begin from a very low level. Capital, credit, developed resources and technical skill were all lacking when the Kemalists finally established themselves as the government of an independent state ; and this government had to work within a framework constituted by the commercial clauses of the Lausanne Treaty and by an Ottoman Debt Settlement which imposed heavy financial responsibilities on the new Turkey. At the same time the government was at first exceedingly reluctant to accept any long-term loans from abroad ; for it feared that they would result in the kind of tutelage to which the Ottoman Empire had been subjected.

The Empire, which had accumulated the Ottoman Debt, being broken up, the obligations had to be apportioned among the "successor states". This was no easy task especially as arrears which had piled up during the war years had to be taken into account ; and the new Turkish government was not willing to concede to the Debt Council the administration of any sources of revenue as guarantee of payment. The negotiations finally resulted in the Turkish Republic accepting responsibility for about 40 per cent of the pre-war Debt ; while the Debt Council, in fact, lost the control over state revenue which it had previously had.

THE LAUSANNE SETTLEMENT AND AFTER

The commercial treaty dated July 1923, which was part of the Lausanne settlement, was concluded between Turkey

on the one hand and Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and Rumania on the other. By it, Turkey undertook to let in raw materials and manufactured goods from the victorious allies at the very low rates of duty specified in the existing Ottoman customs tariff. This agreement bound Turkey for five years, and under it the total volume of trade was high—although most of it was on the import side. Between 1923 and 1929, Turkey imported £T.259 millions' worth of cereals and foodstuffs, £T.600 millions of textiles and textile materials, and £T.244 millions of machinery, metals and metal goods. Imports from the United Kingdom were large—varying between £T.25 millions and £T.37 millions—and constituted an appreciable proportion of all Turkish trade. The U.K. share of Turkish trade diminished fairly steadily from 18 per cent in 1923 to slightly under 11 per cent in 1929. In her trade with the U.K., Turkey had throughout an unfavourable balance which amounted in 1925 to as much as £T.20 millions.

Throughout the first period Turkey was sending abroad tobacco, fruits and nuts, but not in quantities sufficient to pay for the large quantities of foodstuffs, textiles and machinery that the above figures show were being received. Moreover, Turkey was saddled with a share of the debt piled up by the Ottoman Empire. These economic conditions inevitably created a demand in Turkey for foreign exchange, which reacted upon the not yet very stable Turkish currency. The ending of the period in which Turkish customs duties were kept low in accordance with treaty provisions was marked by a rush to get as large a quantity of goods as possible into the country at the old rates. In 1929 there was a fall in the yield of customs duties—because of the large stocks already brought in at the old rates—and an unusually keen demand for foreign exchange

to pay for these stocks. The country had no investments abroad and no large tourist trade which could ease the situation so that the strain upon the currency was very great. This crisis—which led to the further limitation of the powers of the Ottoman Bank and the establishment of the Central Bank as the fiscal agent of the government ¹—marked the beginning of the period of the depression in Turkey.

When Turkey was free of those provisions of the Lausanne settlement which regulated her foreign trade, she repudiated all her existing commercial treaties and invited the states with which she had trade relations to enter into new negotiations. Her aim was a simple one—to increase her exports to cover the imports of machinery and other production goods needed for industrialisation. In the period 1929 to 1933, however, imports were much smaller in value than in the slightly longer preceding period. To take the categories already quoted for 1923–9; cereals and foodstuffs were valued at £T.42 millions, textiles and textile materials at £T.152 millions and machinery and metals at £T.119 millions. Whereas the first group had become a less important part of total imports, and the second group also slightly less important, machinery and metals between 1930 and 1933 accounted for more than a quarter of the total imports as compared with 16 per cent between 1923 and 1929.

As a result of the world depression too a new arrangement had to be made with regard to Turkey's share of the Ottoman Debt. An agreement made in Paris in 1928 had fixed Turkey's obligations at the payment of an annuity of 2 million gold pounds, to be increased to more than 3 millions by 1952, after which year it was to diminish once more.

¹ See page 122.

In 1933 this agreement had to be revised and the total amount of the debt was scaled down from 92 to 7 million gold pounds—a very considerable lightening of the burden of foreign indebtedness. Up to that time, despite the exchange difficulties and the shortage of native capital, the Turkish government was very reluctant to pile up any new foreign debts of its own.

INDUSTRIALISATION AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The government was prepared to take up from foreign concerns short-term business credits to which no political conditions were attached, and these proved of very material assistance to the country. Only one large long-term foreign loan, however, was accepted by the Turkish government before 1933. That was the Swedish Match Loan of 10 million dollars negotiated in 1930 by Ivar Kreuger. He got in return a monopoly of match production in the country. When Kreuger collapsed, a Turkish licensed company took over the monopoly and the obligation to open a factory in Turkey.

The programme of industrialisation began in 1934 and necessitated the import of machinery and other capital goods on a larger scale than before. A loan of 10 million dollars from the Soviet Union was accepted in 1934-5; most of it was used to carry out the expansion of the textile industry under the Five Year Plan. But rather than borrow more elsewhere the government sought to cover its imports by increasing the value of exports. This was done partly by the development of national resources; partly by improved organisation and propaganda. In 1934 a Central Office for Foreign Trade Service (Turkofis) was set up in Ankara with a number of agencies inside the country and with commercial attachés and secretaries abroad. One

department of the office is engaged in general survey work and in supervision of commercial arrangements and clearing agreements ; the other department studies the demand for Turkish exports, opens up new markets and keeps an eye on competitors. Associated with the office are various less important bureaus for the provision of information and the encouragement of tourist traffic.

The principal exports are agricultural products—tobacco, fruits, cotton, mohair, and grain. In recent years fruits have competed with tobacco as the principal item in the trade. In 1938 tobacco accounted for 27 per cent of the total value of Turkish exports ; and fruit accounted for 26 per cent. This 26 per cent includes sultanas, dried figs, oranges, olives and various kinds of nuts ; sultanas and hazel-nuts were by far the largest items in the list and between them accounted for 18 per cent out of the 26 per cent. Grain, which a few years ago was of little account, was of quite considerable importance in 1937 and 1938 and accounted in the latter year for 9 per cent of the export value. If the various livestock products are grouped together—live cattle, hides, wool (mostly wool in grease), and mohair—they account for another 9 per cent ; while the figures for cotton show that its share of export value is rather smaller—7 to 8 per cent.

The most striking thing about the Turkish export trade is the almost complete absence of manufactured goods. Carpets are a tiny item, but they are the only manufactured goods of any importance exported from the country. The minerals in which Turkey is rich make comparatively little contribution to the export total : chrome accounts for 3 per cent of the total by value and the other exported minerals (coal, copper, lead and zinc are the most important) for 2 per cent. A barter exchange of Turkish coal for Brazilian

coffee has been arranged, however, and coal exports are likely to increase with the opening up of the Zonguldak coalfield.

From 1930 until 1938 Turkey had a favourable balance of trade—in the sense of an excess of visible exports over visible imports. But since her mercantile marine was weak, and large sums had to be paid abroad as interest upon past loans, the import of capital goods led to exchange difficulties. Turkey was forced to husband her foreign exchange resources by means of clearing agreements. These agreements were concluded with a range of countries, and by 1937 some four-fifths of Turkey's trade was with these countries. The most important country with which Turkey continued to trade on a free exchange basis was the United States.

The position was eased a little in 1936-7. In April 1936 an agreement was made with France which permitted the payment of some of Turkey's obligations (including her share of the Ottoman Debt and payments in respect of some railway loans) on a basis of 50 per cent in exchange and 50 per cent in goods. The favourable trade balance was not sufficient to prevent a deficit in the balance of external payments. Various temporary expedients were tried and enjoyed a limited amount of success; but the Franco-Turkish agreement was intended to have more lasting results. As the chairman of the Ottoman Bank expressed it, "The French government by agreeing to admit additional imports of Turkish minerals has rendered to the bondholders and to the other creditors of Turkey a service for which in the present circumstances they should be particularly grateful."¹ In 1938, however, the position was worse again. Even the visible balance of trade was unfavourable;

¹ Annual General Meeting of the Ottoman Bank, May 1936.

but Turkey's position was saved by a credit extended to her by the United Kingdom.

That agreement of May 1938 was not by any means the first that had been negotiated between Britain and Turkey. There had been a clearing agreement made in June 1935, but in that year Turkish imports from Britain were valued £T.8,682,000, whereas the figure for exports to Britain was only £T.5,193,000. In a very short time large sums due to British exporters accumulated in the Clearing Account of the Turkish Central Bank. There was a further agreement reached in September 1936, and the balance of trade between the two countries was a favourable one from Turkey's point of view in 1936 and 1937. (Turkish imports from Britain in the latter year were valued at £T.7,129,000, while exports to Britain were valued at £T.9,769,000.)

The financial hold of Britain and France on Turkey was very strong. As the chairman of the Ottoman Bank put it, while Germany had a large share (some 40 per cent) of Turkish exports, "trade with France and England has on the other hand fallen considerably, although to meet the service of the Public Debt as well as the recent agreements, our repurchase of certain foreign concessions, it is to the nationals of these two countries that Turkey has to remit the major part of its financial obligations".¹

Despite the favourable balance of trade from Turkey's point of view between the two countries, there was still a considerable sum due to British exporters in the Clearing Account until the position was to some extent rectified by the May 1938 agreement. The total value of British trade with Turkey was much smaller than in the pre-slump years; and instead of Britain accounting for some 12 per

¹ Annual General Meeting of the Ottoman Bank, May 1936.

MODERN TURKEY

cent of Turkish foreign trade as in 1926 and 1927, she accounted in 1936 and 1937 for about 6 per cent.

Meanwhile Nazi Germany, using her own peculiar methods, had been developing her trade throughout the Balkans, not least in Turkey. By 1937 indeed Germany was by far Turkey's best customer, and accounted for the largest part of her imports. The share of the six principal trading countries was as follows :

	Percentage of Turkish exports going to—	Percentage of Turkish imports coming from—
Germany	36.53	42.08
U.K.	7.08	6.23
U.S.A.	13.92	15.13
Italy	5.27	5.33
U.S.S.R.	4.72	6.21
France	3.81	1.08
Rest of world	28.87	23.94

The Balkan States who are her neighbours account for little of Turkey's foreign trade. They are all, like Turkey, at a low level of industrialisation, and like Turkey again wish to sell agricultural products and buy manufactured goods. Turkey sends comparatively small quantities of cotton and tobacco to Rumania and receives oil and timber in return ; she sends wheat and cattle to Greece and receives cotton thread and dyes in return.

In 1938 two loans were accepted from Britain. One was £6 millions for armaments to be purchased in Britain ; interest was to be paid at 1 per cent above the Bank of England discount rate or at 3 per cent, whichever was the greater, and the capital was to be repaid in half-yearly instalments between 1952 and 1962. The second was a trade credit of £10 millions to be guaranteed by the Export Credits Guarantee Department ; Turkey has availed herself of the credit mainly for mining machinery for the Zonguldak coalfield, and for railway engines and rolling

FOREIGN TRADE AND LOANS

stock. As part of these £16 million loans the Export Credits Guarantee Department granted a credit of some £3 millions in connection with a contract between the British firm of H. A. Brassert & Co. and the Sumer Bank for the construction of the steel works at Karabuk. In order that Turkey might meet her obligations to Britain under the terms of the agreement concluded between them, a company named "Anglo-Turkish Commodities Ltd." was established for the sale of Turkish exports in the British Empire. Certain commodities—metals, mineral ores, coal, wheat, timber, raw cotton, fresh fruit and vegetables, canned fruit—were named particularly; and the company might also handle other commodities agreed upon by the British Exports Guarantee Department and the Turkish government.

Germany also extended credit to Turkey during 1938; the sum involved was Rm.150 millions. The Soviet Union granted a further credit of 8 million gold dollars. From Germany Turkey obtained machinery of all kinds and iron and steel goods.

In 1938 despite the British loans her share of Turkey's export trade was halved—from 7·1 per cent to 3·4—but her share of Turkey's imports rose from just over 6 per cent to just over 11. Nevertheless German predominance continued so far as the external commercial relations of Turkey was concerned—in 1938 practically half Turkey's exports went to Greater Germany and more than half of Turkey's imports came from there.

EFFECTS OF THE WAR

In the first few months of 1939 until the outbreak of the European war the German share of Turkish trade continued to grow. After September, however, the clearing arrange-

ments under which the trade between the two countries had been carried on were not renewed and a number of German firms in Turkey closed down. Difficulties of payment were added to the obstacles which the Allied blockade put in the way of trading with Germany. This meant severe difficulties for Turkey. Figures published by the Government at the beginning of April 1940 showed that Turkish exports to Germany during the first two months of the year instead of being in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent were down to 2 per cent. The drastic reduction of trade had been very sudden and other countries could not immediately take Germany's place as Turkey's chief customer and supplier.

Britain and France by the beginning of 1940 had begun to take a substantial share of Turkish exports. Instead of taking between them 6 per cent of the country's export trade as they had in January 1939 they were taking 28 per cent at the beginning of 1940. Early in January it was reported that a joint Anglo-French economic office was being set up to purchase products which had been going to Germany via the Balkans; and Britain and France separately placed large contracts for Turkish fruit. This was followed in April by the creation of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, Ltd., with capital provided by the Treasury, to develop trade with Turkey and other countries in South-Eastern Europe. At the same time British firms in particular were making rapid progress in the Turkish market both with supplies of machinery and of heavy goods. The British firm of Swan Hunter & Wigham Richardson secured a £2,000,000 contract for eleven merchant ships and Metro-Vickers got a £1,500,000 electrification contract at Catalagzi.¹ Representatives of

¹ See page 115.

Boots Ltd. were active in pressing the trade in industrial and medicinal chemicals, formerly a German monopoly. At the same time the Turkish government cancelled a £7,000,000 contract for the construction by a German firm of a naval base and dockyard on the ground that it did not desire to have Germans associated with any national defence work ; arrangements were made for the work to be undertaken by British firms.

Increased trade with Britain and France was rendered possible by the new financial arrangements which those countries made with Turkey when she became their ally. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed in October had as an integral part of it an economic agreement of a very comprehensive kind. Under the agreement Turkey was to be supplied with military material sufficient to implement an armament programme drawn up by a commission representing the three governments. To cover these supplies the British and French governments were to provide Turkey with a credit of £25 millions which was to bear 4 per cent interest and to be repaid in twenty years. In addition the agreement provided for an Anglo-French loan of £15 millions to be paid at Ankara in gold, to bear interest at 3 per cent and likewise to be repaid in twenty years.¹ The British and French governments agreed that the interest and amortisation of the debt should be effected in Turkish pounds to be used for the purchase of tobacco and other Turkish products. In addition the agreement finally provide for further loans from Britain and France equivalent in all to £3½ millions for the settlement in the first place of the Clearing Account.

¹ It was reported in January 1940 that the transfer of this sum of gold from Syria to Ankara to support the Turkish exchange had been effected.

The Turkish government on its side has done what it could since war began to facilitate foreign trade. In particular it has set up an organisation, Takas Ltd., to deal in compensation premiums. To make trade exchanges with Britain run more smoothly it has been suggested that Turkish requirements should be reviewed and a comprehensive statement of what is needed, with an indication of the relative urgency of different items, be presented to British exporters. At the same time past delays in payment have raised some barriers between British and Turkish traders which have required removing.

British prospects of trade with Turkey seem brighter than for many years past¹; but it is not Britain and France only that have expanded their share of Turkish trade now that Germany is virtually excluded. Italy in early 1940 had about 30 per cent of Turkey's trade; and since the range of goods which Italy, Britain and France could supply to Turkey is restricted, the United States has rapidly developed its trade with Turkey. The obstacles to more trade between the two countries were quite formidable; until the war dealings had been on a free exchange basis and the high Turkish price level had meant that the only commodity sold to the United States in any quantity was tobacco. Here again the Turkish government has done all it can to expand trade and the premium system so far initiated will mean that transactions with the U.S.A. are based on an increased rate of exchange.

Since war began trading between the Balkan states on the one hand and the Great Powers on the other has become more and more highly organised and more closely con-

¹ See in comment on this an address on "The Practical Possibilities of Reciprocal Trade with Turkey," by Sir H. Osborne Mance (of the Ottoman Bank) to the Institute of Export on 20 February 1940.

FOREIGN TRADE AND LOANS

trolled by government machinery. The loans from Britain and France, which are enabling the Turkish armament programme to be carried out and supporting the Turkish exchange, have bound Turkey to the Western Powers economically. But Turkey does not depend on them solely. The rapid development of her trade is a pressing problem for her, and she is prepared to cultivate closer economic relations with Italy and with the United States as well as with her newly found allies.

CHAPTER VIII

RELIGIOUS AND LEGAL CHANGE ; WOMEN WIN THEIR FREEDOM

FOREIGNERS still find it difficult to realise that the Turkish Republic is not a bulwark of the Moslem religion. In few countries has the disestablishment of a long-established religion been carried out more speedily and with less opposition than in modern Turkey. It must be said, however, that Islam had lost any effective influence for many years before its fall. The reasons for this were many. Moslem laws and customs stood in the way of Westernisation. Once the movement of reform had got a strong hold upon the active intellect of the country and had won the support of the army officers, a movement in favour of secularisation came to the fore. In the latter part of the nineteenth century Islam had been identified in the western part of the Ottoman Empire with Turkish nationality and the observance of this religion was regarded as the sign that its devotees belonged to the ruling race in contrast to the subject Christians. The end of the Ottoman Empire and the expulsion of the greater part of the remaining Christians removed this link between Islam and Turkish nationalism. The services of the mosque had continued to be carried on in Arabic, though this tongue was rarely understood by Turks : the services, therefore, had little meaning to the great mass of the Turkish people. In fact, religious faith appears at this period to have consisted of little more than a collection of superstitions.

DISESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAM

Nevertheless, it must have required considerable courage for Mustapha Kemal to come out in open opposition to the long-established Moslem faith. The reforms proceeded gradually at first ; the abolition of the Caliphate was steadily worked for by Kemal, who regarded this success as one of the most important of his early internal reforms. Then the religious colleges and tribunals and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Pious Foundations were dissolved. The Prime Minister took over the Presidency of Religious Affairs and thus secured the sole right to appoint and dismiss priests, religious teachers, etc. The first Kurdish revolt of 1925 was largely produced by religious attacks upon the "atheistic reforms" of Ataturk. When it had been put down Kemal closed all religious houses, dissolved religious sects and orders and declared fortune-telling of any sort illegal. He abolished the dervish monasteries (tekke) and withdrew official protection from the numerous mausoleums of local saints (türbe). Education was completely secularised and the training of religious students taken over by the State. Ten years later theological students had practically ceased to come forward and the government again left their training to private initiative. These facts are in striking contrast to the large supply of mullahs which have continued to be produced at Bokhara and other training places for Moslem clergy in the Turkish-speaking parts of the Soviet Union, whose government has equally discouraged the Moslem faith. In 1934 all wearing of religious garments outside places of worship was forbidden. No restraint has been imposed on the teaching of non-Moslem religions, although the entry of missionaries from abroad has been prohibited.

One of the most symbolic of the revolutionary changes carried through by Ataturk was the abolition of the fez. This form of headgear had been introduced over 100 years before in place of the more Oriental turban ; in origin it resembled much of the headgear worn in the Balkans. With the years, however, it had become not only a symbol of the Turk as opposed to his Christian subjects but also a sign of diehard conservatism. Its prohibition brought home more than any other change the government's intention to proceed with westernisation and secularisation. The veil was also discouraged, although it was left to the Governors of different provinces actually to prohibit its wear when they thought fit. Western clothing had gradually come into use in the towns in the late nineteenth century ; Kemal insisted on the formal wearing of the dress coat and top-hat on all official occasions. It is symbolical that government offices are filled with photographs of Kemal and Ismet in well-cut evening dress, in contrast to the military uniforms of so many other national "leaders". The legal reforms early destroyed all connection between religion and everyday life and guaranteed full freedom of worship. This was made clear in 1928, when the constitution was altered by the removal of the statement that Islam was the state religion.

Services in the mosque were ordered to be held in Turkish and the Koran was translated from Arabic. It is possible that now that religion has thus been "nationalised" there may be a revival of religious feeling. It was rumoured when Ismet became President that he would try to restore the Moslem faith to a privileged position. In May 1940 he restored chaplains in the forces, but so far there has been no sign that he intended to embark upon a general change of policy. This would be very difficult to carry out as the

younger generation which has been brought up since the Kemalists came to power is somewhat aggressive in its atheism. There is no persecution of religion, however, which is looked upon as an entirely personal affair.

LEGAL REVOLUTION

The Republic's thoroughgoing legal reforms were among the most important results of the changed attitude to religion. The drawing up of a new code was fully considered, but in the desire for speedy westernisation it was decided to borrow the penal and part of the commercial code from Italy, the rest from Germany and the civil law from Switzerland. The whole legal procedure was thoroughly modernised and the National Assembly adopted all the codes at once. It was decided that revision should be made at a later date in the light of the experience gained from the operation of the new code ; this was done after ten years' experience in 1936.

The most revolutionary of these changes was the adoption of the Swiss civil law. The same rights and duties were given to all citizens, whatever their race, religion or economic position. This change formed one of the most important parts of the programme for giving women their freedom. To operate the new code it was necessary to pension off most of the old judges, who were unable to accept the westernisation and ideas implied in the new code. Young lawyers who were sympathetic to the regime filled the gaps and arrangements were made to provide a new legal training for would-be lawyers and judges. A faculty of law was opened at Ankara to cater for these new needs.

Despite a good deal of opposition to Kemalist changes very few political prisoners were executed, though a number of those who had played a large part in the Young Turk

movement and at the Sultan's court fled abroad. After the suppression of the Kurdish revolt in 1925 tribunals of independence were set up with the powers of courts-martial. A number of important opponents of the new regime were executed, but the tribunals acquitted some of those who had rendered past services to the country, although they had opposed many of the recent changes. When the need for these tribunals had passed they were dissolved. Active propaganda against the regime is rigidly suppressed, but a wide freedom of discussion is allowed provided no organisation is established to attack the regime. So firmly had the regime become established that Ataturk felt able to declare a general political amnesty not long before he died, and to allow a return of all political refugees save the royal family. In peace time the death penalty is now only pronounced in the worst murder cases. After one of the rare public executions in Istanbul in the summer of 1939 it was decided that all future executions should take place in private. In making this change the government reacted to a growing popular humanitarian feeling.

Many of the prisons are still very primitive, although some model ones have recently been built. They have all been placed under the control of penal reformers who have not only suppressed the torture and ill-treatment formerly common but have initiated a number of experiments for making the greatly reduced number of prisoners into useful citizens. One of the most interesting of these experiments is conducted on the island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmora, which has been turned into a largely self-governing community where prisoners are rehabilitated. This settlement, which chiefly consists of murderers, is guarded by only two police who mix with the prisoners as they learn to be farmers and fishermen. Unlike the Western countries there

is only a small "criminal class". For most law-breakers in Turkey are primitive persons who have not learnt to discipline themselves. It is claimed that the modern methods of dealing with such prisoners have been most successful.

Other changes were made to bring the customs of the country into accord with Western practices. In 1925 the Gregorian calendar and twenty-four-hour day were introduced. In popular practice, however, it is customary when writing the date to omit the first "1"; thus "1939" is frequently written "939". The changeover from Friday to Sunday as the weekly holiday was not made until 1935 through fear of upsetting religious feelings of the population. A new wave of reforms had started the previous year, when all titles, civil, military and religious, were abolished, and new Turkish names were given to different military ranks. "Bay" and "bayan", which are the Turkish equivalent of Mr. and Miss or Mrs., have replaced all previous titles such as pasha, bey or efendi. This reform was deliberately carried out by the government as a step in an equalitarian direction. It was followed by another change which made the adoption of a family surname compulsory. These new surnames, such as Ataturk and Inonu, are only gradually coming into everyday use; the first name still remains the most common form of address.

EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN

No section of the population was more affected by the religious and legal changes than women. Under the Ottoman Empire their lot had indeed been a sorry one. In the towns and particularly among the upper classes they had been little more than the slaves of their male companions. Under Moslem law a man was allowed four legal wives and any number of concubines. A woman was

not allowed to appear in public with men ; she was forced when out of doors to cover her face with a close veil. Any form of education was considered sinful. The woman did not see her husband until the wedding day. When a girl reached the age of marriage her father looked round for a suitable husband, while a prospective bridegroom sent his female relatives to call on families with marriageable daughters. If a girl wished to be married she had to please these go-betweens. When the relations had reached agreement the girl was handed over to her husband, who retained the right to divorce her by word of mouth whenever he so wished. The lack of real family life and the continual quarrels amongst the female members of a household and their children prevented a man from having any real affection for his home. There was no equal division of property amongst children, and a great deal of intrigue took place to secure preference for one or other of the offspring.

This degrading slavery fortunately did not affect so profoundly women of the poorer townfolk and of the peasants. For few of the poor townsmen could afford to keep more than one wife, and a small home did not allow space for the many matrimonial differences resulting from polygamy. In the country peasants often married more than one wife to obtain labour for work on the land. Peasant women frequently worked very hard, as their menfolk usually spent a good deal of their time on military service and often preferred to idle away the gaps between these periods over coffee and raki. This meant that the peasant women had to take a great deal of responsibility for running the farms and for bringing up their families. They usually wore a charshaf, a cloak for covering the head, very similar to that worn by nuns. When at work in the

RELIGIOUS AND LEGAL CHANGE ; WOMEN WIN FREEDOM

fields they did not cover their faces, but only drew this across the lower part of their faces when meeting a strange man.

From time to time very strict laws were enacted to prevent women from throwing off any of the marks of their subjection by wearing freer clothes or going about unaccompanied in the towns. Despite the ferment of liberal ideas at the end of the nineteenth century little change took place, apart from the opening of a number of special classes for women. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 led to an extension of these classes, and women in the upper classes began to wear thinner and more curtailed veils. No change of importance in the status of women, however, took place before the establishment of the Republic.

Mustapha Kemal took a very strong stand at an early date on the necessity for equality of the sexes. During his tour of the country in 1923 he spoke at many meetings upon this subject. He said that "our need today is the higher education of our women. They shall be instructed in every field of science . . . men and women will walk together in all paths of life and help each other." To persuade the people to make the revolutionary change which he desired Atatürk carried on steady propaganda. Attention was drawn to the part women had played in the War of Independence, when many of them had rendered help by carrying up munitions and food to the soldiers. The past was gone into and it was found that women had enjoyed a high status among the nomad Turkish tribes before they settled in Anatolia and came under the Arab, Persian and Byzantine influences which produced the harem and all that went with it.

The constitution of the Turkish Republic, which was adopted in April 1924, did not differentiate between men

and women except by refusing women the right to vote or become deputies or members of municipal councils. The adoption of the new civil code in 1926 made polygamy illegal and made marriage a civil ceremony. Women were given equal rights of inheritance and were allowed to become legal guardians. Divorce was made more difficult and was made equal for both sexes ; a number of legal safeguards were given to wives.

In 1930 the Assembly (Kamutay) gave women the right to vote and be candidates in municipal elections ; in 1934 they were allowed to vote for and become members of the Assembly itself. In the next election in 1935 seventeen women deputies were elected. With one exception these were all teachers and belonged to the ruling party. In the programme which was drawn up by the Republican People's Party in 1935 it was declared that no distinction was made between the sexes.

Women have thus obtained legal, social, political and economic equality. There is no single official bar in civil life to posts which they may obtain. They are found in the ranks of teachers, civil servants, artists, judges, lawyers and deputies ; there are even two women chief constables. They also work in offices, shops and factories and receive equal pay for equal work. Military service for women has been suggested as a final step which should be taken to make equality complete. Some military education has already been given in the lycées and universities. Whether this will be extended has not yet been decided.

How far has this change been generally accepted ? There would appear to be little opposition in the country as a whole, particularly among the educated ruling classes. There is so keen a demand at the present time for people with administrative ability and specialist knowledge to

assist in the country's development that ability irrespective of sex is welcomed. When school teachers and other women in professions marry there is no objection to their retaining their posts. In the factories in the large cities a higher proportion of women will be found working than in the more rural areas. Work within the factories is paid usually at piece rates ; it is found, however, that women usually earn less than men on the same job owing to the time they have to devote to family duties when off work.

In the country districts and the smaller towns the veil is still sometimes seen. Its disappearance appears to be only a question of time. It is significant that when the Turkish troops entered Antioch when they took over the Hatay from the French in July 1939, they were greeted by a deputation of women who symbolically removed their veils to welcome the arrival of the "European" Turks.

It must not be assumed, however, that polygamy has disappeared, for all polygamous marriages that had been contracted before the new code came into force in 1926 were allowed to continue if the partners so wished. In fact, in the last six months before the new law became operative quite a number of peasants with elderly wives married a younger one so as to obtain assistance in work on their land. But the statistics show a steady approximation in the number of husbands and wives which will make the polygamous marriage a curious survival of the past within a few years. Big changes in family life have already taken place, not only amongst the better off but also among the peasantry. The fact that he can now only have one wife, in conjunction with the unwonted peace which Ataturk has given the country and the government propaganda in favour of work to build up the fatherland, is making the

peasant take an interest in his land and supply a fair share of the work alongside his wife.

The existence of polygamy among the upper classes had an important equalitarian influence in the Ottoman Empire because the large families which were produced made it difficult for a powerful hereditary ruling class to gain a strong position. Many of the grand viziers and other important government officials were of humble birth, and it was quite possible for persons of lower middle-class parentage, such as Mustapha Kemal, to carve out a career for themselves in the army or the civil service. Had the abolition of polygamy not been accompanied by a general desire to build up an equalitarian society in the new Turkish Republic, it might have assisted in the accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of a small group. As it is, it seems unlikely that the abolition of polygamy in itself will be followed by such a result.

CHAPTER IX

EDUCATION AND THE ARTS; THE HEALTH SERVICES

BEFORE the advent of the Republic the majority of Turkish schools were dominated by the mosque. The old form of education was largely Arabic in origin. In the early days of the Ottoman Empire a live and thinking culture had existed, but after the Empire's zenith education became formal and scholastic. The upper classes studied Arabic and Persian classics and brought many words from these languages into their everyday speech. They thus created an official Ottoman Turkish which was very far removed from the language spoken by the Anatolian peasantry. The great mass of the people did not go to school at all; such schools as existed were primitive and barbarous and hidebound by religious bigotry. A certain number of missionary schools had been created on European lines, which did a great deal in the latter part of the nineteenth century to 'introduce Western ideas. This benefited the Christian minorities more than the Turks, however. During this period most Turks wanting to acquire Western ideas went abroad to study in France and other European countries.

THE EDUCATIONAL LADDER

The Revolution secularised education; today religious teaching¹ does not appear in the school curriculum save in

¹ In the issue of February 1940 of the Memo. of Information on Foreign Affairs, p. 10 (Imperial Policy Group), it is stated that "Re-

the surviving schools of the minorities. The Constitution declared that elementary education should be compulsory and free for all Turks. Existing private schools, including missionary schools, were allowed to survive, but were forced to conform to the general principles adopted by the State's schools. They have been strictly controlled, with the result that many have closed down. No new ones may be built.

Turkish schools are divided roughly into three groups: public schools governed by the Ministry of Education, private schools controlled by this Ministry, and schools governed by other ministries. The first group include elementary schools, which boys and girls are supposed to attend between the ages of seven and twelve. Their normal course covers five years, but in many country districts only a three-years course is followed.

Junior High Schools have been created for children who have finished their studies at the elementary schools; they have a three-years course. Parallel with these are professional schools, which have a five-years course. These are not co-educational, but are the main trade schools for boys and girls. The girls' institutes teach sewing, hat-making, artificial flower-making and embroidery, and the domestic sciences; the boys are taught carpentry, ironwork, etc. In the same group fall the co-educational commercial schools with a four-years course, and commercial lycées with a six-years course. The ordinary lycées are the pivot of the Turkish secondary school system. They give a three-years course for boys and girls who have finished their studies in Junior High Schools. In most cases they

ligious instruction is given in the schools again, though there are still some from which it is omitted". In response to an official inquiry the Turkish Ministry of Public Education deny this and state that "apart from the minority schools, education is conducted on a completely secularised basis, as it has been in the past".

are also co-educational, although some of the larger towns provide separate schools.

The universities are intended to receive girls and boys who have finished their studies at the lycées and have successfully passed a qualifying examination. The University of Istanbul at present has five faculties : arts, sciences, law, economics and medicine. All of these faculties provide a four-years course, except the medical faculty, where the course lasts for six years. This University was founded in 1871, but was later suppressed and not restarted until 1908. In 1933 it was completely reorganised and about thirty German professors, most of them refugees, were called in. In recent years a new university has been under construction at Ankara ; the faculties of law and arts have already been created and others are now being added.

There are also a number of specialist higher schools and institutes which have the same qualifying entrance standards as the universities ; these include the higher normal schools, the Gazi Institute of Education, the School for Political Sciences, the Academy for Fine Arts and the Higher School of Commerce and Economics. Most of these are at Ankara. There is also a conservatoire for those with special musical ability who have finished their studies at Junior High Schools. Schools for drama and opera have recently been created.

A certain number of Turkish private schools exist, which include elementary schools, Junior High Schools and lycées, and there are foreign schools of a similar character. Some of these, like the Robert College of Istanbul, have a very wide reputation. Greeks, Armenians and Jews have their own private schools in areas where they are numerous ; the Ministry of Education controls the teaching of Turkish and of history in all non-government schools.

MODERN TURKEY


A considerable amount of education is carried on in schools under the control of other ministries. There are military schools, including lycées, and higher technical schools, governed by the Ministry of National Defence. The Ministry of Public Works and that of Agriculture control a Higher Engineering School and the Higher Agricultural Institute. Faculties of law are supervised by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health runs the school for training nurses. All of these higher institutions are on a level with the universities and admit students by similar qualifying examinations.

Education is free in all government schools, including secondary and professional schools and the universities. In most cases, however, pupils have to look for board and lodging, which is sometimes an important factor, as owing to the paucity of the population in many districts, children frequently have to board to attend school. The poorer pupils, however, can often obtain free board and lodging. At the universities many of the students keep themselves by working in the vacation in the same way as students in America. Some of the most important higher educational bodies, including the Faculty of Medicine, the School of Political Sciences and the Agricultural Institute, provide free board and lodging for all students. All such bodies provide board and lodging for a high percentage of pupils.

This educational system aims at equality of opportunity among a people learning to govern themselves. How far are these aims realised in practice? In the first place it must be admitted that the latest figures show that only 53 per cent of the available children in the Republic attend elementary schools. Great efforts have been made to cover the country with village schools ; valis have competed one



CLASSROOM AT SCHOOL OF COMMERCE, ANKARA
Note different physical types among the pupils



A MODERN GOVERNMENT BUILDING
Ankara School of Civil Aviation

with another to persuade village councils to erect the necessary buildings. The progress of primary education has been held up by the lack of teachers. It has also been adversely affected by the need to press ahead first with the building up of a higher system of education to provide the Republic with the necessary personnel to carry out the great reforms upon which it was engaged, and by the many other needs of the country which drew away the necessary finance. In the last few years advance has been more rapid ; most of the big towns now have extensive school facilities, and it will not be long before all large villages have their own schools. But it is likely to take some time before education really becomes compulsory for the whole population. There are many very thinly populated districts which will require the provision of visiting teachers or else free board and lodging for children attending the nearest school. At the present time there is a strong desire in Turkey to achieve the goal of compulsory education as soon as possible, as it is realised that however democratic the system of higher education may be in theory it cannot be so in practice if primary education is not universal. When this has been attained the tradition of the "career open to the talents", which has long existed in Turkey, should enable a larger number of able children to take advantage of the educational ladder and reach the higher posts in the State. But the growth of a sympathetic public opinion will be necessary to persuade parents not to stand in the way of their children's advancement, particularly among the peasantry, who are only too likely to try to keep their sons to work on the farms.

The secondary educational system has aimed at providing not only teachers, lawyers, doctors and civil servants, but also engineers and technical and commercial workers

of all kinds. So great has been the need of technicians, professional men and administrators of ability that the higher educational system which produces them has grown at a very great rate. There were few rich men in Turkey after the Revolution, but there was an official class of soldiers and civil servants, many of them of humble origin themselves, who had grown up under the Ottoman Empire and who were desirous of creating the New Turkey. They naturally did their best to see that their children benefited from the new higher educational system ; they usually had the means to provide the necessary board and lodging if their children had such mental ability as enabled them to qualify for the different schools they wished to enter. It would be difficult to cut out all such advantages which the children of the ruling persons are bound to have even in a democratic educational system such as is being created in Turkey. The rapid expansion of primary education is helping to reduce such advantages ; a system of completely free board and lodging wherever necessary would appear to be a vital addition to free education if equality of opportunity is really to mean anything.

About 800,000 children attend the state elementary schools. Private schools of all kinds serve only 21,036 pupils and foreign schools only 6,736. The boys and girls attending Junior High Schools now number 80,190 ; there are 16,754 at the professional schools and 21,572 at the ordinary lycées. Boys outnumber the girls by a large majority at all of these schools save the professional schools, where the girls form 60 per cent of the total. There are close on 5,000 students at Istanbul University, nearly 1,000 at the Ankara School of Law and round about 500 apiece at most of the important higher educational institutes. About 1,600 students are at present abroad at the

State's expense attending either universities or higher technical schools.

The School of Political Sciences is one of the most important parts of the Turkish higher educational system. Founded in 1858, it was intended to provide an avenue by which boys of ability could be recruited for the higher administrative grades in the civil service. It remained on a very small scale, however, until after the Revolution. It has now been housed in Ankara, where it provides free board and lodging and specialist education for four years, fitting its students to take up posts in the principal government departments. Pupils from all the Turkish lycées compete for entrance to this institute, where a large section of the future rulers of the country are trained. Those who are successful then attend an organisation which is half boarding school and half university. Those in their first year sleep in a dormitory in which bed lies beside bed with little space between and no privacy for the inmates. With each year of seniority a greater space is provided between the beds. As many of the pupils are poor and come from remote parts of the country all who wish are allowed to remain in residence during the holidays. Through this institution the rapidly growing civil service is able to recruit some of the best brains of the country. The Schools of Medicine also provide free board and lodging. So great is the demand for doctors that any boy or girl from the lycées who has passed a university qualifying examination and who so wishes may begin medical studies with the certainty that a government post will be awaiting when he has taken his examinations.

One of the most dramatic of Ataturk's reforms was the change over from the complicated Arabic script to a Latin alphabet. A new simplified form of spelling was intro-

duced with the new alphabet. These changes, in conjunction with the introduction of the metric system, greatly eased the teacher's work in the primary schools. When the new alphabet was introduced in 1928 a determined effort was made not only to instruct the young but also to persuade adults to conquer their illiteracy. Atatürk personally toured the country, teaching villagers and townsmen the new alphabet. From the point of view of the government the alphabet is not only a boon in the fight against illiteracy, but also has the advantage of making it impossible for most of the newly educated to read the vast literature published in the old script, and barriers are thus set up against the return of the old ideas.

Two other changes of importance have been the alteration in the teaching of history and the attempt at language reform. As is mentioned in the first chapter, keen Turkish nationalism has sought to provide the Turks with a noble historic past before the days of the Ottoman Empire, and to try to prove that the Anatolians living before the Turkish conquest were also of Turanian ancestry. In particular, there has been a glorification both of the early Turkish nomads and of the Hittites and other ancient peoples of Asia Minor. Many of the historical nationalist theories which have been developed are of a very exaggerated kind. In so far as the "new history" helps the modern Turks to break with the immediate decadent past it no doubt has a beneficial effect, but it must be admitted that it might form an ingredient in an aggressive nationalism should one arise at some future date. Unlike the Nazi racial theories the Turkish study of the past has not yet reached sacrosanct conclusions.

Archæological studies in Asia Minor are much encouraged by the government, and they are continually bringing to

light new facts which may modify conclusions already reached. In drawing up their official history the Turks have so far attempted to take account of all known historical material ; their chief fault from a scientific point of view has been the building of elaborate theories to fill in the gaps or explain historical difficulties in a way that suits national pride.

Societies for the study of Turkish history and Turkish language were established by Ataturk and have had a big effect in drawing up textbooks used in schools ; the Language Society made a strenuous effort to purify the Turkish language from foreign words, particularly Arabic and Persian. Attempts were made to find suitable Turkish words among those used by the peasantry and where necessary new words were created. Changes followed one another at a rapid pace ; this caused a great deal of confusion, because they were obligatory upon journalists and a number of officials. After a time more common-sense views were adopted, and it was decided that everybody should express himself in the way in which he could be understood, whilst trying to speak as pure a Turkish as possible. The result has been that many French and other Western words have been incorporated into the language, especially in the technical field, whilst long-established foreign words have been forced to adapt themselves to Turkish grammar and frequently have synonyms of Turkish origin. This compromise has resulted in making Turkish simpler yet richer, and a language which is at once more closely related than Ottoman Turkish to the tongue of the common people and at the same time is suited to modern needs.

Increasing attention is being given to physical training for both sexes, especially in the schools. The most modern

methods have been followed and the improvement in the physique of the young, especially of the girls who have benefited from this training, has been most pronounced. The laying out of playgrounds and sports fields has been greatly encouraged. The children at secondary schools have been allowed to organise Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, but these bodies, like all others, are not allowed to affiliate to any international organisations.

In the short period of its existence the Republican educational system has certainly achieved a great deal. Trained at the Gazi Institute of Education and other training colleges, which they periodically revisit for refresher courses, young teachers are steadily establishing themselves in the villages of the country. Both men and women act not merely as pedagogues but as unselfish enthusiasts for the New Turkey. The schools in which they teach have become the centres from which the ideas of the Revolution spread out.

The curriculum and school books are on similar lines for the same kind of school all over Turkey. Revision of these takes place every three years after exhaustive discussion by the teachers and educational administrators. Despite this tendency to uniformity in learning, pupils are persuaded to take interest in what they do, not to repeat what they are taught in parrot fashion. Unlike fascist Germany, the pupils are taught to do things for themselves. They are educated in self-government by running their own co-operative societies and savings clubs, by building their own museums and organising their own concerts and their own plays. Within the limitations which excessive nationalism imposes, the Turkish educational system deserves great praise. It certainly appears to be developing in such a way as to provide the country with

EDUCATION AND THE ARTS ; THE HEALTH SERVICES

citizens who will be capable of governing themselves. In so far as an educational system can provide equality of opportunity and prepare people for democratic government, that of Turkey is developing on lines which should achieve these ends.

THE PEOPLE'S HOUSES

The principal instruments in developing adult education in general and an interest in the arts in particular are the People's Houses (*Halkevleri*), which numbered 367 in the summer of 1939. These have now been created in all the vilayets ; few towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants are without such a centre. Their activities are extensive. Education is given in literature, history, folklore, languages and many other subjects ; facilities are given when required for the drama, cinema, music and drawing. Knowledge of typing and sewing can be acquired, libraries, reading-rooms, sports facilities and social and medical aid are provided. In many areas the People's House has taken the initiative in producing local weekly papers and has encouraged excavations and the opening of museums.

The membership of the People's House is free and open to anyone who wishes to join. The various activities are run by committees and officers elected by its members. There is complete equality between the sexes in their organisation. The finances are derived in part from the entertainments they give, in part from the funds of the People's Party, which has played an active part in their initiation.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARTS

Too short a time has so far passed since the advent of the Kemalist regime to reach final judgment on the great

development of the arts which has taken place since the Revolution, and of which the People's Houses are only one manifestation. The Anatolian has expressed himself during the centuries sometimes by original creation and sometimes by collecting and developing what he has learnt from other civilisations and peoples. At the present time he appears to be doing both.

The archæological exploration of recent years has shown the world the greatness of Hittite civilisation. Further exploration will doubtless reveal the early work of many of the other ancient peoples of Asia Minor. Not only has the Republic encouraged archæological excavations, but it has sought to preserve and restore the most interesting work of the past which still survives. Atatürk's conversion of Saint Sophia into a museum of Byzantine art has enabled the uncovering of its famous mosaics to be pursued. The magnificent mosque of Konya and other Seljuk triumphs have been taken into the possession of the nation and the greatest of the creations of the Ottoman Empire such as Sinan's mosques are now safeguarded. This work of finding and preserving the best in the past is not merely a fad of a few intellectuals who may have gained the ear of the President or other important servants of the Republic for the moment. The Republican People's Party definitely attempts to teach the Turkish people to take pride in its rich Anatolian past. In nearly every small town a museum can be found, usually a restored building of interest, which is in charge of some young enthusiastic graduate who is engaged on collecting anything of interest in his district for his museum, and in seeking out buildings and sites of historical importance, about which he informs the authorities and for which he tries to secure their interest and protection. Enthusiastic valis try to persuade towns and villages in

their vilayets either to start such museums or to found and look after small ones which are usually run in connection with the local People's House or school. Most secondary and many village schools either co-operate in feeding such local museums or else create their own. Up to now, despite exaggerated theories of Turkish nationalism, continual interest has been shown in the work of exploration in Anatolia, which has not been restricted in any way in the interest of any particular racial theory.

This safeguarding of the past has been accompanied by the development of a vital and utilitarian modern architecture. As in the Hellenistic periods of the past, when Greek and Roman forms of architecture were developed and naturalised in Asia Minor, so the architectural styles of Weimar Germany and pre-Hitler Vienna have been introduced and adapted to modern Turkish conditions. The government departments and other public buildings of Ankara and the modern industrial plants constructed in recent years definitely suit the Anatolian landscape. The light style of the utilitarian railway station at Ankara compares very favourably with the monumental, massive, marble-faced monstrosity which Mussolini has constructed at Milan to impress the Italian people and their visitors.

Many of the immigrant villages have been built in a simple red-tiled cottage style which might have been put up in any part of central or southern Europe. Most modern domestic architecture, however, is in the traditional local styles, such as the half-timbered houses of the north and of the forest areas, and the flat-roofed stone dwellings of the central plateau. In many districts where Armenians and Greeks have vanished, old houses can easily be occupied and restored.

The development of Turkish painting and statuary was

long restricted by the Moslem faith. No representation of the human form or even of that of animals was permitted. The Ottoman conquest had been followed by the covering over of all such features which survived from the Byzantine period. Painting on French lines had started in the late nineteenth century but had made little progress. A school for the Fine Arts had been started in 1883, but did not develop to any great extent until after the establishment of the Republic. In 1936 this school was radically transformed into the Academy of Fine Arts, and now forms a centre of artistic life, which certainly compares favourably with that of any of the other Balkan States.

Ataturk had already shown his contempt for the past by erecting in 1926 a monument of himself looking out across the Golden Horn. Soon this defiance was followed by the unveiling of other statues of himself in public places in all the most important towns of the Republic. His portraits and those of Ismet and other prominent ministers now adorn the walls of all public offices, even in the remotest villages. When European numerals replaced Arabic characters on the coinage Ataturk's head was also introduced. Ankara in particular has been decorated with modern sculpture; Hittite lions have been brought out from museums and used to adorn its highways. So far, however, modern Turkish sculptors have been chary of chiselling nudes to erect in public places. A departure in this direction no doubt will come as the representation of the human body ceases to be considered wicked. Up to now most of the sculpture and painting has consisted of representations of Ataturk and of scenes of the national revival. Such nationalist influence is likely to be a dominant factor for many years to come, as the patronage of the State and other public bodies provides the only market of importance.

The growth of industrialisation has widened this market recently by encouraging commercial art. This seems likely to develop in the near future.

The Ottoman Empire at the height of its power had encouraged many fascinating crafts. Turkey's carpets secured world-wide renown, as did her jewellery, metalware and painted tiles. Not only are the best products of the past in these mediums preserved, but the government is doing everything possible to encourage the production of further work in the past tradition.

Turkish literature and poetry in the Ottoman period was strongly influenced by Persian and Arabic classics and were enjoyed only by the small ruling coterie. Western influences were beginning to be felt in the late nineteenth century. It was only with the introduction of the new alphabet, the reform of the language and the decline of illiteracy, that any considerable literary development became possible. A virile journalism and nationalist studies about the Turkish State up to now appear to be the chief results of this change. A greater variety of literary output should soon follow, for the fact that most of the European classics and best-sellers have now been translated into Turkish and that most educated Turks can read French, has opened up knowledge of the Western World to those who can read. Although only one political party is allowed, the works of economic thinkers such as Marx can be read in Turkish, provided no attempt is made to establish political parties in opposition to the regime. The comparative freedom of discussion which exists in Turkey should stimulate such a literary development.

Before 1914 only Istanbul and Izmir possessed theatres. Practically all the actresses were Greeks and other foreigners ; for Turkish women were strictly forbidden to appear on

the stage. Coffee-house concerts were the popular centre of amusement. The government is now attempting to re-establish the drama in the Anatolian life. Actors and actresses have been trained, and the People's Houses have developed a lively interest in amateur theatricals. The Istanbul municipal theatre is attempting to produce a number of Turkish films.

A broadcasting station has been established at Ankara, and another, more highly powered, is to be constructed at Istanbul. Programmes combine Turkish tradition with Western innovation, entertainment with education and government propaganda. Few individuals possess their own wireless sets, but all important government officials and most village schoolmasters and restaurant proprietors in large towns encourage the public to listen to their loudspeakers.

One of the biggest cultural battles is being fought in the musical field. Ataturk took a strong dislike to the old Turkish music, which he considered Oriental. The playing of American negro jazz was encouraged in hotels and public places ; at his official receptions government dignitaries were expected to display aptitude in the latest American dances. Orchestras have been established to play the best Western music, although care is being taken to collect the ancient folk-songs. As in the sphere of language, a practical and broadminded compromise appears now to have been reached in the musical world, although the State still does its best to patronise everything that is considered modern and Western. Restaurants may feature the latest jazz, but the workmen and peasants still sing the old Turkish tunes. Visitors to the broadcasting station at Ankara will see not only the pianos, violins and saxophones necessary for the playing of Viennese waltzes, Italian and

Spanish songs and American jazz music, but also the pipes and other Turkish instruments which have been handed down from the time of the Hittites.

Some young Turkish composers have attempted to modernise the old Turkish style and bring it more into accord with Western musical ideas. A number of tunes in the Turkish tradition, but more palatable to the Western ear, have thus been written. This compromise, however, shows no signs of driving out either of the two traditions which it seeks to combine. Much interest is also shown in Circassian dances and the music of Greeks and other neighbours.

HEALTH SERVICES

The Ottoman Empire had left the care of public health largely to religious and other voluntary organisations. Little impression had been made on the disease-ridden parts of Anatolia. It is of interest that the Green books which were prepared for the British Foreign Office during the war of 1914-18 definitely pointed out certain parts of Anatolia as being healthy and other parts as being unhealthy, as though this definition was natural and little could be done to alter it. The Republic established a Ministry for Public Health and Welfare and organised a campaign, almost on military lines, to free the country from disease. The most serious enemy that had to be fought was malaria. It is widely believed that this fever has been responsible for the decline of civilisation in Anatolia. It certainly seems that after the Turkish conquest and the raids of Tamerlane had destroyed many towns and villages, former irrigation works were replaced by marshes and stagnant pools which formed extensive breeding grounds for mosquitoes. In 1926 the government

decided to place the fight against malaria in the forefront of its health programme. The most stricken areas, which covered a fifth of the country's population, were made centres for an organised campaign. The Minister of Public Health put these areas in charge of medical officers directly responsible to himself. Each area was provided with the necessary equipment and clinics and was divided into sections under the control of numerous doctors and their assistants. A special malaria institute was founded in 1928 at Adana; all Turkish doctors are obliged by law to attend a three-months course there for the treatment of malaria.

The campaign against the disease took three forms. The whole population in the affected areas was medically examined in spring and autumn; all persons found to be suffering from the disease received treatment, in most cases free; and groups of people, such as soldiers, school children and factory workers, were given free preventive medicine. Then swamps and stagnant pools were drained, the peasants often being forced to assist in this work. Official steps were taken to destroy the mosquitoes and their larvæ. Ignorant and superstitious obstruction to these steps was rigorously suppressed.

The campaign had amazing results. Whole regions have already been freed from the scourge. Ankara, the new capital, is now completely freed, although it was once the centre of a stricken area. Epidemics have been greatly reduced in severity and it appears that it will not be long before malaria has been finally conquered. Other battles have been fought against venereal diseases and tuberculosis. Trachome (Egyptian eye disease) has practically vanished in striking contrast to Egypt and North Africa. Smallpox, cholera and the plague have also been taken in hand

The fight against disease, however, has only just begun ; it is symbolic that the Minister of Public Health's table in his office at Ankara has a map under its glass top which is continually kept up to date, showing the fights against disease which are in progress or are planned.

The growth of the medical faculties at the universities has already been sketched. The Institute of Hygiene and the model hospital at Ankara feed the country with the serums, medicines and working knowledge and experience required. New hospitals and clinics are rapidly developing in all parts of the country.

The party programme lays great stress on the steps which need be taken for the improvement of public health, and especially for the care of mothers and children. The infant mortality rate has fallen very rapidly with the general improvement of health. A service of clinics for mothers and children has yet, however, made little progress. The desire to increase the population and fill the many empty spaces in Anatolia is likely to lead to the development of such services at an early date. Turkish doctors have noted the comparatively low maternal death rate and have ascribed this to the strengthening of women's abdominal muscles resulting from the use of the Anatolian form of lavatory. As a result, in this sphere at any rate, the introduction of Western sanitary fittings is definitely discouraged.

Orphanages and mental hospitals have been established, but the latter are still largely experimental in character. The State has a monopoly for the sale of opium and controls its production. It has taken strong steps to stamp out the consumption of dangerous drugs.

The new state factories have set an example in their provisions for looking after the health of their employees. Such large-scale private factories as survive are being

brought into line with this practice since the Labour Code was enacted in 1936. No state-controlled insurances of any sort exist at present, but the government has laid down generous provisions by Turkish standards for compensation to injured workmen.

The new capital, Ankara, was magnificently town-planned by German experts, and in the summer of 1939 a Frenchman's plan for the opening up of the old town of Istanbul and controlling the development of its suburbs was approved. In contrast to the magnificent public buildings, parks and highways which are seen at Ankara, there is an absence of working-class flats and houses. Some of these are provided for in the official plan, but have so far been neglected. It is incongruous that the old town of Ankara on the hill should have been allowed to become surrounded by large numbers of self-made cottages and shacks built by workmen upon the hillside out of its rocky surroundings. Visitors are told that these will be all cleared away when the proper workers' houses and flats have been provided. It will be interesting to see whether this actually happens. It was perhaps natural that the administrative buildings required for organising the drive to construct the New Turkey should have been built first.

Many new cottages have been built by the State for the workers near the new factories and in the mining areas. Whole villages have been laid out for the immigrants. Most Turkish villagers and townsmen, however, have been left to construct their own homes out of the local material, which is usually abundant. The problem of dealing with the working-class population of a growing town had not arisen acutely until Ankara began to develop very rapidly. For Istanbul had been a city in decay from the early 1920's until recently, and had contained ample though primitive

EDUCATION AND THE ARTS ; THE HEALTH SERVICES

working-class housing accommodation, while Izmir had lost its Greek population when its Greek quarter was burnt down and was not developed industrially under the Five Years Plan.

Some of the most vivid forms of health propaganda in Turkey are the numerous posters showing the effect of disease and lack of cleanliness. These, for which the idea has been borrowed from Russia, are put up in post offices, schools and all public buildings. Various voluntary societies, such as the Red Crescent and the Association for the Protection of Childhood, co-operate with the State's health services. The Federation of Sports Clubs encourages sports and provides suitable playing-fields.

CHAPTER X

FOREIGN POLICY

TURKEY before the foundation of the Republic was haunted by the ghost of her Empire in Europe and embarrassed by the reality of it in Asia and Africa. The Balkan states had painfully emancipated themselves and were hostile to the country which had ruled them. In the First Balkan War Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria attacked Turkey and reduced her possessions in Europe to less than her present territory. The dissensions which followed their victory provided Turkey with the opportunity of regaining a little of what she had lost by pushing her frontier beyond Edirne (Adrianople). Just before and during these wars in the Balkans Turkey was engaged in a war with Italy over Tripoli. The Ottoman Empire, sprawling over three continents, poorly organised and administered, was in fact an anachronism.

THE PROPOSED PARTITION OF TURKEY

The Great War brought that Empire to an end. The Allies sought to enlist the support of the Arab nationalist movement by promises of independence and the support of some neutral states by promises of a share of Ottoman territory. Britain and France pursued these two lines of policy with more vigour than discrimination ; and the two Allied Powers found the publication of the Secret Treaties by the Soviet Government in 1917 a special embarrassment, since the treaties showed how frequently in the Near East the same things had been promised to different parties.

FOREIGN POLICY

For example, two separate policies were pursued in Arabia, one conducted from India in support of Ibn Saud and the other conducted from London in support of the Sheriff of Mecca. Again, by the secret Treaty of London Italy had been promised as the price of her entry into the war "a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia¹". It had previously been agreed that Russia should have Constantinople; and France and Greece both had claims upon different parts of the Ottoman Empire which had to be considered. Within a year and a half of the War beginning two diplomats, Mark Sykes and Georges Picot, representing Britain and France respectively, spent from December 1915 to May 1916 discussing exactly how the Ottoman Empire should be divided when it had been defeated. They allotted France as her share of the spoils not only Syria and the Lebanon but Cilicia (including the towns of Adana and Mersin) and part of inner Anatolia as a sphere of special interest. In April 1917, at the Conference of St. Jean de Maurienne, Italy agreed to this arrangement provided that she herself also received a very substantial part of the Anatolian plateau. The plan which had been drawn up with such pains could not survive the double shock of the Bolshevik revolution and the entry of American statesmen into the counsels of the Allied Powers.

The most serious difficulties in the actual planning of the partition at the Peace Conference arose out of the rivalries of Greece and Italy. They could agree only upon one point; that they both wanted Smyrna—and both of them apparently could produce fairly good proof that it had been promised to them. Britain and France, not anxious to strengthen Italy now that the war was over, favoured the Greeks, and as Lloyd George puts it in

¹ Antalya.

his War Memoirs, "Prompt action taken by Wilson, Clemenceau and myself enabled Venizelos to get a Greek force into the town whilst the Italians were hesitating".

The actual bargaining over the partition lasted until August 1920, when the Treaty of Sèvres was signed. The delay was mainly due to the fact that the French would not entrust the control of Constantinople to the British and the British would not entrust it to the French. Finally a satisfactory formula was devised—the Straits were to be demilitarised under international control. The Treaty did not propose merely the division of the Empire; it proposed the partition of Turkey itself. Greece was to have Eastern Thrace, Smyrna and its hinterland; France and Italy were to divide the south of the country between them while a large independent Armenian state was to be established in the north-east with its frontiers drawn by the President of the United States.

The campaigns of Atatürk and the war weariness of the French and Italians prevented this settlement from being enforced, but the menace of European imperialism shown in the Treaty of Sèvres to the national independence and integrity of Turkey provided the starting-point of post-war Turkish foreign policy. The immediate fields of Turkish diplomacy—the Balkans on the one hand and Western Asia on the other—were throughout the twenties and thirties the scenes of intrigue by the Great Powers. In the Balkans France in the nineteen-twenties painstakingly constructed her Eastern European diplomatic system; while Britain was particularly concerned in the Near and Middle East, where she desired to gain control of the supplies of oil, to safeguard the frontier of India and to reconcile the conflicting promises which she had made in Palestine.

In the pursuit of their aims in the Near East the Powers

FOREIGN POLICY

had frequently adopted some of the methods which Nazi Germany was to use during the nineteen-thirties, such as the use of national minorities to disrupt a state from within. The Armenians were the particular victims of these efforts. From the time of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 they had been encouraged and supported by the Powers when such a policy was likely to weaken Turkey. The Armenians, however, were a very definite minority in most of the territories of eastern Turkey which they claimed. They were thus unable to defend themselves effectively when European intrigues and their own ambitions provoked the nationalist and religious feelings of the majority of the local inhabitants. Massacre and expulsion had greatly reduced their number by 1918. Despite their comparatively small numbers at that date they were allotted a large share of north-eastern Turkey by the Treaty of Sèvres. None of the Powers, however, was unselfish enough to undertake the mandate which the Armenians saw was essential if the extensive new state suggested was to be created and have any chance of survival. For such a task would have proved hard and thankless.

THE BASES OF TURKISH POLICY

With such evidence of the self-interest of the Powers brought home to Republican Turkey, her foreign policy has been an extremely realistic one. In no part of the world, for example, did it appear more clearly than in the Near East that one of the main reasons for devising the mandate system was to reconcile the promises of independence and self-determination made by the Powers with their desire to maintain their control over the territories in question. This background to the history of the Turkish Republic has meant that the defence of the independence

and integrity of the country by diplomatic means presented itself, particularly in the early years of the Republic's existence, as a pressing necessity.

The first success of the Turkish republic in the field of foreign policy was at the Conference of Lausanne. It was described by Kemal Ataturk as "the greatest diplomatic victory in history", and certainly it was a triumph for Turkey that she alone of the defeated states secured the benefit of a negotiated instead of a dictated peace. What she gained at Lausanne, however, followed primarily from her military victories in the War of Independence, although these were assisted by the diplomatic skill of Ismet Inonu. By this settlement, reached in July 1923 between Turkey on the one side and Britain, France, Greece, Rumania, Italy and Yugoslavia on the other, the foundation of an independent Turkey was laid. Turkish sovereignty was recognised in Anatolia and talk of independence for the Kurds and the Armenians who had been used by the enemies of Turkey came to an end. The Capitulations were abolished—so that the new Turkish state might be sovereign and independent in the economic sphere. The Ottoman debt was reduced. The non-Moslem communities lost the special privileges and immunities which they had enjoyed under the Ottoman Empire. Turkish sovereignty was limited only by the establishment of demilitarised zones on the Greek and Bulgarian frontiers and by the demilitarisation of the Straits. Merchant ships might pass freely and, with slight restrictions, warships were given the right of entering the Black Sea.

Certain points were left unsettled at Lausanne and had to be negotiated subsequently. The most important of these were the question of the vilayet of Mosul and the frontier between Turkey and Iraq; the execution of the

scheme of exchange of population between Turkey and Greece which was designed to ensure that neither should have any claims against the other on the ground of national minorities ; the details of the division and payment of the Ottoman debt ; and the delimitation of the Syrian frontier in the neighbourhood of Alexandretta.

The objectives of Turkish foreign policy after the Lausanne settlement remained limited to the defence of the country's independence. There has been no question of re-establishing the Empire, although the Republican government did not accept those provisions of the final settlement (notably those concerning the Sanjak of Alexandretta and the right to fortify the Straits) which infringed upon what it regarded as the national legitimate interests of Turkey ; and it has succeeded in bringing about their revision. In the view of Ataturk the extensive and ramshackle Empire brought no benefit to the peasants of Anatolia in return for the burdens of heavy taxation and of long military service which it imposed upon them. Moreover, as Turkish spokesmen have more recently expressed it, they would be unable to defend the interests of Turkey itself or to play any part in European affairs if they were constantly committed to the defence of the Yemen or the distant borders of the former possessions in Africa.

The principles which might have been the basis for extension of territory have been almost entirely repudiated ; for Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism have been thrown overboard. The union of all those of Turkish language in one state had been proclaimed as an objective by many of those who took part in the reform movements at the beginning of this century, but the Republican government has made no attempt to realise it. Although occasional

references in the Turkish press indicate that such sentiment is not altogether dead, the good relations which have existed until recently with Soviet Russia, the country which would be most affected, have put Pan-Turanianism out of the sphere of practical politics. The reunion of the old Ottoman territories on the basis of religion has been quite as specifically rejected. The Turkish government was officially represented at the first General Congress of the Islamic Faith in 1926, but refused an invitation to be represented at the second Congress in 1931. The Turkish Foreign Secretary, indeed, on that occasion condemned the project of such a conference, saying, "Such initiatives are of no value to any country . . . and distract peoples from the path of progress. In particular we are opposed to any internal or external policy which makes use of religion as a political instrument."

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Since the purpose of Turkish foreign policy was to maintain national independence against the threats of the Western Empires or of the smaller states which acted under their inspiration, it is not surprising that the first firm friend of Kemalist Turkey was the Soviet Union. As early as March 1921 Kemal signed the Treaty of Moscow with the Soviet government. The treaty arose out of the common danger to which the states found themselves exposed. "Recognising that the national movements in the Orient are similar to and in harmony with the struggle of the Russian working people for a new social order," ran one of its clauses, "the two contracting parties assert solemnly the rights of these peoples to freedom, independence, and free choice of such forms of government as they themselves desire to have." Turkey, like other newly formed states,

FOREIGN POLICY

of the Near and Middle East thus derived great benefit from the friendship of the Soviets when they categorically renounced the ambitions of Czarist Russia to dominate the territories lying to their south.

The good feeling between the two states survived the first emergencies in which they found themselves placed and was strengthened by the official visits of statesmen and military commanders. Towards the end of 1925 when Turkey was involved in the Mosul dispute a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was signed at Paris by the two governments ; in this each party undertook to abstain from participation in aggression, alliances, coalitions or hostile actions of any kind directed against the other. This Treaty was renewed four years later, when the parties further undertook that neither would enter into any commitments in the field of foreign policy without the consent of the other.

Although the Treaty of Paris on its expiry in 1935 was renewed for another ten years and official relations between the two countries continued to be cordial, there appears to have been little contact or cultural interchange between the peoples of the two states. Some Russian technical help has been given with Turkish industrialisation—but a larger part of the machinery and most of the experts have come not from the Soviet Union but from lands farther west. In art Soviet influence on Turkey is not strong despite the community of experience which the peoples of the two countries have ; and latterly, at any rate, there have been few cases of students of the arts going from Turkey to the Soviet Union to complete their education. As far as internal politics is concerned the Turkish republican regime, although allowing Marx and Lenin to be read, has shown itself a consistent opponent of Communism and

MODERN TURKEY

has imprisoned its active supporters. The explanation of this is to be found in the jealous way in which the Turkish government guards the independence of its country.

EARLY RELATIONS WITH EASTERN NEIGHBOURS

The conditions which produced the first treaty with the Soviet Union were conducive to closer relations with the other states of the Near and Middle East. Before this first treaty and, significantly enough, also in Moscow, Kemal signed a treaty with Afghanistan. By it each state undertook to assist the other in the event of an attack by an "imperialist power". The treaty moreover recognised Turkey as occupying a position of leadership in the movements for national independence which were taking place among the peoples of Western Asia.

Since the Peace Treaties this part of the world has developed a great deal politically and economically. Iran has been, after Turkey, foremost in this development and its Shah was much influenced by the example of Atatürk. Iraq under Feisal secured its independence from Britain in 1932. Afghanistan has passed through vicissitudes, but there too attempts at westernisation have been made. Each of the states has its strategic importance and the region as a whole has rich resources.

During 1921 Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan entered into friendly relations with one another and the Soviet Union, although a frontier dispute prevented Turkey and Iran from concluding a treaty. A Friendship and Security Treaty, however, was concluded between the two states in April 1926. This agreement indicates how much the states of this region still felt themselves in danger from imperialist intrigue. For it was concluded without any settlement of the frontier difficulties which caused friction between the

FOREIGN POLICY

two states. The subsequent suppression by Turkish troops of a Kurdish revolt near the border of Iran harmed relations ; but a more permanent settlement was achieved by the Frontier Treaty of Teheran in 1932 and by associated agreements on other outstanding points of smaller importance.

The Mosul dispute in which Turkey was involved in 1926 accounted for the atmosphere of the negotiations with Iran. The question of the possession of the province of Mosul had been left unsettled by the Treaty of Lausanne and the oil resources and strategic importance of the district made it coveted. The Turks, on the grounds that the inhabitants of Mosul, were racially akin to the population of eastern Turkey, claimed it from Iraq. The Iraqi government on the other hand maintained that its inhabitants were Kurds and Arabs who did not want to belong to Turkey and that its possession was essential if an independent state was to be created in the lower Euphrates valley. As the district was rich in oil and Britain held mandatory power over Iraq the dispute appeared as one between representatives of Western imperialism and of Middle East national independence. The settlement finally reached confirmed Iraqi rule over the disputed land but awarded to Turkey 10 per cent of the oil output from it. This dispute was followed by an all-round reaffirmation of the obligations of the Western Asiatic states towards one another.

RELATIONS WITH THE BALKAN STATES

The other immediate sphere of Turkish interest was the Balkan peninsula, and here too the Great Powers were operating. After the peace settlement a division emerged in Central and South-Eastern Europe between those states—Rumania, Greece, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia—

which were interested in the maintenance of the *status quo* and those—Bulgaria and Hungary—who had lost territory and were anxious to see a revision of the settlement. These revisionist states were unsympathetic to any proposals for a Balkan Confederation or for a pact of mutual guarantee covering the region, because they did not wish to see a guarantee of the newly established frontiers. Bulgaria, for example, wished for a rectification of her northern frontier to give her the Dobruja from Rumania, an arrangement in the south at the expense of the Greeks which would give her an outlet to the Ægean, and in the west the acquisition of Yugoslav Macedonia. The common interest of Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia led to the formation of the Little Entente in 1921.

The Balkans, which before the war of 1914-18 had been the field of rivalry between Germany, Austria and Russia, became during the nineteen-twenties a field of rivalry between France and Italy. The activities of these two Powers and the influence which they were able to exercise cut across the line of division between the *status quo* states and the revisionists. In general, however, France was successful in establishing her influence with the states of the Little Entente while Italy had by 1926-7 cultivated good relations with Hungary and Bulgaria as well as with Albania and with Greece.

Turkey's interest in the Balkans was at first limited to the settlement of outstanding difficulties with individual states. She lost more heavily in the war than any other Balkan state, but she did not range herself with the revisionists. In 1923, however, she made a treaty of friendship with Hungary and in the following year a similar treaty with Austria. With neither of these states were there any difficulties ; with closer neighbours the case was

different. The Treaty of Lausanne had left uncompleted the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, and with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia there were outstanding questions which arose out of the Balkan Wars. Turks had fled from these countries and had not been permitted to return; difficulties arose over compensation for their property. There was, in addition, a large minority of Turks still left in both countries which constituted a problem. Some settlement of these difficulties was reached in 1925 when on the same day Turkey signed Treaties of Friendship with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

Turkey as well as Greece became involved in the Italian search for allies. The Turkish government, remembering the claims of Italy to southern and central Anatolia, which the secret diplomacy of the war period had encouraged, could not but feel suspicious. Italy was moreover fortifying the Dodecanese Islands which she possessed just off the Turkish coast. Mussolini was not yet firmly established, however, and was not prepared for foreign adventures. He accordingly received the Turkish Foreign Minister cordially at Milan in 1928; and later the same year a Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement was signed between the two states. Italy also concluded a treaty with Greece and used her influence to promote good relations between that country and Turkey.

The exchange of population, which ensured that there should be no outstanding minority problems between the two countries, was completed in 1929 after six years' work. In the following year a treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration, signed by the governments of Turkey and Greece, marked the beginning of much more cordial relations between them. In 1933 it was possible for further steps to be taken and a ten-year Pact of Cordial

Friendship to be concluded. This involved a mutual guarantee of frontiers and even provided for the representation of the two countries at international conferences by a single delegate instructed by both parties. Such a remarkable improvement of Turko-Greek relations was, in view of the War of Independence which had been fought only a decade before, a very striking success for the Turkish policy of seeking a settlement of outstanding difficulties by negotiation and ensuring the safety of the Republican regime by preventing any combination of possible opponents. The Turkish government also had it in view that if possible no neighbour should be used as a tool of any Great Power to embarrass or attack Turkey. The 1930 Treaty with Greece actually marked the culmination of this policy.

The year before, Turkey had strengthened her relations with Bulgaria by a new treaty and had participated in the first conference of the Balkan states which took place at Athens. This Conference discussed the possibilities of Balkan federation—but the Bulgarian claims proved an insoluble problem and made the project for the time being impossible. For some time Turkish statesmen, conscious of the perils to which small states were exposed under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, had been working towards some idea of closer Balkan co-operation. This policy gradually gave Turkey the leadership of the Balkan states. For now that her own position was established Turkey could use her influence to promote good relations between her neighbours, who, although friendly towards her, were in varying degrees hostile to one another. At the second Balkan Conference, which was held at Ankara in 1931, Turkey sought to solve some of the difficulties which arose between Greece and Bulgaria ; and in the following two years improved her relations not only with

FOREIGN POLICY

Greece (to the extent of signing the 1933 treaty) but also with Rumania and Yugoslavia. These treaties did not go so far as that with the Greeks ; they did not involve mutual guarantee of frontiers.

A new stage had thus been reached by the end of 1933. Turkey had placed her relations with all the Balkan states on a firm basis of friendship by a skilful settlement of points of difference. She had also strengthened her position further in 1932 by joining the League of Nations. With the accession of Hitler to power at the beginning of 1933 international conditions began to change and danger for the small states of Europe grew greater than ever. The Little Entente drew closer together in February 1933. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Turkey signed the Soviet Convention for the Definition of the Aggressor in July 1934 ; Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey had already signed a Pact of Balkan Understanding in February 1934. This provided for a mutual guarantee by the signatories of their common frontiers, joint consultation on matters of common interest, publicity of the intention of any signatory to conduct negotiation with any other Balkan state ; and, in a secret protocol, that if any signatory were attacked by a non-Balkan power assisted by a Balkan state the terms of the Pact would operate against the latter. From this pact, which established the Balkan Entente, two states, Albania and Bulgaria, stood aside. In both cases Italian influence was strong and Bulgaria continued to object to any agreement based on the maintenance of the existing frontiers.

The danger of political and economic expansion by the Fascist Powers and the Four Power Pact of 1933 between Britain, France, Italy and Germany, which suggested an indifference to the interests of the smaller states, had led

MODERN TURKEY

to the establishment of the Balkan Entente despite the abstention of Bulgaria and Albania, who seemed prepared to play with fire. At a further conference at Ankara later in 1934 regular machinery for the implementing of the Pact was worked out. Its main feature was a Permanent Council consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the four countries, and meeting regularly ; there was in addition to be an Economic Council. Although the terms of the Pact of Understanding were strictly limited, the formation of this entente between countries having an aggregate population of nearly 60 millions was an event of first-rate significance.

FROM THE AUTUMN OF 1934 TO THE SPRING OF 1939

By the formation of the Balkan Entente Turkey had achieved a position in Europe and in Asia which is remarkable evidence of the skill of her diplomats and the success of her policy of internal reform. In 1934 she was elected to the council of the League of Nations and declared her belief that collective security alone provided a durable basis for peace. But events mocked these words ; and the background of subsequent Turkish policy was provided by the collapse of collective security, the triumph of aggression in Abyssinia and Spain, the Nazi attempts to penetrate the Balkans and the catastrophe of Munich.

Turkey's enthusiasm for collective security had come more than anything else from the belief that the main menace to her peace and independence was no longer the British Empire operating in the Middle East but Italy, who desired supremacy in the Mediterranean and Germany who wished again to dominate the route to Bagdad. Turkey participated in the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Italy in 1935-6. With the other members

of the Balkan Entente, she declared that she would honour her obligations under the League of Nations Covenant and would support Great Britain in the event of an attack by Italy arising out of the sanctions. The Turkish representatives at the League of Nations indeed showed themselves inconveniently enthusiastic for the principle of collective security, opposed the Hoare-Laval Plan, supported the proposal to impose oil sanctions and told the Italians that Turkey's obligations under the Covenant took precedence over the provisions of Treaties of Friendship.

When sanctions were removed and Hitler's fortification of the Rhineland had set the states of Central and Eastern Europe wondering how far Britain and France could honour their military obligations even if they would, the Turkish Foreign Minister made it clear that Turkey would have to consider the needs of national defence. Turkish policy followed two lines—on the one hand an increase in armaments and an endeavour to secure such a revision of the Treaty of Lausanne as would enable the country to make the fullest use of its position, and on the other an attempt to find in regional agreements some measure of collective security.

As far as the improvement of the defence of the country and the utilisation of its natural strategic position are concerned, the most important step which Turkey took was to secure the right to fortify the Straits. By the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey had been forbidden to fortify the Straits and compelled to demilitarise a wide belt of territory on each side. Turkey protested against this several times, but it was not until the middle of 1936 that Italy's Abyssinian adventure provided a favourable opportunity. The situation, as the Turkish spokesmen pointed out, was very different from what it had been in 1918. The determining factor was the attitude of Britain, with whom Turkey's

MODERN TURKEY

relations had grown more cordial and who was not unwilling to see a development in the Eastern Mediterranean which would be unfavourable to Italy. The Soviet Union was also anxious for the alteration of the conditions under which the Straits were controlled ; a conference at Montreux restored to Turkey the full rights to fortify the Straits. Commercial vessels and warships belonging to the Black Sea states were to have free passage in time of peace ; Turkey, however, was to be able to restrict the passage of warships which belonged to nations other than these and during war to close the Straits even to vessels of the Black Sea states unless they were acting under the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Conference further recognised that if Turkey were at war herself passage of the Straits would be entirely at her discretion. Turkey's prestige rose greatly on account of the "constitutional" manner in which she secured this international change in contrast to the methods of the Fascist Powers.

Under the Peace Settlement there had also been an actual cession of territory, which it was the consistent aim of Turkish policy to regain. The Hatay became part of France's Syrian mandate in 1921. This territory, which included a valuable harbour and had a large Turkish population, had been the subject of negotiation in 1926 and again in 1936, when France was making arrangements with the Syrian government for the termination of the mandate. These negotiations resulted in a series of compromises, each more favourable to Turkey than the last, until the Hatay actually became a part of Turkey in July 1939.

The other side of the Turkish foreign policy which developed as collective security became increasingly unreal was a renewed attempt to strengthen regional agreements. In this respect Turkey and her neighbours behaved in the

FOREIGN POLICY

same way as the small states of Northern and Western Europe, who for a time sought security in advertising their neutrality and in drawing together into the Oslo grouping. For such a policy of course Turkey had two obvious fields—the Balkans and the Middle East. In the former there already existed the Balkan Entente; and the problem was to draw Bulgaria into it by the settlement of her disputes with her neighbours. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in 1937 concluded a treaty and in the following year Bulgaria, although still not prepared to enter the Entente, made a promise of non-aggression against its members—an expression of friendly sentiment which was hastened by the Nazi invasion of Austria. At the same time the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne which demilitarised the frontiers of Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey in Thrace were allowed to lapse, and Bulgaria's right to rearm was recognised. The problems of the Dobruja and of Bulgaria's access to the Ægean, however, remained unsolved.

In the Middle East a similar course of policy has been pursued. In July 1937 Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey concluded the pact of Saadabad, which guarantees the inviolability of frontiers and provides for reciprocal non-aggression and for consultation in all international questions of common interest. The signatories also undertake not to intervene in one another's internal affairs.

ANGLO-FRENCH GUARANTEES AND THE EUROPEAN WAR

The invasion of the rump of Czechoslovakia and still more the conquest of Albania by Italy transformed Turkey's foreign policy in the spring of 1939. A pact was concluded with Britain which was ratified unanimously by the Turkish National Assembly on May 12. The Prime Minister, introducing it, declared that in the face of recent political

events the government had at first decided to remain neutral ; but when events involved the Balkan Peninsula and endangered the security of the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey was faced with a situation so perilous that neutrality was impossible. The former ambassador in London, who spoke in the course of the debate, pointed even more frankly to Italy as the enemy against which Turkey was seeking a British guarantee. The international earthquake, he said, had shaken the foundations of peace and security. One country had been wiped off the map in twenty-four hours ; a veiled ultimatum had been presented to Rumania : and a small Balkan state had lost its independence at the hands of a Great Power which already possessed islands adjacent to the shore of Turkey and had concentrated war material in them. Turkish forces, however, combined with those of Britain would be able to repulse any danger.

This pact was supplemented the following month by the Franco-Turkish declaration of mutual assistance. Like the agreement with Britain this was avowedly an interim one to be followed by a definitive treaty of long duration. Meanwhile, however, the French and Turkish governments declared that in the event of an act of aggression which might lead to war in the Mediterranean they would be prepared to co-operate effectively and to give each other all the aid and assistance that they could. The terms of the agreement which France made with Turkey were in fact identical with that which Britain had already made.

In both cases the agreements referred to the necessity of giving security in the Balkans ; and Turkish foreign policy in the succeeding months was directed to making the Balkan Entente the foundation of this security. There was some criticism from Yugoslavia of the negotiations between Turkey and Britain, but the Turkish reply was that such

an agreement was strictly in keeping with the principles of the Balkan Entente, being as it was consequent on the unilateral guarantees given by the Western Powers to Greece and Rumania. In June, speaking on the occasion of a visit from the Foreign Minister of Rumania, the Turkish Foreign Minister declared that the signatories of the Balkan Entente had collaborated wisely, for although they moved along the line of a common policy each maintained its independence.

Turkey and Rumania were both ready to emphasise the fact that the Balkan Entente was more solid than ever and that it was open to any Balkan state still outside to come in. It was Bulgaria which they had in mind. The Prime Minister of that country had also been a visitor to Ankara. That had been in March 1939 and on his departure he had declared that the friendship of Bulgaria and Turkey was firmer than ever before. In May, after the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish Pact, there were rumours in Turkey that the government had offered to support Bulgaria's claim to the Southern Dobruja, provided that Bulgaria gave up her claim for an outlet to the Ægean Sea at the expense of Greece. A month or two later, the story was that the Turkish government would use its good offices to persuade the Rumanians to cede the disputed Dobruja territory in return for Bulgaria's entry into the Balkan Entente. No one can say how far either of these rumours was inspired or how far they were the guesswork of journalists ; but they do not misrepresent the fact, which was Turkey's desire to consolidate the Balkan grouping by bringing Bulgaria into it.

Nor did the new link with Britain and France necessarily mean the breaking of the old friendship with Russia. The Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs visited Ankara shortly before May 12 and his government and that of Turkey

were able to declare the similarity of their views. The final statements referred to the pursuit of "their respective and parallel efforts for the safeguarding of peace and security" and declared that the two governments would continue to keep in touch. Their friendship was not apparently weakened by the Anglo-Turkish Pact, which was warmly welcomed by *Izvestia* as "a link in the chain which is the only sure means of preventing the extension of aggression to new parts of Europe". Nor did the Turkish Foreign Minister on his side miss any opportunities of repeating that relations with Russia were as close and cordial as ever.

During the summer preceding the outbreak of war, then, Turkey's relations with her former friends were unchanged by the guarantees which she had sought. Her position, in fact, was strong enough for attention to be turned to what appeared to the government the most pressing danger—Italian possession of the Dodecanese. The newspapers published articles demanding that this foreign power should not be allowed to remain at a point so vital to Turkey and to Greece. In July even the official press was declaring that the time had come to demand the cession of the Dodecanese.

On the outbreak of war, Turkey at once put herself in a state of preparedness. Seventeen army classes were called up, and other measures taken for national defence. A considerable measure of demobilisation, however, soon took place; troops were disbanded in southern Turkey by agreement with the Italians, who withdrew troops from the Dodecanese, and in Thrace as a gesture of goodwill towards the Bulgarians. Tension in the Near East, however, has continued, and in the New Year Turkey enacted further emergency legislation which gave the government extensive powers ostensibly for national defence purposes.

Turkey's foreign relations have developed fast since war began. The Turkish Foreign Minister spent some considerable time in Moscow during the autumn of 1939, but the negotiations broke down, apparently because the Russians proposed as part of the Black Sea mutual assistance pact which was under discussion that Turks should in all circumstances keep the Dardanelles closed to the warships of any nation hostile to the Soviet Union. The Turkish government chose to regard this proposal of the Soviet government as an obligation inconsistent with the agreement entered into with Britain and France.

Turkey has continued to play her part in the Balkan Entente, the Council of which met at Belgrade in February 1940. It was attended by the Foreign Ministers of the Entente countries, and at its conclusion they published unanimously their agreement upon the common interest of the four states in the maintenance of peace and security in South-Eastern Europe ; their desire to remain united in the Entente and to watch over and safeguard their integrity ; their wish to develop friendly relations with neighbouring states in a spirit of mutual understanding ; and their anxiety to strengthen the economic ties with one another. The Ministers further agreed upon the prolongation of the Balkan Pact for seven years from 1941. This meeting of the Council emphasised above all the firm determination of the countries represented to maintain their respective attitudes towards the European war. Of keenest concern to the countries represented at this meeting was the attitude towards the Entente of Hungary, and more important still, of Bulgaria. The Turkish Foreign Minister made it his special duty to get in touch with the Bulgarian government and a Turkish newspaper as early as a week before the Balkan Conference published an

interview with the Prime Minister of Bulgaria emphasising his country's friendly relations with her neighbours and her desire to do nothing to take advantage of their difficulties. Most striking of all has been the recent change in the attitude of Turkey and for that matter of the other Balkan states towards Italy, who could be described by the Rumanian Foreign Minister as "standing like a beacon before our own aspirations for peace, order and security".

The changes in Turkish foreign policy since the war began have aroused particular suspicion in the Soviet Union. Italy and Turkey are linked together in the Soviet press as attempting to disturb the peace of the Balkans. Turkey is described as acting for Britain and France, and the Turkish Foreign Minister's speech in which he said that Turkey was not neutral but was outside the war is quoted as illustrating her position. A growth of anti-Soviet feeling in Turkey was strikingly illustrated by the despatch published in the *Daily Telegraph* of March 6, 1940.

The volte-face in the Turkish outlook regarding Russia has undergone an interesting development.

The general conviction engendered by the slow progress of the Soviet war against Finland, that Russia presents no real menace to Turkey has now produced a growing tendency among the younger generation to consider that the time has come to tackle this traditional enemy while he is occupied in the north and not to wait until he makes an attack.

Information reaches me from reliable sources that the defences which the Russians are feverishly erecting on the northern shores of the Black Sea, notably at Batum and Odessa are not, as has been alleged, in readiness for possible Turkish and Allied retaliation against a Russian advance into the Caucasus and Asia. Rather are they measures against a possible Turkish offensive.

The growing Allied effectives in the Near East have not passed unnoticed by Moscow. This increase in strength is thought to portend a possible Allied-Turkish offensive in the spring in the Black Sea with, as its main objective, the Baku

FOREIGN POLICY

oilfields and the pipeline to Batum. These are for all practical purposes Russia's main source of petrol supply. . . .

Those who know something about the Russian oilfields affirm that under the best conditions Russia could provide Germany with relatively little in the way of oil fuel. Today when her own needs must be very great, the quantities that can pass under the new arrangement for transport across the Black Sea to Varna and Constanza must be even smaller still.

Thus Turkish foreign policy between the last war and the present one has undergone striking changes. She has secured for herself, over a period of years a position of leadership which the Ottoman Empire never enjoyed among the states of the Balkans and those of Western Asia. The obligations which she has most recently assumed towards the British and French have meant injuring the friendship with Russia which has been the cornerstone of her policy from the earliest days of the Republic. Turkey has been guided by her desire to retain her political integrity and independence. In the early 1920's she and Russia alike feared the intervention of the Western Powers and naturally came together in self-defence. The growth of German political and economic power in South-Eastern Europe and the increasing aggressiveness of Italy in the late thirties led Turkey to adopt a policy of friendship with the Western Powers, who had come to respect her strength and no longer desired to interfere with her affairs. Turkey hoped that she would be able to combine the now traditional friendship with the Soviet Union with a policy of alliance with the Western Powers to safeguard her against danger from Germany and Italy. Up till the outbreak of war it looked as though this would be possible ; succeeding months and the divergence of views between Russia and the Western Powers have made such a policy increasingly difficult. Fear that Russia may once more

resume her advance to the Mediterranean and attempt to obtain control of the Straits, with or without German aid, has done much to undermine the cordial relations between the two countries which have existed for the past twenty years. It is true that there are certain elements in Turkey who would like the chance for war with Russia. The old Republican friendship with the Soviet Union, however, dies hard ; the present leaders of Turkey are likely to do their best to keep out of the war if they possibly can. They will certainly commit no aggressive act against Russia whatever pressure is brought to bear on them, although they will fight to the best of their ability to defend their country against attack or to prevent German or Russian control of the neighbouring Balkan states.

CHAPTER XI

MILITARY POWER AND STRATEGIC POSITION

FOR hundreds of years the fighting qualities of the Turk have been famous. The Ottoman Empire was built upon the bravery and endurance of the Turkish soldiers—and in its decline depended on peasants recruited for long periods of service far from their homes. When the military collapse of that empire came it was not due to the failure of the armies so much as to the failure of the high command and of the supply services. Bribery and peculation were very common and essential; preparatory work was neglected. This is clearly shown by the experience of Mustapha Kemal himself during the Great War. Under the Republic, care has been taken of the armed forces and pride shown in them; ¹ officers have been sent abroad to learn the methods used in foreign countries and everything possible has been done to repair the gaps in the military system. Although the period of service demanded of the Turkish citizen is fairly long, the burden which it imposes is nothing like so great as under the Empire.

The army occupied under the Empire a position of peculiar significance. Not only did the Empire depend

¹ “72. The defence of the fatherland is the most sacred of national duties. All the living and inanimate resources of the country shall be used to this end in the case of necessity. . . .

“73. We especially take care that the army of the Republic which is the unshakable foundation of the High State organisation and which protects and guards the national ideal, the national existence and the Revolution, as well as its valuable members, be always honoured and respected.”—From the *Programme of the Republican Party of the People*, adopted by the 4th Congress (1935).


MODERN TURKEY

upon it for its maintenance, but the army provided a career comparatively open to talent, and its officers particularly in the later years of the Empire were ready to respond to propaganda for reform. Ataturk himself was a soldier, and those closely associated with him in the work of government were for the most part those who played some military part in the Great War and directed the operations against the Greeks which followed it. Every year now on the occasion of the festival of the Republic on October 29, a great military parade takes place and athletes and members of youth organisations participate with the soldiers in the celebrations.

Despite the popularity of the army the atmosphere is far from being militarist—as far as one can judge from the portraits to be seen everywhere, Ataturk and his successor in the presidency prefer the people to see them in westernised evening dress rather than in the uniforms to which they were entitled.


THE CONSCRIPT ARMY AND ITS OFFICERS

States nowadays are all reluctant to disclose the details of their military organisation and military strength. About the numbers of the Turkish army it is, however, possible to speak with some certainty. There is no professional long-service army apart from the officers. Those who wish to follow a military career must make their choice fairly young. They are required to have served for six months in the ranks and to have a good general education. Thereafter they must follow a two-years course at a military college; 1,000 professional officers a year graduate from this college. Some four out of every five are themselves the sons of officers, but there is no restriction of the field from which officers can come. Teaching is free to those



ANKARA, ATATURK BOULEVARD

Note contrast between old town on hill and modern government offices



A MECHANIZED ARMY

who satisfy the entrance qualifications ; but the rich of course have the advantage that they can more easily allow their sons to follow an occupation where earning begins comparatively late. Once he has taken his commission, however, the Turkish officer receives an adequate salary and does not require a private income ; there is, however, an age limit for every rank, and the officer who does not secure promotion before he reaches that age limit is pensioned off.

The army which these officers command is a conscript one. Every Turk is liable for service between the ages of 20 and 46, and these ages are extended to 16 and 65 on general mobilisation. At present even the girls at school are given some form of military training, so that if the situation were ever to become desperate, as it was, for example, in 1922, the women could form a last line of defence. All men are liable for eighteen months' active training. There are some exemptions and reductions of service, but generally the full term has to be put in. If a man on calling up is selected for the artillery or the air force his period of service will be longer, and if he has some special qualifications to enter the navy he may have to serve for four years. All those who have passed through a university are trained as commissioned officers ; and for this category it is impossible to buy partial exemption, as can be done in some cases by rank and file soldiers. These graduates serve for six months in the ranks, for six months at a training school, and for six months as officers. Thereafter they are on the reserve and those who have served with the actual fighting forces, as from the supply services for example, are liable to be called up for refresher courses later. Turkey has thus a large supply of well-trained, well-educated reserve officers and the system

which is in force adds to their number at the rate of 2,000 a year. Even when an officer has received his commission and retains it he continues his military education. There is a military academy at Istanbul where Turkish and foreign specialists conduct a special one-year course for those above the rank of colonel.

The social consequences of conscription are important. Peasants who are called up for service at the age of 19 or 20 may be illiterate since the schools do not yet cater for the whole of the population of the countryside. The conscripts receive elementary education for an hour a day. They are taught if necessary to read and write and are given some smattering of general knowledge. This seems to be intended to eradicate the cruder superstitions which may still exist and to give the conscript some conception of the geography and present political position of the nation of which he is a citizen. Inevitably when the soldiers go back to the villages they pass on details of their new experiences and encourage others to take up their attitude. Those who distinguish themselves while in the army are given additional training lasting perhaps for some months, to fit them to be assistant teachers in the country districts or agricultural advisers.

This system of conscription provides an army which numbers at least 120,000 men and rises to a figure a good deal larger during the summer manœuvres. These men are divided into ten corps each with its special territory. They are used during their period of training for a variety of duties—such as the guarding of government buildings and the patrol of state forests. The sentry outside a government office, incidentally, is not merely an impressive ornament, but a commissionaire who chats to passers-by and gives directions to visitors. Discipline in the army is

MILITARY POWER AND STRATEGIC POSITION

in general rigid—"a soldier is taught that there are no bad officers", say the Turks—but it is realised that it is important to see that a rank-and-file soldier has an understanding not only of what in general he is fighting for but of the reasons why particular tactics and strategy are employed.

THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE

The Turkish navy, although it is not large and many of its vessels appear to be far from new, is by no means a negligible factor in any operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Its aggregate tonnage in 1936 was 56,000 tons. Since then it has been enlarged and new ships were under construction in Britain at the outbreak of war. The principal base of the navy is no longer at Istanbul but in the well-protected gulf of Izmit in the Sea of Marmora. An additional strategically valuable harbour at Alexandretta has been gained by the cession to Turkey of the Hatay. The navy, it is emphasised, is conceived as having purely defensive functions, but at the same time it is a force which must be reckoned with. Its activities are supported by the coastal defences, on which large sums of money have been spent in the past five years. The enlargement of the navy and the fortification of the coasts arose largely out of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the resulting tension in the eastern Mediterranean.

The air force—which in 1923 numbered ten planes and fifteen pilots—has also been expanded under a Three Year Plan for 1935–8 ; and a powerful voluntary society, which has more than 100 local branches and is encouraged by the government, has sought to make the population air-minded. This Aviation League has organised displays and encouraged sport flying (in which the Russians have given help). By

MODERN TURKEY

1937 the country had 150 front-line planes at its disposal ; and the number has been considerably augmented since then by the purchase of bombing planes abroad. Not only has provision for such purchase been made in the state budget but clubs, municipalities, and private firms have presented planes to the government and have received as a recognition of this a small silver emblem of an aeroplane which they display with pride. At Eskishehir, Kayseri, and Divrigi (in the east of the country) repair and construction shops have been set up. The military college, where the professional officers are trained, was providing about 100 candidates a year in 1939 for training as pilots, so that Turkey is seeking in this and other ways to build up a reserve of pilots which will be comparable with her reserve of army officers.

MATERIALS OF WAR

Wars, however, are not won only by soldiers, and in Turkey in the past they have not even mainly been lost by them. The supply services and the organisation of the higher command are of great importance in assessing the military strength of the country. The President of the Republic commands its armed forces in the name of the National Assembly, and he is chairman of the supreme war council, an advisory body whose members include the Minister of National Defence, the Chief of the General Staff, and the three Army Inspectors. (Each member of the Army Inspectorate is responsible for one part of the country.) As far as the supply of armaments is concerned, Turkey has been obliged in the past to rely upon imports. She is not quite so utterly dependent as she was in 1914 upon foreign supplies, as there are in the country two or three small arms factories. There has not up to the present

been any Turkish iron and steel industry, so that these factories have not been much more than assembly plants ; but the steel factory newly opened at Karabuk will provide some of the materials for a native armament industry. Turkey is fairly well situated as regards other supplies for war purposes. She is self-supporting in essential foodstuffs and provided the agricultural machinery and labour were available could increase her agricultural production. She has mineral resources on which she could draw, but her weakness, like that of many other states, has been lack of oil. The Turks are at present prospecting for oil, and in April 1940 were reported to have struck large supplies in the south-east near Siirt. Even if these do not prove adequate, Turkey can secure oil from Iraq and Iran with whom her relations are good—although its transport might present difficulties.

At the same time the opening of Karabuk and the availability of supplies of raw materials did not equip Turkey to carry on a first-class modern war independently. Industrialisation is not yet far enough advanced for this. Eight or nine men, according to the generally accepted calculations of German experts (and a larger number still according to other estimates) are needed in industry behind the lines to maintain each soldier in a modern army. Assuming the mobilisation of 500,000 men—a mere fraction of the total numbers who have passed through a conscript training since 1923—Turkey would need 4 million workers in the munition factories, transport and supply services to deal with the needs of her fighting force alone. If Turkey enters the present war she will do so not as a principal, but necessarily as the vassal of her economically more advanced allies who will supply her with the products of their industries. Nor is Turkey financially strong enough to bear the brunt

of war ; her participation could only be financed in the same way as the recent improvements in her army—by loans from abroad.

TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION

The strategic importance of Turkey's control of the Dardanelles is obvious ; and the experience of the Great War underlined it. Had the collapse of the Turkish power come in 1915 or 1916 when Russia was still an active belligerent, the opening of the Dardanelles would have enabled the Allied Powers to supply the Russian army on a scale impossible through the Arctic or Pacific ports which in fact were all that remained open to them. Moreover, the opening of the Dardanelles would have exercised a profound influence throughout the Balkans. Rumania's support for the Allied cause would have been more fully utilised and the elements sympathetic to the Central Powers overawed. Lloyd George, summing up the problem of the Straits as it appeared to the peace-makers of 1918, wrote :

The War had demonstrated the danger of entrusting the impregnable sea gates of vast regions like Southern Russia and Rumania to the complete control of so unreliable a country as Turkey had proved to be. . . . Russia and Rumania were not defeated by the German and Austrian armies but by the Dardanelles. . . . These narrow straits imperilled the chances of Allied victory. They certainly postponed that victory for probably two years.

It was impossible for the Allies to contemplate any peace terms which would leave so vital an international waterway to be dominated by the guns of a country that had taken so disastrous an advantage of its command of an indispensable way of communication between great nations. The peace which would not secure the world against this menace would not be a peace to which any responsible or even sane statesman could append his signature. The Allies therefore soon after

MILITARY POWER AND STRATEGIC POSITION

the War commenced came to the conclusion that the freedom of the Narrows from the Bosphorus to the Dardanelles must be secured not by paper guarantees above a Turkish signature, but by entrusting the keys of this channel to hands that could be relied upon to maintain free access along its waters to all nations that kept the rules of the Covenant of Peace.

The Gallipoli campaign showed how difficult it was to capture that position even when the Turkish forces defending it were neither numerous nor well supported. Since then, Turkey has appreciated fully the importance of controlling access to the Black Sea from the Mediterranean, and having regained at Montreux the right to fortify the Straits has spent in this district a large part of the total sum devoted to coastal defence works. Needless to say, details of these fortifications are not public, but there can be little ground for doubt that no fleet would be likely to penetrate from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea against the will of the guardian of the Straits.

If the Straits are vital to any power seeking access to Bulgaria and Rumania they constitute an essential first line of defence for the Soviet Union. Britain, France and Turkey assailed Russia from the south in the Crimean campaign, and the Black Sea littoral was one of the main theatres of war during the intervention against the Soviet government. Essential lines of communication from one part of the Soviet Union to another run actually across the Black Sea ; so from the Russian point of view it is now more important than ever that hostile fleets should be prevented from passing through the Straits.

So much for the international significance of the Dardanelles ; what of Turkey's position from the point of view of self-defence ? Even if Istanbul and the Dardanelles were lost, the country would still be in an extremely strong defensive position. This position has been rendered

all the stronger by the movement of the capital from Istanbul to Ankara and by the establishment of the new industrial centres at Kayseri nearly 200 miles to the south-east of the capital and at Karabuk which lies about 100 miles inland from the Black Sea coast, and about 200 miles to the north of Ankara. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that these centres were deliberately sited with the fear of Italian invasion in mind. The natural base for such an invasion would be the Island of Rhodes and the smaller islands in the Dodecanese which the Italians have held since the end of the Tripoli war and which they have recently heavily fortified. The use of these islands would depend to a large extent upon the naval balance of power in this part of the Mediterranean. Any hostile force advancing eastward from Istanbul or the western seaboard would be obliged to maintain long lines of communication, and there is no railway connection between Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia. The terrain would be a difficult one, not only because of its mountainous character, but because of snow in winter and the lack of water in summer.

As far as the east of the country is concerned and Turkey's communications with her neighbours on that side, the completion of the Sivas to Erzurum railway in September 1939 has linked the railway system of Turkey with that of the Soviet Union. It must, however, be noticed that the connection from Erzurum to Serikamus which lies 200 miles to the east is by a narrow-gauge railway constructed for military purposes by the Czarist army which invaded Turkey during the Great War. Any troop movements or transport of supplies in this part of the country would be slowed up by the changes which would be necessary and by the fact that this narrow-gauge railway, like the greater part of the Turkish railway system, is a single line one.

MILITARY POWER AND STRATEGIC POSITION

In February 1940, however, the Minister of Transport announced plans for the extension to the Russian frontier of the newly built standard gauge Erzurum line. On the south-east there is still no through railway connection with Iraq and Iran. The Berlin-Bagdad railway is now nearing completion, however, but the line from Diyarbakir to Lake Van is still under construction and the proposals for an extension to Teheran have been postponed indefinitely.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH NEED OF TURKEY

The Ottoman Empire sent its armies west to Vienna, south to the Nile and east to the Afghan mountains, while its fleet for a time commanded the Mediterranean. Turkey today enjoys a position of authority in the Balkans and the Near and Middle East which is based upon an appreciation of her strength ; and by her geographical position she provides a base for effective action in the Balkans or in Western Asia. Neither Bulgaria nor Greece could long resist determined pressure from this powerful neighbour whose population is greater than that of the two countries combined. Turkey with her air bases at Eskishehir and Divrigi and the harbours which ring her coasts would provide an advanced position for the armed forces of the British and French Empires, all the more valuable because it could not easily be overrun. The country is a bridge between Europe and Asia across which lines of communication have run for centuries. She blocks the expansion of any European power eastwards towards Iran, Iraq and India. Through her, contact can be made with the Arab lands, Syria and Arabia ; there is direct railway communications between Turkey and Palestine.

This advanced position is of particular importance from the point of view of the British and French Empires, for

there are considerable reserves of troops in the Middle East. Apart from the forces stationed in Palestine and Syria, Britain has a special position in Iraq and in Egypt. Britain may station up to 10,000 troops in Egypt and the Royal Air Force is allowed the considerable strength of 400 pilots ; there are a number of air stations in the country and Cairo is the headquarters of the R.A.F. Middle East Command. There is a treaty between Britain and Iraq which guarantees to Britain during war all possible facilities including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and means of communication ; and during peace permits the stationing of four air force squadrons in the country. The armies of both Egypt and Iraq have received instructors and equipment from Britain.¹ Before these forces and particularly these air forces can be used with any real effect in the Balkans or against Russia, however, Turkey must be in accord with Britain and France. In present-day conditions a neutral Turkey would constitute a hindrance and a hostile Turkey a grave menace to the Anglo-French position.

Closely connected with this aspect of Turkey's strategic position is the value of her harbours and fleet in the struggle for the eastern Mediterranean. The Mediterranean is vital to the communications of the British Empire and the commercial interests of Britain and France in the lands upon the sea-coast are considerable. Since the end of the Great War, however, Italy has been offering a challenge to this Anglo-French control and has been strengthened by her possession of the Dodecanese islands, from which fortified bases she can menace not only Turkey but also Britain's route to the East. The Italian successes in Abyssinia and

¹ For a full description of the situation see *The Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom*, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chapters VI and VII.

Spain lowered the prestige and weakened the strategic position of the British Empire, while the conquest of Albania gave Italy a useful bridgehead into the Balkans. Turkey hoped to checkmate this danger by ranging herself with Britain and France. With Greece, Turkey has completed the circle of British and French influence in the eastern Mediterranean; the circle stretches from the southern border of Albania to the eastern frontier of Libya. It is hoped that the Dodecanese will thus be converted from a menacing and potentially destructive military base into an isolated group of islands. It should not be forgotten, however, that air power may offset sea power to a large extent in this area. The Allied cause would suffer severely if an Italian army pushed through from Albania to Salonica and successfully co-operated with the Italian air bases at Leros (Dodecanese) and Tobruk (eastern Libya).

It is only recently that Turkey has become closely linked with Britain and France. But in the short time since May 1939 when the Anglo-Turkish Pact was announced, collaboration in the economic and military spheres has gone far. Turkey's defence budget was larger than ever before; the country could not have supported it without Anglo-French economic assistance. Military commissions have visited London and declared themselves able to reach full agreement, while General Wavell, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the Near East, has been in Ankara with his French counterpart. In August 1939 British battleships which were part of the Mediterranean Fleet paid visits to Istanbul and Izmir; the Admiral in charge was received by the President and had conversations with the General Staff in which it is understood plans were discussed for the co-operation of Turkish forces with the Mediterranean Fleet.

The attractiveness of Turkish collaboration in the war against Germany is not hard to understand. A parade of Allied diplomatic and military strength is indeed as essential as an economic offensive in the countries to the south-east of Germany from which she might draw supplies. For there are no lines of fortifications there to block their advance and the dissident populations of Czechoslovakia and Poland might be encouraged to rise by an Allied offensive on an eastern front. But the obstinate neutrality of the states on Germany's south-eastern frontiers creates an apparently insuperable barrier, which no country would have more chance of overcoming than Turkey whose prestige stands so high in the Balkans.

No less indispensable is the friendship of Turkey to any group of countries at war with Soviet Russia. Recent developments in the Baltic and Scandinavia have made any attack on Leningrad or the neighbouring parts of northern Russia a difficult military proposition. An attack through the Dardanelles across the Black Sea, however, offers the only prospect of successful operations against the Soviet Union which is likely to have any immediate results. For the greater part of Russia's oilfields lie in the Caucasus area and feed pipe-lines which terminate on the Black Sea coast. An attacking air force would therefore have considerable prospects of success against the actual wells at Baku and elsewhere while a dominant naval force in the Black Sea could not only attack the oil ports but also interfere with the large volume of seaborne traffic across the Black Sea. A definite invasion of the Soviet Union, however, would be much more difficult. For an attack from eastern Turkey against the Soviet Caucasian provinces could only be carried out successfully with overwhelming superiority of arms and numbers. Communications in

eastern Turkey are still very difficult and an army operating there would have to depend on the one-line railway to Erzurum. Naval control of the Black Sea, however, would facilitate the movement of forces and supplies by water to Trabzon and neighbouring ports. Any attempt at a landing in the Crimea or elsewhere on the north coast of the Black Sea would be a hazardous expedition, even with complete naval control of the Black Sea.

A Russian attack on Turkey also offers considerable strategic difficulties. Any attempt to force the Bosphorus would necessitate complete naval control of the Black Sea. Even then, the strong batteries would probably take as great a toll as Turkish batteries took of the Allied Fleets in the Dardanelles in 1915. Allied naval reinforcements would almost certainly be able to join the Turks in repelling such an attack and soon carry the fight into the open waters of the Black Sea, where their superior numbers would rapidly be effective. A land attack from the Caucasus, unless of a surprise character, would also face great difficulties, as similar campaigns did in 1914-17. Turkish communications to the east, although still difficult, are infinitely better than twenty years ago. The Turkish frontier is now further advanced and takes in the difficult mountainous district round Kars. Any strong well-armed defensive force with a reasonable amount of support in the air should be able to resist any attacking force successfully in this difficult terrain. For not only is the country intensely wild and rocky, but much of the land is of great height and most of the area is snowbound for a large part of the year.

The most successful chance of an attack on Turkey by Russia, Germany or Italy would be across the Balkans. Turkey is guarded against such a move not only by the strong fortifications of the Straits, but also by the defences

that guard eastern Thrace. This small strip of territory forms an excellent bridgehead into Europe and is a suitable shape for defence. It has recently been well fortified.

It is unlikely, however, that Turkey would wait for the invaders should an attack be made southwards through the Balkans. Almost certainly she would go to the help of Rumania and Greece and probably of Yugoslavia should they be invaded. The large Allied force in the Near East to the south of the Turkish Republic would be able to reinforce the Turkish army should hostilities arise. Not only would their guns and men be of great assistance but the air support would also help to fill the most serious gap in Turkey's defences.

So far Turkey has refused to allow Allied warships to enter the Black Sea to carry out contraband control. For she realises that such action which would interfere with Soviet communications across the Black Sea would be bound to be interpreted as a hostile act. It is unlikely that Turkey will give any facilities to the Allies for action against Russia unless she thinks she, herself, cannot possibly keep out of any anti-Russian war. She is likely to be less squeamish about allowing facilities to the Allies in any action they may want to take against German or, should it be necessary, Italian trade, provided such action was not likely to involve her in trouble with Russia.

CONCLUSIONS

WHEN half a century ago Sir Henry Maine wanted to quote examples of states governed by custom rather than by a definite sovereign power the despotisms of the East came most naturally to his mind. Among these despotisms the Ottoman Empire exercised most influence—although as the history of the “Eastern Question” shows that influence was of a negative kind—upon events in Europe. The Sultan and his entourage, acting through the corrupt provincial administration and in case of need the armed forces, ruled the Empire, pursued a foreign policy, levied taxation and maintained a certain degree of order by setting one subject people against another. But for the mass of the population the simple routine of their lives, determined by the seasons and sanctified by religion, sufficed. The payment of taxation and the onerous military service terms were all the contact the Anatolian peasant had with the government, whose purpose he could no more influence than he could the weather. If bad harvest or other misfortune made the situation of a little community so desperate that it revolted, the Sultan’s administration suppressed the rising. And that was the only special contact that the peasants had with the government; the rest was routine by which the subject gave services and money for no return.

Events, however, can arouse a people with remarkable speed. An amazing transformation in the attitude of the Turkish people towards life in general and politics in particular has been achieved by the series of changes which ended in the Turkish revolution. The shocks upset the

customs, religious observances and traditional allegiances which had bounded their lives. Kemal's government depended specifically on the popular will ; he was only able to create an army which won the War of Independence by stirring the Anatolian peasants with the desire to play a positive part themselves in building a free and independent Turkey. So strong was this desire and such the vigour of his personality that the Turkish people as a whole were prepared to follow his lead in making all internal changes, however revolutionary, which seemed necessary to render secure the victory which had been won on the battlefield.

The Turkish peasantry after the experience of the War of Independence could never quite relapse into its former state. When peace came and the soldiers of the Kemalist armies went back to cultivate their land or stayed in the towns as artisans, their horizon was wider and their attitude to the new government was quite different from what it had been to the old. This must not be overestimated, for a country such as Turkey cannot easily be changed, and there must still be an enormous amount of superstition and unreasoning fear of all change, especially in the older generation of country people. But the educative influence of the People's Party no less than the schools and the conscription period has shaken the old attitude and given to the mass of the Turkish people a more enterprising and independent outlook.

The country in which they made that revolution had not an elaborately developed class structure. Practically all large-scale business, such as it was, was in the hands of foreigners or of members of the Christian minorities. The country's tradition, especially the existence of polygamy, had prevented the growth of any big landed aristocracy such as existed in Hungary or Russia. A peasant people,

CONCLUSIONS

however, is not well adapted to making a revolution by itself and the leadership came, therefore, from the educated minority of the population and especially from the army officers, who, as the career of Atatürk himself shows, might be of humble birth. Kemal was thus able to combine practically all sections of the people in support of his revolutionary nationalist programme.

The growth of national sentiment and the desire for complete independence from control by foreign capitalists or their governments was certainly the most active influence behind the revolution. In attacking foreign imperialism Kemal wisely insisted that the Turks should recognise the rights of the Arabs and other former subject peoples to self-determination, while claiming to be masters themselves in their own Anatolian homeland. Mustapha Kemal's nationalism, however, so far as it had a theory, derived it from the French Revolution. For many army officers had been sent in the late nineteenth century to France for their military training and had absorbed many French ideas. The social structure of Turkey enabled these ideas to be developed and applied in their own way, free from the difficulties caused by a sharp conflict of classes.

In his desire to destroy the Ottoman tradition Kemal had the wisdom to realise that the new Turkey must learn to govern itself if the changes he proposed were to be permanent and were to succeed in making the Turkish people virile and active. On the other hand the failure of the Young Turk Parliamentary regime, based as it was upon a slavish copy of Western examples, provided a wholesome lesson. The Turkish constitution of 1923 was no Weimar imbecility ; it sought to give Turkey a government which could govern, at the same time keeping that government informed of the people's wishes and enabling those

elected to the National Assembly (Kamutay) to learn how to make a parliament work. Kemal behaved very much as a Tudor sovereign towards parliament. When he wanted to carry through any big change he first sought to win over the Assembly and then used its members to educate the people to support his project ; he was always prepared to learn from the suggestions put forward in the Assembly. Unlike most other dictators, he was anxious that the Turkish people should learn to govern themselves, and therefore sought steadily to build up democratic practices in the full knowledge that the best way to make democratic institutions work is to use them.

In the early years of the republic the higher positions in the state were almost exclusively staffed with men who had taken a leading part in the War of Independence ; most of them therefore were drawn from the higher ranks of the army. In recent years, however, many men who have never been professional soldiers have obtained important positions in the State. These have usually risen through the ranks of the civil service, although some have been business men. The civil service and state businesses are now recruiting their executive grades from the universities and technical educational institutions. The basis of the ruling stratum of society is thus steadily widening.

Not only did the Kemalists work out their own form of democratic machinery for Turkey ; the equalitarian and secular aspects of their revolution equally took on a Turkish character, although inspiration was obtained from French examples. In giving women their freedom the Turks went far beyond the French. It would be difficult to find another instance in history in which one section of a community was given full freedom and equality by another section without any agitation or pressure from the subject

CONCLUSIONS

section. The French educational system, although copied in great part, was suitably adapted to meet the needs of the growing republic. A comparison of the educational system which the republic is building up with that which existed in the heyday of the Ottoman Empire in the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent suggests that in this field also Turkish tradition may not be without its influence. For it would appear that the rulers of the new Turkey will be selected by merit from the whole population on somewhat comparable lines to the way in which the Sultan's servants were selected from the children contributed in taxation by Christian subjects. The victory over clericalism was more sweeping than it had been in France and the changes met with less opposition. In the revival of the arts Kemal's Turkey owed a great deal to France, though here the Turks also learnt from many other Western peoples. In two important spheres, those of legal reform and industrialisation, little was learnt from the French. Many European peoples were here of assistance, but German influence was frequently stimulating. The new Turkey also owed a debt to Russia, for the first five year plan was undoubtedly initiated as a result of the success of its Russian prototype ; the recent reorganisation of government industrial machinery has also benefited from Russian experience.

The Kemalists were certainly not afraid to borrow from abroad, but they had a rare ability to assimilate foreign ideas and learn from foreign experience. Consideration of the programme of the People's Party which was adopted in 1935 illustrates this capacity. This was displayed not only in the power to modify borrowed ideas, but, if need be, to transform them radically. This was seen to best advantage in the economic field. Kemal certainly did not borrow any specifically Socialist ideas from France ; the

new republic tried to secure economic independence in its first ten years by encouraging the development of native capitalism. When this did not succeed in producing rapid industrialisation and an increase in national prosperity a programme of State Socialism was instituted. This did not aim at creating a hundred per cent Socialist economic structure, but originated in the need of making the best use of Turkish capital and resources and of doing the jobs which private enterprise had been unable to do. The greater part of the large-scale industry of the country thus came into the hands of the State, because Kemalists found that State Socialism was the only way to effect national independence in the economic sphere. Once these changes were under way, however, it was realised that State Socialism would also strengthen the democratic and equalitarian elements in the republic by checking the growth of large fortunes, by raising the general standard of living and by opening up a career to talents to many whom the new educational system was producing. This new collectivism, therefore, grew out of the earlier basic ideas of the Turkish revolution ; it did not in any way run counter to the strong belief in private property which many Turks possess and which shows itself in the desire of peasants to own their own land and workers and craftsmen their own houses and shops. The tendency towards a growth of Socialistic enterprise will probably continue, but there is no indication that a definite departure will be made from the present mixed economy. Every effort will be made to reconcile small-scale private enterprise with large-scale state operations, although where necessary some form of co-operative or municipal undertaking will be created. Within the ruling People's Party there are many differences of opinion on the question of economic structure. There is no indication

CONCLUSIONS

that any hard-and-fast theoretical faith will be adopted ; it seems likely that the question of which industries will be nationalised will be settled on the merits of the particular industry.

There are at present no trade unions either in state or privately owned industry and no signs that they will be tolerated in the near future. Whether any form of industrial self-government will develop from the *ad hoc* committees recently created under the Labour Code to negotiate with the management on wages and conditions or from the People's Party branches in the larger state factories it is too early to say. Without some effective bodies to represent the workers there must always be a danger that they will not benefit so much as they might do from the greater national wealth resulting from the state control and planning of industrialisation. So far, however, the state enterprises appear to have given a lead to private employers in matters of wages and conditions.

Great and important changes have been effected in Turkey's external position as well as at home. In its decay the Ottoman Empire was the prey of competing imperialist interests. Republican Turkey not only won independence for herself but secured the respect and leadership of her neighbours. From Yugoslavia to Afghanistan she is looked up to and there is widespread support for her efforts to preserve these countries from foreign domination and exploitation. Turkey's power and influence has not been so great for many centuries. From the defeat of the Greeks until the outbreak of the European conflict in the autumn of 1939 Turkey went from strength to strength. Securing first the aid of Soviet Russia she was able to resist French and British imperialism ; then when German and Italian pressure began to be felt in the Balkans and to endanger

the independence of Turkey along with that of her neighbours the republic sought the assistance of Great Britain and France. At first it seemed that she would be able to combine her friendship with the Western Powers with that of the Soviet Union. The Russo-German Pact, however, raised numerous difficulties. Turkey sought with great care to avoid conflict with Russia but has made it clear that she would do her best to keep both her Balkan and Middle-Eastern neighbours free from domination by Germany, Italy or Russia. For this purpose she became an ally of the Western Powers, but she has not surrendered her right to have a say in any action the Western Powers propose to take in this part of the world. This new alliance transformed the strategic position in the Near East and was followed by prolonged discussions between military experts.

In the early days of the republic the government refused to allow any considerable borrowing from abroad through fear of bringing the country to the same unfortunate pass which the Ottoman Empire reached. When the new industrialisation began Turkey borrowed first from Russia and then from Germany and the Western Powers. In this the republic at first very successfully played the various European Powers off against one another and secured the necessary cash to press ahead with industrialisation. The Turkish economy, however, became increasingly strained by the pace of this industrialisation, the urgent necessity of extensive rearmament and the policy of buying out foreign-owned public utilities. The closer political and military links which were made with the Western Powers were thus accompanied by greater financial support from them. Whether Ataturk would have agreed to quite so close a connection with any group of foreign powers is perhaps doubtful. Turkey certainly, however, would not have been

CONCLUSIONS

able to proceed with her industrialisation anything like so rapidly but for this assistance, and it is of interest that she has persuaded her creditors to accept repayment over a period of years in goods, thus opening up markets for her exports.

There are signs that certain elements in Turkey would like to turn their backs on Kemal's policy of friendship with Russia and of respect for self-determination on the part of Turkey's neighbours. This sometimes shows itself in proposals for expansion into Syria and Iraq. In these territories Turkish minorities are practically non-existent and any such aggression would undoubtedly rouse the ill-will of the Balkan and Middle-Eastern states who now follow Turkey's lead ; it would also arouse great anti-Turkish feeling among the whole of the large Arab-speaking world. More understandable is the general desire in Turkey to possess Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands lying along the south-west coast of Asia Minor. In the possession of a great power such as Italy these seem a constant threat to Turkish independence. Were they ceded to Turkey it might be possible to exchange their largely Greek population for the Turkish minority remaining in Cyprus.

A possible revival of Pan-Turanianism in the event of a war with Russia has also been discussed in some quarters in Turkey and has been encouraged by certain British imperialist interests. Any attempt to try and conquer the territories inhabited by Turkish-speaking peoples in Central Asia and the Caucasus would lead the Turkish republic very far from Kemal's practical teaching, for these other Turkish-speaking peoples have had a very different history from the Anatolians and would be very unlikely to be loyal subjects of a new empire centred in Anatolia. Such a

state would be bound to include many areas inhabited by non-Turkish-speaking peoples if it was to be made into any kind of administrative unit. Even so such an empire would sprawl across the map without any natural centre and would be open to attack from many sides. So far those brought up in the tradition of Kemal have steadfastly set their faces against any such political dreams or adventures, despite their deep interest in the early history of the peoples who gave their country its name and of their close sympathy with peoples speaking very similar languages to their own.

Turkish nationalism expresses itself not only in its interest in Turkish-speaking peoples but in its deep love for the rocks and soil of Anatolia, in wonder in its long and still frequently unexplored past and the keen desire to develop and exploit its many resources. It is to be hoped that a constructive Anatolian loyalty will prevail over any Central-Asian romanticism which racial theories may have created.

In recent years Turkey has been a loyal member of the League of Nations. In any system for international reconstruction it is likely that she would do her best to back up any new international organisation that the Great Powers might support. The dominant position Turkey occupies in both the Balkan and Near and Middle-Eastern groups of states would enable her to take the initiative in creating regional groups of states with certain things in common within any wider international body. It is unlikely, however, that Turkey at any early date would be willing to hand over control of her internal politics and economic structure to any great extent to an international organisation.

Turkish influence has been great among the surrounding countries not only because of her active foreign policy but because of the success of her great internal changes. Many reformers in neighbouring countries have tried to imitate

CONCLUSIONS

Kemal, but without anything like the same success ; the nearest approach to so comprehensive a change has been in Iran. It is probable that as the Turkish regime becomes stabilised the republic's example will be more widely followed than at present. For it is obvious, if the Balkan and Near-Eastern states are to secure independence from imperialist control and are to develop their peoples and their resources some similar form of government will be essential. In most of these states class divisions do not run along western European lines, but in none of these states is an equalitarian tradition quite as strong as in Turkey. If these states do not establish economic as well as political independence of outside powers, there is a grave danger that they may develop some of the worst features of Western capitalism by refusing to control and use their resources in the national interest as a whole. A contrast to Turkey of great interest is provided by Egypt. Here foreigners and minorities have continued to play a large part in commercial development. The country is certainly wealthy, but in contrast to Turkey a wealthy native ruling class has grown up and little economic advantage has accrued to the great mass of the people.

Not only can Turkey serve as a useful example to her neighbours but there are many parts of the world, not excluding the territories ruled by the Great Powers, where her experience can be studied with benefit. It is to be hoped in the present time of stress that the Turkish republic will remember the inspiration of Kemal, defend his ideas as well as the Turkish homeland with every effort in her power, and do her best when peace comes once more to the world to spread their practice far wider.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

There is a library of books on Turkish history and culture.

One of the best general introductions to the subject is still—

TOYNBEE, A. J., and KIRKWOOD, K. : *Modern Turkey* (London, 1926).

An account of Turkey at the moment when the Kemalist movement was rising is—

TOYNBEE, A. J. : *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London, 1922).

For a general account of Near Eastern problems which set Turkish conditions in their background—

KOHN, H. : *Western Civilisation in the Near East* (Translated by E. W. Dickes) (London and New York, 1936).

There are a number of lives of Ataturk, none of them really satisfactory. The most valuable are—

WORTHAM, H. E. : *Mustapha Kemal of Turkey* (New York, 1930).

ARMSTRONG, H. C. : *Grey Wolf, an intimate study of a dictator* (London, 1932).

On present-day conditions in the country, the most recent books are—
WEBSTER, D. E. : *The Turkey of Ataturk* (The American Academy of Political and Social Science. Philadelphia, 1939).

CONKER, O., and WITMEUR, E. : *Redressement Économique et L'Industrialisation de la Nouvelle Turquie* (Paris, 1937).

CLERGET, M. : *La Turquie. Passé et Présent* (Paris, 1938).

DEPARTMENT OF OVERSEAS TRADE : *Report on Economic and Financial Conditions in Turkey* (London, 1939).

LINKE, LILO : Chapter on Turkey in *Hitler's Route to Bagdad* (edited by L. Woolf) (London, 1939).

ALP, TEKIN : *Le Kemalisme* (Paris, 1937).

KRAAL, AUGUST VON : *Kemal Ataturk's Land, the Evolution of Modern Turkey* (Translated by Kenneth Benton) (Vienna, 1938).

MIHAJLOVIC, D. : *La Nouvelle Turquie Économique* (Belgrade, 1937).

A less formal account of the country is given in—

LINKE, LILO : *Allah Dethroned* (London, 1937).

In addition there is a series of booklets on such subjects as The Development of National Banking in Turkey, Public Instruction in the Turkish Republic, Turkey on the Way of Industrialisation, etc., published in Ankara by the Press Department of the Ministry of the Interior; and up-to-date information on the economic conditions of the country is most readily available in the *Ottoman Bank Circular*, published monthly in London.

APPENDIX

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF THE PEOPLE

PROGRAMME

ACCEPTED BY THE FOURTH GRAND CONGRESS
OF THE PARTY

May, 1935

INTRODUCTION

THE fundamental ideas that constitute the basis of the Programme of the Republican Party of the People are evident in the acts and realisations which have taken place from the beginning of our Revolution until today.

On the other hand, the main ideas have been formulated in the general principles of the Statutes of the Party, adopted also by the Grand Congress of the Party in 1927, as well as in the Declaration published on the occasion of the elections to the Grand National Assembly in 1931.

The main lines of our intentions, not only for a few years, but for the future as well, are here put together in a compact form. All of these principles which are the fundamentals of the Party constitute Kemalism.

PART I

PRINCIPLES

- 1.—The Fatherland.
- 2.—The Nation.
- 3.—The Constitution of the State.
- 4.—The Public Rights.

1.—THE FATHERLAND. The Fatherland is the sacred country within our present political boundaries, where the Turkish

APPENDIX

nation lives with its ancient and illustrious history, and with its past glories still living in the depths of its soil.

The Fatherland is a Unity which does not accept separation under any circumstance.

2.—THE NATION. The Nation is the political Unit composed of citizens bound together with the bonds of language, culture and ideal.

3.—CONSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATION OF THE STATE. Turkey is a nationalist, populist¹, state socialist, secular, and revolutionary Republic.

The form of administration of the Turkish nation is based on the principle of the unity of power. There is only one Sovereignty, and it belongs to the nation without restriction or condition.

The Grand National Assembly exercises the right of sovereignty in the name of the nation. The legislative authority and the executive power are embodied in the Grand National Assembly. The Assembly exercises its legislative power itself. It leaves its executive authority to the President of the Republic, elected from among its members, and to the Council of Ministers appointed by him. The courts in Turkey are independent.

The Party is convinced that this is the most suitable of all state organisations.

4.—PUBLIC RIGHTS.

(a) It is one of the important principles of our Party to safeguard the individual and social rights of liberty, of equality, of inviolability, and of property. These rights are within the bounds of the State's authority. The activity of the individuals and of legal persons shall not be in contradiction with the interests of the public. Laws are made in accordance with this principle.

(b) The Party does not make any distinction between men and women in giving rights and duties to citizens.

(c) The Law on the election of deputies shall be renewed. We find it more suitable to the real requirements of democracy to leave the citizen free to elect electors whom he knows well and trusts, in accordance with the general conditions of our country. The election of the deputies shall take place in this manner.

¹ i.e. dependent upon popular sovereignty.

APPENDIX

PART II

THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF THE PEOPLE

5.—The Republican Party of the People is :

- (a) Republican, (b) Nationalist, (c) Populist,
- (d) State Socialist, (e) Secular, (f) Revolutionary.

(a) The Party is convinced that the Republic is the form of government which represents and realises most safely the ideal of national sovereignty. With this unshakable conviction, the Party defends, with all its means, the Republic against all danger.

(b) The Party considers it essential to preserve the special character and the entirely independent identity of the Turkish social community in the sense explained in Art. 2. The Party follows, in the meantime, a way parallel to and in harmony with all the modern nations in the way of progress and development, and in international contacts and relations.

(c) The source of Will and Sovereignty is the Nation. The Party considers it an important principle that this Will and Sovereignty be used to regulate the proper fulfilment of the mutual duties of the citizen to the State and of the State to the citizen.

We consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before the Law, and who recognise no privileges for any individual, family, class, or community, to be of the people and for the people (populist).

It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labour for the individual and social life of the Turkish people.

The farmers, handicraftsmen, labourers and workmen, people exercising free professions, industrialists, merchants, and public servants are the main groups of work constituting the Turkish community. The functioning of each of these groups is essential to the life and happiness of the others and of the community.

The aims of our Party, with this principle, are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish

APPENDIX

harmony of interests. The benefits are to be proportionate to the aptitude and to the amount of work.

(d) Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one of our main principles to interest the State actively in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible.

The interest of the State in economic matters is to be an actual builder, as well as to encourage private enterprises, and also to regulate and control the work that is being done.

The determination of the economic matters to be undertaken by the State depends upon the requirements of the greatest public interest of the nation. If the enterprise, which the State itself decides to undertake actively as a result of this necessity, is in the hands of private entrepreneurs, its appropriation shall, each time, depend upon the enactment of a law, which will indicate the way in which the State shall indemnify the loss sustained by the private enterprise as a result of this appropriation. In the estimation of the loss the possibility of future earnings shall not be taken into consideration.

(e) The Party considers it a principle to have the laws, regulations, and methods in the administration of the State prepared and applied in conformity with the needs of the world and on the basis of the fundamentals and methods provided for modern civilization by Science and Technique.

As the conception of religion is a matter of conscience, the Party considers it to be one of the chief factors of the success of our nation in contemporary progress, to separate ideas of religion from politics, and from the affairs of the world and of the State.

(f) The Party does not consider itself bound by progressive and evolutionary principles in finding measures in the State administration. The Party holds it essential to remain faithful to the principles born of revolutions which our nation has made with great sacrifices, and to defend these principles which have since been elaborated.

APPENDIX

PART III ECONOMY

AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, MINES, FORESTS, COMMERCE AND PUBLIC WORKS

6.—Liquid capital is important in Economy. The only source of normal capital is national work and saving. Therefore, the essential principle of our Party is to increase work, and to instil the idea of saving in the individual, the family, and in general, in state, local, and national administrations.

7.—The problems of credit shall be looked after with the importance proportionate to the needs. The cheapness and ease of interest and discount in credit transactions is our main desire.

(a) The Party attaches great importance to the security of credit in the country. We are convinced that this can only be achieved by giving preference to real and strong guarantees. We are also convinced that this is the only means of limiting the desire to use credit in business to real businessmen.

(b) It is right to provide for the seasonal credit needs of small farmers by means of agricultural credit co-operatives, and the yearly credit needs of farm owners by means of mortgage credit.

(c) The methods of granting credit against crops, live stock, agricultural implements, and machinery shall be systematised.

(d) It shall be provided that the day of payment of farm credits be postponed until after such time when the crop can be sold to the best advantage, without pressure on the part of the buyers.

(e) The credit needs of miners, industrialists, handicraftsmen, small traders, fishers, and sponge fishers shall be provided for.

(f) The methods of providing credit for industrialists, and against machinery and implements for sea products shall be systematised.

(g) Our Party considers it an important principle to enable citizens to become home owners. It attaches great importance to widening the basis of real estate credit, which at present is narrow, and favours devoting for the moment that part of the resources of the Real Estate Bank reserved for new constructions to the building of dwellings. The Real Estate Bank

APPENDIX

cannot grant credit for new buildings to be constructed for the purpose of acquiring revenue. Credit can be granted against existing buildings on condition that the proceeds are not devoted to the construction of buildings for rent. In this way the use of the existing capital, for the purpose in question, is generalised. On the other hand, we consider necessary the establishment and existence of a Real Estate Credit Organisation on the model of *Crédit Foncier* as soon as possible.

8.—It is one of the principles of our Party to fight Usury.

9.—The problems of insurance shall receive our attention proportionate to their importance.

10.—Our Party considers the encouragement of co-operative undertakings as one of its main principles. We think it important to establish and increase the number of credit and sales co-operatives which will benefit the agricultural producers with the real value of their products. The Agricultural Bank of Turkey is the Mother Bank of agricultural co-operatives.

11.—It is our aim to render the Agricultural Bank more useful especially to the economy of the peasant and farmer, and to see that it is owned in such a way as to secure its control on a legal basis.

12.—It is our obligation to regulate our balance of payments, and to keep our foreign trade in balance.

Our principle in foreign trade and commercial agreements is to buy the products of those who buy our products.

13.—The small and the large industries shall enjoy protection in harmony with the interests of the producers of raw materials.

14.—Every economic enterprise shall harmonise with united national work as well as with the general interest. This harmony is also the principle in the union of work between the employer and worker.

With the Labour Law the mutual relations of workers and employers shall be regulated. Labour conflicts shall be dealt with by means of conciliation, and where this is impossible, through the arbitration of Reconciliation Agencies to be set up by the State. Strikes and lock-outs shall be prohibited.

We are interested in the life and rights of the nationalist Turkish workers within the framework of these principles. The Labour Laws to be promulgated shall conform to these principles.

15.—The industries which the State or individuals shall

APPENDIX

establish for the industrialisation of the country shall conform to a general programme. The items of the state programme shall follow one another in such a way as to render the country an industrial unit.

The industrial undertakings shall not be concentrated in certain parts of the country, but shall, instead, be spread all over the country, taking into consideration the economic factors.

In order to prevent conflict of interest between producers and consumers of industrial products, the State shall organise price control. Apart from this, financial and technical control shall be established for the state factories.

The financial control of establishments, the majority or totality of whose capital belongs to the State, shall be organised in such a way as to conform to their commercial character. We shall emphasise the rationalisation of work.

Trusts or Cartels which establish unity of price against the consumers shall not be allowed. Those undertaken for the purpose of rationalisation are excepted.

16.—All kinds of commercial activity are useful in the development of the country. The owners of capital who work normally and on a technical basis shall be encouraged and protected.

17.—We consider exportation one of the important national activities and the regulation of foreign trade one of our main economic duties. We shall render fruitful the activities of those engaged in commerce. We shall be closely interested in facilitating the sale of our national products and manufactured articles, in safeguarding their reputation, in insuring their export, and in measures to be taken for their standardisation. We desire to let our foreign trade function in accordance with an exportation policy which conforms to the necessities and requirements of different markets. We also want to strengthen our foreign trade with state aid. We shall have organisations which will furnish those engaged in the export trade with information they need to succeed in their work.

18.—We consider it a good policy to create, when necessary, free zones which will benefit the State in foreign trade transits.

19.—We shall always consider carefully the port, dock, quay, and loading and unloading tariffs which shall be made to conform to the requirements of national economy.

20.—We shall attach importance to fishing and sponge fishing. The development of the fishing industry, as well as the

APPENDIX

improvement of the present system of dealing in fish, which is against the benefit of both producers and consumers, is necessary.

21.—We shall encourage the canning industry.

22.—We consider the tourist trade (*tourisme*) a means of making Turkey known and liked abroad, and a means of benefiting Turkish economy.

23.—In our economic considerations we shall consider a general principle the rule of absolute usefulness and profitability from the economic point of view in all affairs of State relating to any ministry or authority. We consider it important to improve, in time, old laws and methods on this point.

Our Party, besides attaching this importance to economic matters, considers Economics one of the important branches of state affairs, each of which has a special importance for us.

24.—We shall endeavour to develop and regulate transportation by land, sea, and air. We consider it one of the economic needs of the country to bring about a harmony in the exploitation and tariffs of these three kinds of transportation so that they may benefit the country to their full extent.

We shall further the State Navigation Administration according to an extensive programme. In this connection, we attach importance to freight shipping.

25.—Extensive water schemes which will serve our economic purpose are our ideal. To complete our small water schemes is one of our first aims.

26.—Our public works shall follow a practical and productive programme in all its branches. Among these, we shall continue the railway construction work, which is a means of bringing prosperity and strength to the country.

We shall consider the necessity of beginning the construction of ports at convenient times.

Work shall continue on *Vilayet*¹ roads and on a practical programme to provide the country with bridges and a net of roads built with modern technique, and connecting the different parts of the country.

In building roads, economic considerations shall be given importance, and they shall be constructed perpendicular to the railway lines in order to feed them with traffic. Considerations

¹ Administrative division corresponding to a county or French Province.

APPENDIX

of national defence and security shall also be taken into account in their construction.

27.—We shall organise matters relating to the post, telegraph, telephone, and wireless in such a way as to render them technically perfect, and corresponding to the needs of the country. We shall constantly increase the telephone connections between the cities.

28.—The following matters shall be considered :

Not to let the price of wheat, which is first in quantity and value among our agricultural products, fall below its worth.

To widen and strengthen the measures to counteract the changes that may take place to the disadvantage of producers and consumers.

To this end, we shall continue the work of constructing grain elevators and warehouses, already begun. It is a duty to keep sufficient grain stocks to suffice in case of national defence or unexpected drought.

29.—We attach great importance to reducing our agricultural products and our fruits to types suitable for exportation, and to producing the quantity of raw materials needed for our home industry. To this end, we shall work intensively on the improvement of seeds, tree nurseries, and tree grafting.

30.—The advancement of the agricultural industry is one of our main tasks.

31.—In order to protect the work of producers we shall fight the diseases and enemies of plants and animals.

32.—To exploit and to render valuable our underground wealth, our water power, and our forests shall be a special part of our work. We consider the electrification of the whole country one of the main items in the progress of the Turkish Fatherland. We shall continue our researches in order to determine the real value and extent of our wealth in this category. It is our aim to found a financial establishment to take care of these enterprises. These undertakings are the main fields of application of the state socialist qualification of our Party.

33.—We shall endeavour to encourage, ameliorate, and increase the breeding and rearing of live stock, and to advance the live-stock industry.

34.—It is one of the principal aims of our Party to render each Turkish farmer owner of sufficient land. It is necessary to

APPENDIX

enact special laws of appropriation in order to distribute land to farmers owning no land.

35.—The geographic situation of our country and the standard of civilisation and the duty of our nation require that our citizens consider sea-mindedness important from the points of view of sport, health, defence and general economy. The Party believes in the necessity of considering this in all national and governmental affairs.

PART IV

FINANCE

36.—The principal idea of finance in our Party is a budget based on continued and real balance. We consider regular payments important for the Treasury, and a principle in the tax payments of the citizens.

37.—It is our aim to place the imposition of taxes on an indirect and net revenue basis. Our efforts shall continue, in the meantime, to better our fiscal laws with the view of rendering them practical and applicable without disregarding the capacity of the nation for payment.

38.—It is one of the matters which we consider important, to try to put our customs tariffs and formalities on a basis more in harmony with the economic interests of the nation.

39.—We consider suppression of smuggling a means of protecting the rights and authority of the Turkish Treasury.

40.—The State Monopolies constitute a source of revenue to the State Treasury, and serve the national economy by protecting the value of the products which enter their field of activity.

PART V

NATIONAL EDUCATION AND INSTRUCTION

41.—Our main principles for national education and instruction are as follows :

(a) The cornerstone of our cultural policy is the suppression of ignorance. In the field of public instruction a policy of teaching and training more children and citizens every day shall be followed.

APPENDIX

(b) The training of strongly republican, nationalist, populist, state socialist, and secular citizens must be fostered in every stage of education.

To respect, and make others respect the Turkish nation, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and the Turkish State must be taught as a duty to which everyone must be very sensitive.

(c) It is our great desire to attach importance to intellectual as well as physical development, and especially to elevate the character to the high level inspired by our great national history.

(d) The method followed in education and instruction is to render Learning an instrument in the hands of citizens for guaranteeing success in material life.

(e) Education must be high, national, patriotic, and far from all sorts of superstition and foreign ideas.

(f) We are convinced that it is important to treat the students in all institutions of education and instruction tactfully, in order not to hinder their capacity for enterprise. On the other hand, it is important to accustom them to serious discipline and order, and to a sincere conception of morals, in order to prevent their being faulty in life.

(g) Our Party lays an extraordinary importance upon the citizens' knowing our great history. This learning is the sacred essence that nourishes the indestructible resistance of the Turk against all currents that may prejudice the national existence, his capacity and power, and his sentiments of self-confidence.

(h) We shall continue our serious work in rendering the Turkish language a perfect and ordered national language.

42.—Our main ideas about the schools are the following :

(a) The normal primary education consists of five years. The number of primary schools in cities, villages, or groups of villages shall be increased according to a regular programme of application, and according to the needs. In the village schools ideas on hygiene, better living, agriculture and industry that have a bearing upon the region in question shall be taught.

(b) Village schools of three or four terms shall be opened to give the village children, in a short time, the essential learning required in practical life. A plan shall be made to establish such schools and to increase their number.

These schools shall be of a separate type from those which propose to prepare the children for higher education. It is necessary to begin the education in these village schools at a

APPENDIX

maturer age, to continue it without interruption, and to have it controlled by the State in the same manner as the military service duty.

(c) The professional and trade schools, as well as the night trade schools, shall be increased to cope with the needs of the country, and necessary new courses shall be instituted.

(d) We are convinced of the necessity of having secondary schools in the capitals of *Vilayets* and in the regions of *kazas*¹ wherever it is necessary, following the principle of spreading secondary education throughout the country. We shall endeavour to create organisations to provide boarding facilities which shall enable the children of the country to benefit from these schools in peace and security.

(e) We shall strengthen and complete our Lycées in every way, so that they may prepare students fully qualified for higher education.

(f) The University and our schools for higher education shall be brought to a state of perfection where they can give the results expected of them. We are thinking of increasing the number of Universities.

43.—Boarding facilities of a practical nature for the ordinary primary schools for the children of several thinly populated villages, as well as for the special type village schools, shall be established and protected.

44.—The fine arts, and especially music, shall be given an importance in accordance with the high expression of our Revolution.

45.—Importance shall be attached to collecting historical objects in order to enrich our Museums. For this purpose, we shall undertake excavations, classify the works of antiquity, and preserve them where they stand, if necessary.

46.—Matters in connection with books, publications and libraries are important for the Party. We want to establish and increase the number of libraries in cities and villages.

47.—Our Public Instruction policy shall be organised after a plan taking into consideration the present and future requirements of education. After this plan, all the degrees of education shall be reformed according to the needs of professions and trades.

¹ Administrative division (subdivision of Vilayet).

APPENDIX

48.—We consider it important to give the masses a continuous adult education, outside the classical school education, in harmony with the advancement of new Turkey. The State shall protect with all possible means the People's Houses ¹ which are working to this end.

49.—The Party shall found a Museum of the Revolution. We consider this an effective means of instilling the revolutionary culture in the people.

50.—The Turkish youth shall be organised in a national organisation so as to bring them together in clean ethics and a high love of Fatherland and Revolution. They shall be given a physical education that will foster their joy, health, and their belief in themselves and in the nation. The youth shall be brought up with the conviction of considering the defence of the Revolution and of the Fatherland with all its requisites of independence, the highest duty of youth. They shall be taught to be ready to sacrifice everything in order to fulfil this duty.

In order that this fundamental education shall attain its full results, high qualities requisite for success, such as thinking, making decisions and taking the initiative shall be developed in the Turkish youth. In the meantime, they shall be required to work under strict discipline, which is the sole means of accomplishing every difficult task.

The sports organisations in Turkey shall be established and furthered in accordance with these principles. The connection and co-operation of the ideals of the new youth organisation with the University, the Schools and Institutes, People's Houses, the factories and establishments employing a number of workers together, shall be organised.

Uniformity in physical and revolutionary education, as well as in matters relating to sports in the country, shall be considered.

It shall be made obligatory for everybody in schools, government institutions, in private establishments, and factories to take part in physical education according to their age. The sport fields and organisations necessary for physical education shall be established. In securing the sport fields, the municipalities and local administrations shall be led to take a special interest.

51.—The Party considers the radio to be one of the most

¹ People's Houses (Halkevleri) are the cultural centres of the Republican Party of the People.

APPENDIX

valuable instruments for the political and cultural education of the nation. We shall erect powerful broadcasting stations, and shall provide for the easy purchase of cheap receiving sets. We shall consider it our task to render the moving pictures in the country useful to the nation.

52.—The national opera and the national theatre are among our important tasks.

PART VI

SOCIAL LIFE AND PUBLIC HEALTH

53.—The conservation of the institution of family is essential in Turkish social life.

54.—The increase of our population and the bringing up of a strong and healthy future generation are among tasks which we must always take into important consideration.

55.—We shall work under a definite programme, and with scientific methods, to improve the hygienic conditions and drinking-water supplies of our cities, towns, and villages; to improve the housing conditions in our villages, and to increase the hygienic knowledge of our villagers.

56.—The Party is deeply interested in the life of children and in the health of their mothers. To this end, we shall continue to work according to the following main lines:

(a) To increase the number of maternity homes, to open maternity wards in state hospitals, to provide gratuitous maternity help, and to use every means of persuasion imparting advice in child care, as well as to increase the number of scientifically trained midwives and visiting nurses.

(b) To increase the number of baby homes, examination and consultation centres for babies, day nurseries and homes for orphans in cities and towns.

(c) To protect the working mothers and their children in the workmen's districts.

57.—The orphans, needy old people, and invalids are under the protection and tutelage of the nation.

58.—We shall endeavour to provide the social and hygienic needs of workers and their families. We shall especially continue to open day nurseries in workmen's districts for women who have to earn their living.

APPENDIX

59.—Matters relating to public hygiene have a special importance for our Party. Work in this connection shall be widened continuously and in proportion to general needs.

60.—We shall continue the fight against contagious diseases such as Malaria, Syphilis, and Trachoma.

PART VII

INTERIOR, JUDICIAL, AND FOREIGN POLICY, PUBLIC SERVANTS, PEOPLE ENGAGED IN FREE PROFESSIONS

61.—The basis of our work is to establish and provide for the functioning of a governmental authority. This authority must be unshakable before any event or influence, and shall protect all the results of the Revolution, the full security of the citizens, and national order and discipline, by means of its internal and judicial organisation and its laws.

62.—Among the tasks of applying our principle to increase our population, we shall provide all help and facility to Turks who may come from outside the country.

63.—We shall elaborate and complete the law on the organisation of the courts of justice, in a manner most suitable to the needs of the public and to the interests of the country.

We shall widen the scope of the simple, rapid and practical judicial procedure which offers security.

We shall take measures to guarantee rapidly and easily the desired results in matters relating to judicial execution and notification.

We shall endeavour to separate the prisoners from the people under arrest, and to turn the prisons into reformatories.

64.—Peace in the country and peace in the world is one of our main principles.

65.—The public servants who devote their life to their duty with all their attention and care, always considering the high interests of the nation, are worthy of all peace and prosperity.

66.—No association shall be founded in Turkey with the purpose of propagating ideas of class distinction, or of class conflict. Those who receive salary or pay for their services from the State, local administrations, municipalities, or establish-

APPENDIX

ments attached to the State, cannot use the identity of their position in order to found associations, in the quality and identity of the office they hold.

67.—Organisations carrying the name of Students' Associations can in no way engage in politics, nor can they in any way engage in activity against the administration of the School, Faculty or Institute to which they belong.

68.—We shall make a point of organising the Turkish workers and members of different trades within the main existence of the nation, and in such a way as to render them useful and invigorating to it, in accordance with the attitude outlined in the Party Programme.

69.—Associations with internationalist intentions shall not be founded, and it shall be forbidden to found associations with their centre outside the country. The decision of the Council of Ministers is necessary to found associations to create unity among nations that shall be deemed by the State to be of use, or to open branches of such associations already in existence.

70.—The services of people exercising free professions useful and necessary for the national Turkish existence are appreciated by the Party. It is our duty to keep their field of activity open and secure, in order that they may reap the benefits of their capacity and effort.

71.—We consider the village important from every point of view in the life of new Turkey. The health and happiness of the peasants, their understanding of the Revolution and of culture, and their force in the economic field, are to be considered important from the point of view of our available working forces.

PART VIII

DEFENCE OF THE FATHERLAND

72.—The defence of the Fatherland is the most sacred of national duties. All the living and inanimate resources of the country shall be used to this end in case of necessity. The Party has accepted the principle of applying obligatory military service equally to all citizens. The Turkish army is above all political considerations and influences. We consider it important that the army possess the power to fulfil successfully,

APPENDIX

at every moment, the high duty confided in it, and that it be equipped with means in conformity with modern advancement.

73.—We especially take care that the army of the Republic, which is the unshakable foundation of the high state organisation, and which protects and guards the national ideal, the national existence, and the Revolution, as well as its valuable members, be always honoured and respected.

INDEX

- Abdul Hamid II, 36
 Abyssinia, 195, 209
 Adana, 5, 89, 90, 91, 94, 110-11, 116, 117, 132-3, 176
 Adnan, Dr., 50
 Adrianople (Edirne), 43, 51, 180
 Afghanistan, 188-9, 197
 Agricultural Bank, 83, 88, 122, 123
 — Institute, 162
 Agriculture, 79-99, 131, 132 ;
 value of produce, 79 ; variety
 of produce, 79 ; research in,
 83, 86, 92, 98 ; mechanisa-
 tion, 87-8, 99
 Air Force, 208-9
 Albania, 31, 33, 36, 190, 193, 194,
 197
 Aleppo, 116
 Alexandretta. *See* Hatay
 All-Turkey Congress, 48
 Alphabet, reform of, 54-5, 165-6
 Anatolia, 3, 6, 47-9, 104, 114, 175,
 184
 Anatolian Defence Rights Associa-
 tion, 47, 48
 Anglo-Turkish Commodities, Ltd.,
 143
 — Pact, 197-204
 Ankara, 5, 49, 50, 51, 69, 70, 83,
 94, 97, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121,
 133, 138, 151, 161, 164, 171,
 174, 176, 177, 178, 214 ; cost
 of living in, 133 ; climate,
 84-5
 Antalya, 94, 121, 181
 Arabs, 36-7, 40-1, 49, 180-1
 Archæology, 7, 166-7, 170-1
 Architecture, 171
 Armenia, 6, 44, 45
 Armenians, 6-13, 100, 161, 183, 184
 Army, 43-4, 205-9
 Arts, 38-9, 169-75
 Assyrians, 8
 Austria, 28-31, 33-4, 36-7, 190,
 197
 Aviation League, 209
 Balkan Entente, 192-4, 195, 197,
 198-202
 — States, 18, 21, 22, 28-37, 42,
 142-4, 146, 180, 182, 189-202
 — Wars, 42-3, 180
 Banking, 35, 121-4. *See also* under
 separate Banks
 Berlin-Bagdad Railway, 37, 116,
 215
 Berlin, Congress of, 34
 Black Sea, 120, 184, 213, 220
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22, 31-36
 Brassert & Co., Ltd., 112, 143
 Britain, and Eastern Question, 26-
 37 ; trade with Turkey, 136-
 147 ; Treaty of Mutual Assist-
 ance with Turkey, 145-6,
 198 ; relations with Turkey,
 100, 180-6, 194-202
 Broadcasting, 174
 Budget, 61, 124-7, 217
 Bulgaria, 29, 31-4, 36, 43, 184,
 189-94, 197, 199-202
 Bursa, 99, 121
 Calendar, Gregorian, 153
 Caliphate, 19, 53-4, 149

INDEX

- Cape route to India, 24-5
- Capitulations, 27, 184
- Carpet industry, 104, 139, 173
- Catalagzi, 115, 144
- Catherine II, 27
- Cattle, 82, 85-6, 95-6, 99, 142
- Cement, 120
- Central Bank, 122-3, 137, 141
- Chanak, 51
- Chemical industry, 100, 111-12
- Cholera, 176
- Chromium, 114, 115
- Cilicia, 90-2, 94, 95
- Civil Aviation, 120
- Clearing agreements, 140-2, 143, 144, 145
- "Cleveland" cotton, 91
- Climate, 3, 4
- Clothing, 54, 150, 154-5, 157
- Coal, 105, 108, 113-14, 139
- Coffee, 92
- Committee of Union and Progress, 36, 41-2, 45
- Communist Party, 104
- Conscription, 207-9
- Constitution, 58-75, 223-4
- Co-operative associations, 83-4, 88, 128
- Copper, 105, 114, 139
- Cost of living, 133-4
- Cotton, 79, 90-2, 98, 105, 106, 108, 109, 139
- Council of State, 73
- Court of Appeals, 73
- Crimean War, 30, 213
- Cubuk Barrage, 83
- Czechoslovakia, 189-90, 197
- Dardanelles, 42, 43-4, 182, 184, 195-6, 212-13, 218
- Deniz Bank, 119, 124
- Disraeli, 32-4
- Divrigi, 108, 114, 210, 215
- Diyarbakir, 117, 120, 215
- Dodecanese Islands, 191, 200, 214, 216-17
- Drama, 174
- Druses, 30, 41
- Edib Halide, 50
- Edirne, 116, 180. *See also* Adrianople
- Education, 66-7, 159-69; agricultural, 83, 86, 96-8; secularisation of, 149, 159-60; elementary, 160, 161, 164; private, 160, 161, 164; Junior High Schools, 160, 161, 164; lycées, 160, 161, 164; professional schools, 160-1, 162, 164; universities, 161, 164; specialist schools, 161; equality of opportunity in, 162-3; compulsory, 163
- Elections, 58, 64-5
- Enver Pasha, 42, 44, 47, 52
- Ercgli, 90, 109
- Ergani, 117
- Ertoghul, 21
- Erzurum, 47, 48, 84, 117, 118, 120, 214, 215, 219
- Eskishchir, 116, 210, 215
- Eti Bank, 113-15, 122, 124
- Export Credits Guarantee Department, 142-3
- Exports, 92, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 136-47
- Exchange of population, 13-16, 185, 191
- Fethiye Société, 115
- Fez, abolition of, 2, 54, 150
- Financial Structure, 112-13; local taxes, 63
- Foreign policy, 180-204
- Forest Defence Corps, 89

INDEX

- Forests, 80, 88-90
 France, 26, 100; trade with Turkey, 136-47; Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Turkey, 145; relations with Turkey, 180-6, 194-202
 Fruit, 93-5, 136, 138
 Gallipoli. *See* Dardanelles
 Gazi Institute of Education, 161, 168
 General Monopoly Administration, 127
 Germany, 45, 194-202; financial penetration of Turkey, 34-7, 42; trade with Turkey, 142-5
 Gladstone, 29, 32
 Glass, 111
 Grain, 85-8, 98, 139
 Grapes, 93-4
 Greece, 21, 28, 43, 184, 189-94, 197, 199
 Greeks, 28, 46-51, 100, 161, 178; influence on Turks, 7-9, 10
 Gulemen, 155
 Gutu, 8
 Halkevleri. *See* People's Houses
 Hatay, 12, 14, 92, 94, 157, 185, 196, 209
 Health services, 109-10, 130, 175-9
 Hemp, 95
 High Court, 73
 History, study of, 161, 166-7
 Hittites, 6, 166
 Hospitals. *See* Health services
 Hungary, 22, 26, 52, 189-90
 İçel, 132-3
 Igdir, 120
 Immigration, 13-16, 178
 Imports, 136-47, 210
 Imrali, 152
 Industry, 100-134; law for the assistance of, 101, 102, 104, 128; development to 1933, 101-4; value of product, 103; five-year plan, 104-13, 128, 138; consumption goods industries, 105, 111, 120; basic industry, 105, 106, 111-112, 120; siting of factories, 108; four-year plan, 120-1, 128
 Industry and Mining Bank, 103
 Inonu, battle of, 50
 Inonu, Ismet, 101; as general, 50; as statesman, 57, 60, 150, 184
 Inspectors-General, 68
 Iran, 188-89, 197, 211, 215
 Iraq, 184, 188-9, 197, 211, 215
 Iron, 105, 106, 108, 112, 114
 Irrigation, 83, 91-2
 Ish Bank, 113, 123, 124
 Istanbul, 1, 82, 103, 106, 111, 112, 116, 118, 120, 122, 126, 132-3, 161, 164, 173-4, 178, 208
 Italy, 36, 42, 146, 181-2, 190-204
 Izmir (Smyrna), 5, 47, 50, 92, 93, 120, 126, 132-3, 173, 181, 217
 Izmit, 112, 209
 Janissaries, 18, 23-4, 28
 Jazz, 174-5
 Judicial system, 73-4
 Kamutay. *See* National Assembly
 Karabuk, 87, 108, 112, 118, 120, 143, 210, 211, 214
 Karlovitz, peace of, 26
 Kars, 96, 219
 Kayseri, 70, 84, 90, 96, 108, 109-110, 116, 117, 210, 214
 Kaza. *See* Provinces
 Keciborlu, 111

INDEX

- Kemal Atatürk, 38-57, 59-60, 76-77 ; significance of, 38 ; early years, 39-40 ; imprisonment, 40 ; service in Damascus, 40-1 ; work with Committee of Union and Progress, 41-2 ; in Tripoli, 42-3 ; military attaché at Sofia, 43 ; at Gallipoli, 43-4 ; in Armenia, 44 ; on a military mission to Germany, 45 ; in Syria, 45 ; democratic faith, 45-6, 223 ; lands at Samsun, 47 ; in War of Independence, 46-51 ; foundation of Nationalist party, 48-9 ; made Commander-in-Chief, 51 ; aims as ruler, 52-3 ; political tactics, 53-5 ; marriage and divorce, 55 ; as leader of his people, 55-7 ; creates an opposition, 63 ; formation of the People's Party, 71-3 ; appeal to peasants, 82, 83 ; and Ish Bank, 113 ; and religious reforms, 149 ; declares political amnesty, 152 ; views on sex equality, 155 ; and alphabet, 166 ; and the arts, 170, 172, 174
- Kocaeli, 133
- Kombinats, 87-8, 99
- Konya, 4, 116, 170
- Koran, 150
- Kreuger, Ivan, 138
- Kurds, 8, 12, 50, 95, 149, 153, 184, 189
- Kutahaya, 121
- Kutchuk Kainardji, Treaty of, 27
- Labour code, 130-4, 178
- Land-owners, 72, 80-2
- Land tenure, 80-3, 85, 86, 90, 95 ; in Ottoman Empire, 20-1
- utilisation, 79-80
- Language, study of, 166-7
- Languages in Turkey, 11, 159
- Lausanne, Treaty of, 12, 101, 119, 135-7, 184-5, 189, 195
- Law, Faculty of (Ankara), 151, 164
- Lazes, 7, 11, 14
- League of Nations, 193, 194, 195, 196, 230
- Legal reform, 151-3
- Lepanto, battle of, 24
- Literature, 173
- Little Entente, 190, 193
- Lloyd George, 46, 181, 212
- Local government, 65-8
- Macedonia, 36, 41-2
- Malaria, 175-6
- Malatya, 90, 108, 117, 119
- Manzikert, battle of, 9
- Marmora, Sea of, 5, 49, 92
- Maronites, 30
- Medicine, Faculty of, 162, 165
- Mehemet Ali, 29
- Mersin, 90
- Mesopotamia, 95
- Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Co., Ltd., 115, 144
- Minerals, 35 ; development under republic, 113-15
- Ministers, 59, 62
- Ministry of Agriculture, 162
- of Education, 160-1
- of Finance, 122, 127
- of Interior, 66, 68
- of Health, 162, 175, 176, 177
- of Justice, 162
- of National Defence, 162, 210
- of National Economy, 119, 122, 124

INDEX

- Ministry of Public Works, 162
 — of Transport, 215
 Minorities, 10, 11-13, 159; Turkish minorities abroad, 13-16, 191
 Mohacs, 22
 Mohair, 86, 139
 Mohammedanism. *See* Religion.
 Monopolies, 126-7, 129
 Montenegro, 30, 43
 Montreux, Conference of, 196, 213
 Moscow, Treaty of, 186, 188
 Mosul, 115, 184; dispute, 187, 189; railway communication with, 117
 Mudros, Armistice of, 45
 Municipalities Bank, 123
 Music, 174-5
 Mustapha Kemal. *See* Kemal Ataturk

 Nahiye. *See* Provinces
 National Assembly, 59, 60-5, 73, 128, 151, 156, 224; opposition in, 63-4; elections to, 64-5
 National Pact, 49
 Navy, 209
 Nazilli, 109
 Negroes, 6
 Newspapers, 57, 74-5
 Nicholas I, 29
 Nomads, 82, 95-6

 Oil, 115, 128
 Olives, 95, 96
 Opium, 95, 177
 Osman, 21
 Ottoman Bank, 35, 100-1, 122, 128, 137, 140, 141
 — Debt, 31, 34-6, 135, 137, 138, 140-1, 184, 185
 Ottoman Debt Commission, 35, 39, 101, 135
 — Empire, 2-3, 5, 10, 135, 205, 221; administration in sixteenth century, 17-23; causes of decline, 23-5; course of decline, 25-36, 40-2; penetration by foreign capital, 31-6, 135; end of the empire, 36-7, 53-5, 57; proposed partition of, 46; economic development, 100-101; position of army, 205-6

 Painting, 171-3
 Pan-Islamism, 52, 185-6
 Pan-Slavism, 31
 Pan-Turanianism, 52, 185-6
 Paper, 111
 Paris, Treaty of, 187
 Pasabagce, 111
 Peasantry, 108, 110, 205, 222; numbers, 79; lack of land, 80-2
 People's Houses, 70, 131, 169, 171
 Peter the Great, 26
 Physical training, 167-8
 Political Sciences, School of, 161, 162, 165
 Polygamy, 153-4, 156, 157-8
 Population, size and distribution, 4-5; origin, 6-16
 President of the Republic, 58-60, 70, 73, 210
 Prime Minister, 59-62, 65
 Printing trade, 55
 Prisons, 152-3
 Private enterprise in industry, 110-11, 128-9, 130
 Provinces, 65-8; division of, 66
 Prussia, 29, 31, 32, 34
 Public utilities, 35, 100, 121, 126, 128

INDEX

- Race, Turkish, 7-11
 Religion, 9, 53-4, 148-51; place
 in Ottoman Empire, 18-19,
 27, 36, 39
 Republican People's Party, 47, 49,
 53, 56, 59, 62-3, 64-5, 68,
 69-73, 75-8, 97, 113, 130,
 131, 170
 Rumania, 27, 33-4, 189-94, 198-9,
 202, 212, 213
 Russia, 26-31. *See also* U.S.S.R.

 Saadabad, Pact of, 197
 St. Jean de Maurienne, Confer-
 ence of, 181
 Saint Sophia, 170
 Salonica, 39-42
 Samsun, 47, 49, 112, 117, 118
 San Stefano, Treaty of, 33
 Sculpture, 172
 Scutari, Convention of, 30
 Serbia, 21, 30-1, 33-5, 43
 Serikamus, 214
 Sèvres, Treaty of, 51, 182-3
 Sheep, 86, 95-6, 98-9
 Siirt, 115, 211
 Sinan, 170
 Sivas, 48, 112, 117, 118, 120, 214
 Smallpox, 176
 Sobieski, John, 25
 Soil, 3
 Spahis of the Porte, 17-18, 25
 State in industry, extent of inter-
 vention, 73, 104-5, 124, 127-9
 State Institute of Mining and Re-
 search, 114, 116
 Sugar, 96, 98, 103, 113, 120, 121
 Suleiman the Magnificent (Sultan
 1520-66), 2, 18, 22-3
 Sulphur, 104, 111
 Sultanate, abolition of, 53
 Sumer Bank, 106-8, 112-13,
 122-4, 143

 Swan, Hunter and Wigham
 Richardson, 144
 Swedish Match Loan, 138
 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 181
 Syria, 215

 Takas, Ltd., 146
 Taxation, 101, 122, 125, 134
 Tea, 92, 95, 98
 Teheran, 117
 Textile industry, 102, 105-6, 109-
 111, 112
 Thrace, 51, 220
 Timariots, 18
 Timber, 105
 Tobacco, 92, 93, 95, 136, 139, 145
 Tobruk, 217
 Touz Gol, 3
 Trabzon, 95-6, 99, 118, 120-1, 219
 Trachome, 176
 Trade Unions, 130-4, 230
 Transport, 96, 116-20, 128; rail-
 ways, 35, 116-18, 120, 214-
 215; roads, 118-19; ship-
 ping, 119, 121
 Transylvania, 26
 Tripoli, 180
 Tuberculosis, 176
 Turkofis, 138-9

 Ulukisla, 117
 United Kingdom Commercial
 Corporation, Ltd., 144
 Universities. *See* Education
 U.S.A., 140, 146, 147
 U.S.S.R., 50, 104-5, 106, 124,
 138, 143, 179, 180, 186-8,
 196, 199-200, 202-4, 209,
 212-20; Turkish-speaking
 peoples in U.S.S.R., 15-16

 Vali. *See* Provinces
 Van, Lake, 4, 117

INDEX

- Venereal disease, 176
- Vilayets. *See* Provinces
- Village councils, 66, 76
- von Sanders, 43-4
- Wages, 102-3, 110, 131-4
- Wool, 98
- Working class, 72, 81, 102, 104,
106-7, 109-10, 130-4
- Workmen's compensation, 130,
178
- Women, position of, 55, 58, 153-8;
in industry, 104, 134, 156-7
- Young Turks, 36-7, 41-2, 43, 151,
155
- Youth organisations, 69, 168
- Yugoslavia, 189-94, 197, 198, 201
- Zapolya, 22
- Zonguldak, 112, 113, 115, 120,
140, 142

